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Summary 
 
Accidents and threats have always been present in society, but the increasing 
complexity and interconnectedness within society, including the public sector, 
contribute to the emergence of new types of risk and more complex 
causalities. The ability to understand the emergence of risk, and to manage 
and control risk is a prerequisite for individuals, organizations, and society to 
survive and operate safely. Over the past years the role of the state, as a 
regulator and risk manager, has increased. The management and control of 
risk within the state takes place at many system levels, ranging from policy 
level to street level bureaucrats by means of laws, rules, and instructions. 
Each level can influence the others in an integrated and tightly coupled 
control system. These levels constitute subsystems within the state and offer 
different organizational interfaces or points of contacts between the 
organizational subsystem and its members. Managing risk and preventing 
accidents in the public sector therefore depend on activities and interfaces 
among actors at different system levels.  
 
This thesis draws attention to multilevel risk management processes in two 
public sectors: public healthcare and municipalities (local government). The 
risk management processes covered are those ensuring patient safety in the 
specialized healthcare sector and municipal emergency management in the 
municipal sector. The thesis explores and analyzes how the society establishes 
regimes to regulate and manage risk within the public sector, by applying the 
socio-technical system perspective as a framework. This approach allows the 
shifting of levels of analysis within the socio-technical system involved in 
public risk management and gives rise to issues like regulatory regimes; tools 
and strategies applied in controlling and managing risk; understanding the 
emergence of and adaptation to, risks; information flow and learning 
processes among system levels; and characteristics of organizational 
interfaces among different agencies and institutions of national, regional, and 
local character of importance for public risk management processes.  
 
The main focus of the thesis is the organizational interfaces involved in risk 
management processes in the public sector. The overall research problem is: 
How can organizational interfaces across system levels explain risk 
management processes in the public sector? Several theoretical contributions 
in risk, regulation, and organizational studies are applied to explore and 
interpret these organizational interfaces. A qualitative research strategy was 
chosen to provide insight into organizational matters, risk management 
processes, and discourses within different risk regulation regimes. A multiple 
embedded case study was conducted and the cases were selected according to 
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a most dissimilar approach, in order to emphasize the contrasts among them. 
The cases covering specialized healthcare and municipal emergency 
management were chosen due to their variance in risk profiles, complexity, 
and size involving different risk regulation regimes.  
 
In four research articles, the thesis documents that organizational interfaces 
across system levels can explain risk management processes in the public 
sector. Two articles describe organizational interfaces across the entire socio-
technical system; how risk amplification and attenuation and learning function 
in the interfaces; and how regulatory enforcement influences risk management 
processes. Two articles investigate how the organizational interface between 
regulators and regulatees affects public risk management; how different 
enforcement strategies promote or counteract learning processes; and how a 
system or an individual focus in enforcement activities makes different 
contributions to risk management processes. 
 
Results in Article I documented that different system levels in Norwegian 
healthcare depend on each other in the process of error prevention. The 
contextual descriptions of the entire healthcare risk management system 
revealed that learning from errors is sporadic, individual and occurs separately 
within the single system levels, with limited information and knowledge 
exchange among system levels. The healthcare system’s ability to prevent and 
learn from errors was negatively affected by reforms initiated at the 
governmental level. Structural reforms concerning hospital financing and 
institutional management altered important framework conditions at all 
system levels. The reforms resulted in a compound pressure between 
efficiency and safety at hospital, management, staff, and work operation 
levels. The effects were time pressure, stress, increased workload, and 
understaffing, all of which had a negative impact on the learning conditions 
within and across system levels. Results also show that the regulator-regulatee 
interface has limited impact on the ability to learn from errors in the 
healthcare system.  
 
Article II documented how risk regulation strategies in municipal emergency 
management contributed to information exchange and learning within the 
regulated municipalities. Results demonstrated that activities categorized as 
compliance enforcement strategies contributed to second-order learning 
processes and defined regulation as a learning process. Activities within 
deterrence enforcement strategies were categorized as short-term adjustments 
and not defined as a learning process. Learning barriers such as time pressure, 
competing demands, and financial circumstances were identified in the 
regulator-regulatee interface, complicating the improvement of risk 
management processes.  
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Article III demonstrated that the regulatory activities within specialized 
healthcare that were rooted in a system perspective promote openness and 
dialogue affecting patient safety more positively than activities that were 
rooted in an individual perspective. The individual perspective contributes to 
underreporting, fear of sanctions, hampering openness, discussion, and 
information exchange. From a risk management perspective, the approaches 
within the regulator-regulatee interface need improvement if they are to move 
systematic regulatory activities towards a system perspective, and to 
emphasize incidental and advisory activities more strongly. 
 
Article IV revealed differences in the degree of heterogeneous versus 
homogenous risk perception across system levels between specialized 
healthcare and municipal emergency management. Findings showed that risk 
perception differs among employees and officials within various system levels 
of the two risk regulation regimes. Risks are amplified and attenuated 
throughout the socio-technical system through risk management processes 
depending on interaction among humans, organizations, and regulators; 
external pressure from public and organized interests; technological changes, 
and financial circumstances causing compound pressure between safety and 
efficiency. The social amplification and attenuation of risks were more 
prominent in the specialized healthcare regime, counteracting a common 
conceptualization of risk throughout the regime.  
 
To conclude, the study of two most dissimilar cases has demonstrated that 
contrasts between structures (e.g. legal framework, institutional design, 
framework conditions, roles, and responsibilities) and processes (e.g. 
interaction among subsystems, regulatory practice, information flow, 
conflicting objectives) provided new insight into how organizational 
interfaces add explanatory power to the success or failure of risk management 
processes, with potential relevance beyond municipal emergency management 
and specialized healthcare. Socio-technical systems involving a 
comprehensive legal framework, defined roles and responsibilities; complex 
institutional design; and tightly coupled interaction processes among diverse 
occupational groups create multiple subsystems and organizational interfaces 
in which risk management processes are highly dependent on common 
conceptualization of risk, sufficient communication mechanisms, and 
continuous information flow across the organizational interfaces to succeed. 
Socio-technical systems involving less structural complexity; fewer legally 
predefined roles and responsibilities; and more loosely coupled interaction 
processes create fewer interfaces between subsystems and their members, 
implying better conditions for communication processes, information flow, 
and oversight. This leaves the organizational interfaces less prone to 
contribute to complicate the risk management processes. This thesis found 
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that a multilevel understanding of organizational interfaces requires an 
integration of a broad theoretical perspective in order to interpret their 
implications at different system levels, ranging from the governmental level in 
the blunt end to street level bureaucrats in the sharp end. Thus, the research 
results create a foundation for further theoretical and empirical development, 
and suggest focal areas in order to develop an understanding of public risk 
management as a multilevel process.  
   
Part I 
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1 Introduction 
 
This thesis is about risk management in the public sector. To set the agenda, a 
brief introduction to the historical development of risk research is provided 
along with the parallel development of risk regulation research. 
Characteristics of the public sector and risk management processes therein, 
form the background of the research purpose and problem of the thesis.  
  
1.1 Background 
Risk has always been an inherent feature of human existence, and the field of 
risk research started when people started reflecting on the possibility of their 
own death and contemplating actions to avoid dangerous situations (Aven, 
2003; OECD, 2003a,b; Renn, 1998; Rosa, 1998). However, the systematic 
scientific attempts to study risks in society, is more recent (Renn, 1998; Hale 
& Hovden, 1998). Risk research has been influenced by a range of theoretical 
perspectives and methodological approaches (Tayler-Gooby & Zinn, 2006). 
Multiple academic disciplines such as technology, economy, psychology, 
sociology, and anthropology have contributed to the evolution of risk research 
and provided new knowledge on improving the management of risk. Yet, no 
common definition of risk exists, neither in the sciences nor in the public. 
Nevertheless, Renn (1992; 1998) argues that all risk concepts have one aspect 
in common: the distinction between reality and possibility. If the future were 
either predetermined or independent of present human activities, the concept 
of risk would make no sense (Renn, 1992; 1998).  
 
Early models of risk management were linear and static. Hazards were 
depicted as escaping energy or substances that could be managed by the 
design of barriers. However, the models turned out to be insufficient due to 
the dynamic nature of risk management, which still remains a major challenge 
for risk research. Systems are dynamic and include several feedback and 
adaptation loops, as revealed when risk research started incorporating human 
and organizational aspects (Hale, 2006; Hale & Hovden, 1998). Risk issues 
are now understood as complex social issues, in which a variety of 
stakeholders have divergent – though equally legitimate – points of view. 
How these diverse views are considered and integrated into policy making, 
how risk and decisions are communicated, and how the media and society at 
large receive and apply information have been integrated into risk 
management (OECD, 2003b). Today many risk researchers direct focus to 
contextual aspects and changes imposed on the actors at different societal 
levels and even beyond national borders in a globalized world. During the 
past ten years, the concept of risk governance has emerged, referring to the 
actions, processes, laws, traditions, and institutions by which decisions about 
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risk are prepared, taken, and implemented. The adoption of the governance 
concept in risk research is a response to complexity and changes. It meets the 
need for a more systemic integrative understanding of technological and 
social aspects of risk, risk perception, and regulation regimes, and it tries to 
cope with the interplay among economic, political, scientific and civil society 
actors involved in governance processes (Renn, 2005; 2007; Renn & Klinke, 
2004). 
 
In parallel with the development of risk research, the field of risk regulation 
and the nature of the philosophy of regulation have changed as an aspect of 
New Public Management reforms (Hale, 2006; Loefstedt, 2004; Gunningham, 
1999; Reason, 1997; Hovden, 1998). The last thirty years have preached self-
regulation (e.g. Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), 
reduction of government intervention, and directed the responsibility to the 
risk creator in order to establish sufficient risk management systems to be 
inspected according to a goal-based regulation, replacing the prior detailed 
rule-based regulation (Hood & Jones, 1996; Kirwan et al., 2002; Hale, 2006). 
However, not everyone has been a proponent of self-regulation regimes, such 
as small and middle-sized enterprises in industrial sector and small 
municipalities in the public sector (Lindøe & Hansen, 2000). They have 
pleaded for clear rules as a way to lighten the burden of risk management. The 
shift from rule- to goal-based regulation also constitutes a challenge to 
regulators and inspectors. They need tools and strategies that enable them to 
assess whether or not companies and sectors or interacting actors in complex 
systems can be trusted to be self-regulating (Hale, 2006; Reason, 1997; 
Svedung & Rasmussen, 1998). Along with a shift in regulation philosophy, 
aspects such as out-sourcing, cost-cutting, the break up of monopoly 
companies have challenged the ability of anyone to grasp the big picture 
(Hale, 2006). 
 
1.2  New Public Management (NPM) 
Worldwide, the public sector has undergone tremendous changes over the past 
twenty years. New Public Management (NPM) forms the backdrop of these 
change processes (Osborne & McLaughlin, 2002; Power, 1999; Hood, 1991). 
NPM was based upon a sharp critique of bureaucracy as the organizing 
principle within the public sector (Osborne & McLaughlin, 2002), and on the 
concern with the ability of the public sector to provide the economical, 
efficient, and effective provision of public services (Huges, 2003). NPM 
comprises a variety of overlapping elements and a cluster of ideas borrowed 
from the conceptual framework of private sector administrative practice 
(Power, 1999). Even though there has been some discussion over the precise 
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nature of NPM (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Flynn, 2002), the main aspects of 
NPM involve (Hood, 1991; Osborne & McLaughlin 2002): 
 
• A focus on hands-on and entrepreneurial management, as opposed to 
the traditional bureaucratic focus of the public administrator 
• Explicit standards and measures of performance 
• An emphasis on output controls 
• The importance of the disaggregation and decentralization of public 
services  
• Greater competition in the public sector 
• A stress on private styles of management and their superiority  
• The provision of discipline and cost cutting in resource allocation. 
 
An important theme within NPM has been a macro level change to the form 
and functioning of public agencies. There have been shifts in organizational 
form; deregulation; privatisation; and downsizing. NPM has also caused 
changes in how the public bureaucracy is controlled, implying the creation of 
new regulatory and audit based organizations, with the intention of shaping 
the behavior of public sector professionals to ensure a uniform and high level 
of service quality (Ferlie, 2007; McLaughlin et al., 2002; Hood et al., 1999b).  
 
1.3 The compatibility between NPM and risk management 
The literature on complex organizations and accidents mainly consists of two 
schools of thought. One has an optimistic view of safety and is called High 
Reliability Theory (e.g. La Porte & Consolini, 1991, Weick et al., 1999; 
Roberts et al., 2005). It argues that safe operations are possible even in 
extremely hazardous technologies and organizations characterized by 
complexity, system dependencies, and tightly coupled interactions. The 
second school is the more pessimistic Normal Accident Theory (e.g. Perrow, 
1984; Clarke, 1999), which argues that serious accidents in complex high 
technology systems are inevitable (Sagan, 1993). Hood and Jackson (1992) 
have related aspects of NPM to the Normal Accident Theory and worry that 
“NPM could be a disaster waiting to happen” (Hood & Jackson, 1992: 122). 
They argue that NPM increases the government’s capacity to produce 
accidents for several reasons: growing urban density and population causes 
difficulties in effectively regulating hazardous processes; new technology of 
administration contributes to build interactive complexity and tight coupling 
into the public sector; the potential for misinformation within government has 
increased as a consequence of NPM due to its lack of a system view of the 
organization. Reasons for this increase in the government’s capacity to 
produce accidents come from contextual changes and technological 
development. However, it has been demonstrated that NPM adds to these 
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factors some of the organizational ingredients for the production of accidents 
(Hood & Jackson, 1992). NPM’s features of privatization, deregulation, and 
cost cutting seem particularly influential in counteracting safety and 
robustness, and cause a need to cope with the pressures to be faster, better and 
cheaper, potentially implying a compound pressure between efficiency and 
safety (Hood, 1991; Hood & Jackson, 1992; Reason, 1997; Rasmussen, 1997; 
Woods & Cook, 2004; Woods, 2006; Flin, 2006). In order for public sector 
organizations to maintain the capacity of robustness, detect risk signals, and 
learn from undesired events there is a need for a relatively high degree of 
slack (Hood, 1991; Marcus & Nichols, 1999; Cook & Rasmussen, 2005; 
Pettersen & Aase, 2007); a control framework focusing on input or process 
rather than on output; a personnel management structure that promotes 
cohesion without punishing unorthodox ideas; a task division structure that is 
organized for systemic thinking rather than on narrow compartmentalization; 
a responsibility structure that allow mistakes; and relatively loose couplings 
and emphasis on information as a collective asset within the organization 
(Hood, 1991; Allsop & Mulcahy, 1996; Walshe, 2003; Leape, 2005; Morath 
& Turnbull, 2005). In sum, the underlying values of NPM that put economy 
and production at center stage, may limit the capacity for public organizations 
to manage disruptions and variability, and thus operating safely (Hood, 1991; 
Woods, 2006; Flin; 2006)   
 
1.4 Risk management in the public sector 
Accidents and threats have always been present in society, but the increasing 
complexity and interconnectedness within society, including the public sector, 
contribute to the development of new types of risk and more complex 
causalities (e.g. Beck, 1997; West, 2000; OECD, 2003a, b; Aven et al., 2004; 
Wiig & Aase, 2007). The ability to understand the emergence of risk, and to 
manage and control risk is a prerequisite for individuals, organizations, and 
society to survive and operate safely (Aven et al., 2004, Institute of Medicine 
2000; 2001). Over the past years the role of the state, as a regulator and risk 
manager, has increased (Majone, 1994; Hood et al., 1999a; 2001). There has 
been a major growth in academic discussions on the phenomenon of risk and 
regulation. Regulation of risk is not an attempt to eliminate risk; it is an 
attempt to manage risk (Hutter, 2001a). In this thesis risk management is 
defined in a broad sense as a process involving a range of activities for coping 
with risk, including how risk is identified and assessed, and how social 
interventions to deal with risk are monitored and evaluated (Hood & Jones, 
1996). The management and control of risk within the state takes place at 
many system levels, ranging from policy level to street level bureaucrats by 
means of laws, rules, and instructions. Each system level can influence the 
others in an integrated and tightly coupled control system (Hovden & 
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Larsson, 1987; Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson; 2004). These system levels 
constitute subsystems within the state that offer different organizational 
interfaces or points of contacts between the organizational subsystem and its 
members (Büssing et al., 2000). Managing risk and preventing accidents 
within the public sector therefore depend on activities and interfaces among 
actors at different system levels (Hovden & Larsson, 1987; Rasmussen, 1997; 
Büssing et al., 2000; Leveson; 2004).  
 
Most of the previous research on managing risk or breakdown in risk 
management has explored industrial settings and private business such as the 
Challenger Launch Decision (Vaughan, 1996), and the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
(Clarke, 1999). However, research covering the analogue processes of risk 
management and regulation within the public sector have been left rather 
unexplored (Hood et al., 1999b). This thesis draws attention to multilevel risk 
management processes in two public sectors: public healthcare and 
municipalities (local government sector). The risk management processes 
covered are those ensuring patient safety in the specialized healthcare sector 
and municipal emergency management in the municipal sector.  
 
The thesis includes a multilevel exploration and analysis of how society 
establishes regimes to regulate and manage risk in the public sector (Hood et 
al., 1999b), by applying the socio-technical system perspective as a 
framework (Rasmussen, 1997; 2000). This approach includes the possibility 
of shifting levels of analysis within the socio-technical system involved in 
public risk management and gives rise to issues like regulatory regimes; tools 
and strategies applied in controlling and managing risk; understanding the 
emergence of and adaptation to, risks; information flow and learning 
processes among system levels of the socio-technical system; and 
characteristics of organizational interfaces among agencies and of national, 
regional, and local institutions that are important for public risk management 
processes (Baldwin & Cave, 1997; Rasmussen, 1997; 2000).  
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1.5 The research purpose  
This thesis focuses on organizational interfaces in risk management processes 
in the public sector. The overall purpose of the study is to add to the 
knowledge of risk management processes in the public sector. More 
specifically, the following objectives have directed the research: 
 
I. To improve knowledge of vital organizational interfaces in the 
socio-technical system involved in public risk management 
processes. 
II. To improve knowledge about regulatory enforcement in public 
risk management processes. 
III. To explore risk perception in different public risk regulation 
regimes.  
IV. To explore information flow and learning processes among 
different system levels in public risk management processes. 
 
1.6 The research problem  
The overall research problem of the thesis is: 
 
How can organizational interfaces across system levels explain risk 
management processes in the public sector? 
 
The formulation of the research problem comes as a consequence of the 
perspective on risk management as a process involving a range of activities 
involving actors within different system levels of the public sector (Hood & 
Jones, 1996). There is a need to enhance the knowledge of the socio-technical 
system involved in risk management, in particular to understand the 
organizational interfaces among the system levels and their contribution to 
risk management processes in the public sector (Büssing et al., 2000; 
Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson et al., 2005). 
 
I refer to the organizational interface concept as a point of contact among 
organizational subsystems and their members (Büssing et al., 2000) The use 
of the organizational interface concept among system levels is two-
dimensional, referring both to a structural aspect in forms of the decomposed 
levels of the socio-technical system, and a process aspect in forms of the 
interaction across these levels (Rasmussen, 1997). The structural aspect is 
related to institutional design, administrative structures, and the legal 
framework defining responsibilities, and roles for different institutions at 
different hierarchical levels of the public sector. The process aspect is related 
to the interaction among the system levels in the public sector due to feedback 
mechanisms, formal and informal processes, communication, and activities 
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stated in the legal framework, or conflicts caused by diverging purposes, 
roles, tasks, and expectations among system levels.  
 
1.7 Thesis limitations  
In directing and narrowing the research process, the thesis makes the 
following limitations:  
 
• There is a vast literature on the socio-technical system perspective 
(e.g. Geels, 2004; 2005; van Eijnatten, 1993; Ketchum & Trist, 1992), 
however this thesis is limited to the application of the socio-technical 
system perspective to risk management processes, as it is approached 
by Rasmussen (1997; 2000), Rasmussen & Svedung (2000), Svedung 
& Rasmussen, (2002), and further developed by Leveson, (2004) and 
Leveson et al., (2005; 2006). 
 
• The exploration of public risk management processes could have 
emphasized topics such as power, trust, and regulatory standards 
setting. It could also have applied alternative theoretical perspectives 
implying other methodological approaches to the field, without 
emphasizing a multilevel approach, by exploring public risk 
management processes within single system levels in more detail. 
However, this thesis is an empirical exploration of public risk 
management in a multilevel perspective, one that is almost absent in 
current research. There is a need to provide new insight, 
understanding, and improvement of the risk management processes, 
as they appear in real context in the public sector.  
 
• Further thesis limitations are presented in the following chapters in 
which they belong.  
 
1.8 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of two parts. Part I describes the background, research 
problem, and the research process, including the theoretical and 
methodological perspectives and their rationales. Part I summarizes the results 
of the four research articles, and describes the relationship among them. Part I 
discusses answers to the research problem and associated research questions, 
the implications for risk management in the public sector, and suggests 
directions for further research.  
 
Part II contains the four research articles included in the thesis. The articles, 
along with their publication information are listed below:  
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I: Wiig S. & Aase, K. (2007). Fallible humans in infallible systems? Learning 
from errors in health care. Safety Science Monitor, (Fall 2007, Forthcoming).  
 
II: Wiig, S. (2007). Risk regulation strategies in public emergency 
management – A learning perspective. International Journal of Emergency 
Management, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 584-599. 
 
III: Wiig, S. & Lindøe, P.H. (2007a). Patient safety in the interface between 
hospital and risk regulator. In Aven, T. & Vinnem, J.E. (eds.) Risk, 
Reliability, and Societal Safety, Vol. 1, pp. 219-227. London, Taylor & 
Francis.    
 
IV: Wiig, S. & Lindøe, P.H. (2007b). Risk perception within different risk 
regulation regimes. In review for Policy and Practice in Health and Safety. 
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2 Theory 
 
This chapter presents the general theoretical contributions of the thesis, 
addressing the research problem: How can organizational interfaces across 
system levels explain risk management processes in the public sector?  
 
The research problem is broad but comprehensive. In order to demonstrate 
important theoretical aspects of relevance for the research problem and 
demonstrate their relationship, the risk governance concept (Renn, 2005) is 
used to direct the more specific theoretical topics of interest. A set of more 
specific theoretical contributions is used to operationalize the research 
problem by developing research questions that have guided the research 
process. For a more thorough presentation and discussion of applied 
theoretical contributions I refer to each of the research articles in Part II.   
 
2.1 Risk governance 
In the last decade, the term “governance” has gained in popularity in the 
literature on international relations, comparative political science, policy 
studies, sociology of environment, and in risk research (e.g. Renn, 2005; 
Braithwaite et al., 2007; Hutter & Jones, 2007). Governing choices in modern 
societies is an interplay among governmental institutions, economic forces 
and civil society actors (Renn, 2005; Knodt, 2004). It is useful to distinguish 
horizontal from vertical governance (Benz & Eberlain, 1999). The horizontal 
level concerns the relevant participants in decision-making process within a 
geographic region or a functional segment. The vertical level concerns the 
links among these segments, such as the institutional relationship among 
municipalities, regional, and state level (Renn, 2005, Benz & Emberlain, 
1999).   
 
Risk has become an increasing interest for governance (Rothstein et al., 
2006). The concept of risk governance integrates a broad view of risk, one 
that encompasses risk management and risk analysis, and moreover examines 
how risk-related decision-making unfolds when a variety of actors are 
involved in the processes, requires coordination, and understanding of a large 
number of roles, perspectives, goals, and activities. According to Renn (2005) 
the concept of risk governance builds on the observation that collective 
decisions about risk are the result of a “mosaic” of interactions among 
governmental or administrative actors, science communities, corporate actors, 
and actors in civil society. The interplay among these actors has different 
dimensions, including public participation, stakeholder involvement, and the 
formal horizontal and vertical structures in which it occurs. The problem 
solving capabilities of the actors are limited and often not satisfying for the 
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challenges facing today’s society. Risks in society require coordinated efforts 
amongst numerous actors some times beyond the borders of countries, 
sectors, hierarchical levels, disciplines, and risk fields. Risk governance 
moreover illuminates the contextual aspect of risk, by including aspects such 
as historical and legal framework, governance structure, risk perception, 
regulatory regimes, regulatory style, and organizational capacity involving 
intellectual and material assets (Renn, 2005; 2007).  
 
When looking at risk governance structures it is impossible to include all 
variables that may influence risk decision-making processes (Renn, 2005). 
Renn (2005) recommends limiting the effort to the factors and actors in which 
theoretical reasoning and/or empirical analysis are demonstrated to be 
important in the outcome of risk governance. In this thesis I have delimited 
the governance structure aspects by using the socio-technical system 
perspective (Rasmussen, 1997; 2000) as a framework to map actors and vital 
organizational interfaces involved in the two segments in the public sector and 
to understand vertical risk governance processes and information flow within 
the two regimes. Moreover, the broad integrative perspective of the risk 
governance approach makes a variety of theoretical contributions possible, 
making it necessary to define the theoretical perspectives. My perspectives 
cover risk regulation regimes (e.g. Hood et al., 1999a; 2001); strategies to 
control risk (e.g. Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; 
Hawkins & Thomas, 1984); learning in organizational interfaces (e.g. Argyris 
& Schön, 1996; Reason, 1997; Allsop & Mulcahy, 1996; Gherardi & 
Nicholini, 2000); and risk perception in risk regulation regimes (e.g. Pidgeon, 
2003; Pidgeon et al., 1992; Kasperson, 1992; Kasperson et al., 1988). 
 
2.2 Risk management in a socio-technical system perspective 
The thesis applies a socio-technical system perspective in order to examine 
the phenomenon of risk management processes across organizational 
interfaces (Rasmussen, 1997; 2000; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Leveson, 
2004; Leveson et al., 2005; 2006). Managing risk involves numbers of actors 
and stakeholders at different levels of society. The dynamics of change and 
the interaction among these levels of society are important for developing 
sound risk management processes (Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002). 
Traditionally, the system levels are studied separately, and few attempts are 
made to explore the effects of dynamic interaction across system levels 
(Rasmussen, 1997; 2000; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Svedung & 
Rasmussen, 2002; Kirwan, 2001). Thus, there is a need for a system 
perspective and multilevel studies to concentrate on the vertical interaction 
across all system levels representing the control structure involved in risk 
management within the society (Rasmussen, 1997). In the socio-technical 
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system perspective the system is viewed as hierarchical structures, where each 
level imposes constraints on the activity of the level beneath. Control 
processes operate in the organizational interfaces among these levels, and 
effective communication channels among the levels are needed to send 
information upwards and downwards. Feedback is critical for the system to 
provide adaptive control, and a key issue is to analyze the system holistically 
and evaluate the organizational interfaces among the system components and 
determine the impact of component interactions (Leveson, 2004; Rasmussen, 
1997). The socio-technical system is viewed as a dynamic system involving 
continuous processes adapting to achieve its ends and to react to changes in 
itself and its environment (Leveson et al., 2006). Accidents are viewed as the 
result of flawed interactions among humans; societal and organizational 
structures; engineering activities; and physical system components. The 
process leading up an accident can be described in terms of adaptive feedback 
functions that fail to maintain safety, as system performance is dynamic and 
changes to meet several set of goals and values over time (Leveson et al., 
2005).  
 
The different levels of risk management processes and the framework 
conditions constitute the socio-technical risk management system within the 
public sector, involving the system levels: government, regulators and 
associations, company, management, staff, and work operation (Figure 1) 
(Rasmussen, 1997). At each system level, changes or environmental stressors 
may be introduced, including new legislation, a changing political climate, 
changing market conditions (e.g. changes imposed by NPM), changes in 
company competency levels, and technological changes. Given the 
interconnectedness among levels, such changes will affect the entire system 
(Rasmussen, 1997; 2000; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000).  
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Figure 1. The socio-technical system involved in risk management (Rasmussen, 
1997). 
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Some of the key challenges for risk management processes in socio-technical 
systems are the following: (1) information flow, including communication 
channels and feedback processes, among decision makers at all levels of the 
system; (2) the nature of risk and its characteristics are comprehensive and 
diverse perceptions of risk exist within different system levels; (3) several 
activities may take place in parallel, decisions about risk are made out of 
diverse rationalities, and it is difficult for employees, decision-makers, 
regulators, and politicians to understand the extended effect of their individual 
actions and decision within the system (Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson, 2004). 
Accidents may develop over years in a process where signals and precursors 
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are misperceived because of cultural norms and beliefs; regulatory 
shortcomings (e.g. Kennedy, 2001) or events occurring unnoticed or 
misunderstood and not managed within the system (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; 
Rosness et al., 2004, Hopkins, 2007). The occurrence of “modern” accidents 
represents the visible manifestation of the limited ability to control risk 
(Kirwan et al., 2002; Perrow, 1984).  
 
The socio-technical system approach advocated by Rasmussen (1997; 2000), 
Rasmussen and Svedung (2000), and refined by Leveson (2004) has been 
applied for the purposes of accident modelling and analysis. In that sense the 
models have been assumed to be normative or prescriptive, implying that the 
system should fit prescribed indicators at each level in order to perform as 
expected, and avoid accidents (Le Coze, 2007). In this thesis the socio-
technical system perspective is used for explorative and descriptive purposes. 
It depicts and describes risk management processes from a multilevel 
perspective (Baram & Hale, 1998), categorizing the involved system levels, 
and the organizational interfaces between these system levels. The socio-
technical perspective has also been used to structure data collection and 
analysis.  
 
2.3 Risk regulation regimes 
Regulation is a topic that has stimulated interest in economics, political 
science, sociology, history, psychology, and other disciplines (Baldwin & 
Cave, 1999). The concept of regulation has been defined in numerous ways 
(e.g. Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Hood et al., 1999a; 2001; Black, 2002; Walshe, 
2003). Broadly it denotes the use of public authority (often in the hands of 
public agencies) to set and apply rules and standards. The concept of 
regulation is usually directed towards institutions outside the public sector, 
and we are not accustomed to think of the government as regulating itself. 
Since this thesis explores regulation within the public sector, it is necessary to 
clarify what is meant by regulation inside government. According to Hood et 
al. (1998; 1999b; 2000) three features characterize regulation inside 
government: (1) one bureaucracy shapes the activities of another, (e.g. the 
Norwegian parliament expects the municipalities to perform risk and 
vulnerability analysis); (2) there is some degree of organizational separation 
between the regulating bureaucracy and the regulatee, (e.g. the County 
Governor is the regulator established at the regional level to inspect 
municipalities at the local level); and (3) the regulator has some kind of 
official mandate to scrutinize and change the behavior of the regulatee (e.g. 
the regulator can interfere in cases of non-compliance in order to change the 
municipal behavior).   
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Regulation can be viewed as centrally concerned with the control of risk 
(Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Kirwan et al., 2002), and different regulatory 
regimes are developed to respond to risk and influence the risk management 
practices in organizations (Hutter & Jones, 2007; Hood et al., 1999a; 2001). 
The objective is to get organizations to give risk management practices 
priority over other organizational objectives (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; 
Hutter & Jones, 2007). The concept of risk regulation regime is abstract and 
refers to the way the state regulates risk in a particular domain. It denotes the 
complex of institutions, practices, and ideas that characterize the state’s 
management of each risk. Risk regulation regimes have several dimensions 
and their emphasis vary according to the perspective and analytic interests of 
the observer (Hood et al., 1999a; 2001; Majone, 2002). In this thesis the 
concept is applied according to Hood et al. (1999a; 2001). Their cybernetic 
framework organizes and links categories with other features of regulation.  
Regulation is seen in its most abstract meaning as a control system, and the 
risk regulation regime in a general sense constitutes the combination of three 
control components that any control system contains: standard setting (means 
by which goals are set), information-gathering (means by which the state of 
the system is observed and monitored), and behavior modification (means by 
which power or influences are imposed on the system to change its state). 
These components align with policy-making, monitoring, and enforcement. 
Different regimes vary according to these components and there might be 
constancy or flexibility of relationship among these components when 
different risks are being regulated (Hood et al., 1999a, 2001; Baldwin et al., 
2000; Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Black, 2002; Walshe, 2003). Risk regulation 
regimes cannot be understood without going into the contextual aspects of the 
regime (Walshe, 2003; Hood et al., 1999a; 2001; Renn, 2005; Baldwin, et al., 
2000; Baldwin & Cave, 1999). Contextual aspects are the backdrop of 
regulation, such as the kind of risks being addressed and the way in which risk 
perception varies among social groups; the actors producing or being affected 
by the risk, how are they organized, and what public preferences and attitudes 
are related to the risk. Moreover, the content of regimes is important to 
understand when exploring differences among regimes. Regime content 
consists of regulatory objectives and the amount of regulation brought to bear 
on any risk in a regime; the organizing of the regulatory responsibility and 
structure of institutional arrangements; operating styles of the regulators; and 
the formal and informal processes through which regulation is enforced. The 
context and content of risk regulation regimes could have been examined in 
other ways (e.g. Walshe, 2003), however these elements have received the 
most emphasis in the risk regulation literature (Hood et al., 1999a; 2001, 
Walshe, 2003).                                                                                                                                                  
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In order to analyze different risk regulation regimes, Hood et al. (2001) have 
developed an analytical framework denoted the Risk Regulation Regime 
(RRR) comprising a two-dimensional anatomy of a regime constituted by the 
control components on the one side (standard setting, information collection, 
and behavior modification) and on the other side: contextual aspects (type of 
risk, public preferences and attitudes, and organized interests), and content 
aspects (size, structure, and style). I have applied the RRR framework (Hood 
et al., 1999a; 2001) to analyze the two studied public sector risk regulation 
regimes according to how officials and employees perceive risk, and how risk 
is a subject for amplification and attenuation within these risk governance 
structures and processes (Pidgeon et al., 2003; Rothstein, 2003a; Pollak, 
1996).  
 
2.3.1 The control of risk  
How regulators approach their role and function appears to be culturally 
dependent. Similar regulatory challenges result in different regulatory 
solutions in different regimes and different nations. The way regulators 
conceive their mission and their regulatees is important in explaining the 
approaches of different regimes (Walshe, 2003; Rothstein, 2003a; Hawkins & 
Thomas, 1984; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). A vital aspect in understanding 
risk regulation processes is to study regulatory enforcement practices. Just as 
it is important to know how standards are formed, it is also important to gain 
knowledge about how these are transmitted downward the regime levels or 
sub-systems, and implemented at the street level. The complexity of 
regulatory regimes, the complexity of problems in the area to be regulated, 
and the distance between regulatory authority and the regulated, all make the 
issue of how to control the discretion at the street level crucial (Hawkins & 
Thomas, 1984; Rasmussen, 1997).   
 
It is difficult for risk regulators to choose the appropriate enforcement 
strategies to target the optimal method of regulating risks. Regulators seek to 
enforce compliance with the law, not merely through formal enforcement and 
prosecution, but also through a host of informal techniques, including 
education, advice, persuasion, and negotiation (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). 
According to Kagan and Scholz (1984), problems of regulatory enforcement 
usually refer to the motives, attitudes, and capabilities of the regulatee. Three 
“images” of the regulatee are created in the literature with corresponding 
theories to explain non-compliance. The first image depicts the regulatee as 
amoral calculator, motivated entirely by profit. This regulatee disobeys the 
law if it is beneficial to do so, and non-compliance stems from economic 
calculation. The second image depicts the regulatee as a political citizen, 
tending to comply with the law, partly because of a belief in the law, and 
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partly because of long-term interest. In this case, non-compliance stems from 
principled disagreements with regulations that are sometimes regarded as 
arbitrary or unreasonable. The third image depicts the regulatee as 
organizationally incompetent, whose intentions are to obey the law, however 
it is potentially fallible due to lack of organizational capacity to do so. In this 
case the non-compliance arises from organizational failure. Each of these 
images requires different regulatory enforcement strategies (Kagan & Scholz, 
1984; Reiss, 1984; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Walshe, 2003) and roles for 
the regulators (Reason, 1997; Reiman & Norros, 2002). To deal with the 
amoral calculators the regulatory authority should emphasize aggressive 
inspection. The goal is deterrence and the inspectors appear as policemen. To 
deal with the political citizen the regulatory authority should act as a 
politician, persuading the regulated of the rationality of the case. In order to 
deal with the organizationally incompetent entity the regulator should serve as 
a consultant, bridging the competence gap through education. Each of these 
theories of corporate legal behavior or misbehavior, capture important aspects 
of reality. However, the diverse sources of non-compliance imply that reliance 
on any single theory of non-compliance is likely to be wrong, and, when 
translated into enforcement strategies, counteractive. This means that 
regulators need to be adaptive and should be aware that non-compliance may 
have multiple reasons. Regulatory inspectors must be prepared to shift roles 
according to their analysis of the regulated organization (Reiman & Norros, 
2002; Kagan & Scholz, 1984; Reiss, 1984; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).  
 
Diverse strategies in enforcing regulation described in the literature usually 
concern the use of compliance versus deterrence approaches as strategies for 
applying legal standards (Walshe, 2003; Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Hutter & 
Lloyd-Bostock, 1992; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Reiss, 1984). Compliance 
is an informal style of regulation emphasizing diplomacy, persuasion, and 
education rather than the routine application of sanctions to produce a 
compliance culture within the regulatee. The regime promoting compliance 
approaches is flexible and tolerant, and its regulators use discretion and 
pragmatism in their application of the law. The goal is to achieve compliance 
without invoking the formal legal process. In contrast, deterrence relies on 
penalties or punishment to discourage the regulated from breaking the rules 
(Hood et al., 2001; Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Braithwaite et al., 1987). A 
regime promoting deterrence approaches is excessively legalistic, involving a 
strict imposition of standards. Proponents of deterrence approaches tend to 
argue that compliance approaches imply relationships between regulators and 
regulatees through shared experiences, contacts, and staff exchanges or 
familiarity, making routine prosecution unthinkable. Conversely, proponents 
of compliance approaches argue the deterrence approaches fail to improve 
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regulatee performance, and instead causes resentment, hostility, and a lack of 
cooperation in those regulated (Baldwin & Cave, 1999).  
 
However, some researchers argue for a hybrid approach, referred to as 
responsive regulation. This approach promotes compliance responses for 
those regulatees who have been identified as poorly informed or morally 
concerned about the regulatory requirement, while deterrence responses are 
promoted for regulatees who show themselves to be opportunistic and amoral 
(Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). Responsive regulation is pragmatic and replaces 
the choice between compliance or deterrence approaches with a highly 
flexible, situationally specific, and adaptable approach. It avoids the “one size 
fits all” approach in favor of contingency – making the nature of the 
regulatory regime highly dependent on the behavior of the individual 
regulated organizations. Moreover, this approach makes use of a hierarchy of 
regulatory strategies and sanctions in each of the three control components of 
standard setting, information collection, and behavior modification (Walshe, 
2003). This is often presented as a set of pyramids - one pyramid of regulatory 
enforcement strategies corresponding to a second pyramid of regulatory 
sanctions. The aim is to provide the regulator with a full range of regulatory 
interventions that can be applied responsively and tailored to the needs and 
behavior of each of the regulated organizations. The two other key words: 
tripartism and empowerment, are important for responsive regulation. 
Advocates of responsive regulation argue for tripartism, meaning that the 
regulatory process should be designed to include and cooperate with 
stakeholders beyond the regulator and the regulated for the purpose of 
regulation (e.g. by using the stakeholders as informants and secure greater 
regulatory compliance by taking advantage of the stakeholders to pressure the 
regulated organizations). According to the idea of empowerment, regulation 
should enable the regulated organizations to perform well rather than impose 
requirements that may constrain or limit their performance. Thus, regulation 
should promote improvement beyond the short-term adjustments, and 
emphasize long-term goal of improvement around regulatory objectives. In 
sum, proponents of responsive regulation argue that the trick of successful 
regulation is to establish a synergy between punishment and persuasion 
(Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Walshe, 2003) 
 
2.3.2 Learning in organizational interfaces  
The regulatory process can be part of a wider learning cycle of legislators, 
regulators, and the regulated organizations. The sharing of information among 
agencies, including regulatory authorities, is essential aspect to improving risk 
management (e.g. Reason, 1997; Allsop & Mulcahy, 1996; Hood et al., 
1999a; 2001; Walshe, 2003; Price, 2002; Allsop & Sakes, 2002). The focus is 
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on the systemic improvements generated from local indicators such as non-
compliance or deviation from safe work practice and how these are caused by 
regulatory, organizational, and managerial conditions. To improve risk 
management, preventive measures, and organizational changes based on such 
indicators should be introduced to eliminate the problems. These 
improvements should represent new safety standards and be incorporated into 
legislation, which in turn would change the regulator’s inspections and 
surveillance criteria in an ongoing process (Reason, 1997). This learning cycle 
(Reason, 1997; Allsop & Mulcahy, 1996; Walshe, 2003) involves information 
exchange and learning in the organizational interfaces involved in risk 
governance (Renn, 2005; Rasmussen, 1997; 2000; Reason, 1997). Similar to 
the learning cycle perspective is the view of risk regulation as a problem 
solving process involving activities such as: (1) discover risk and define 
problem; (2) make and promulgate rules for control at one level within a 
regime (legislating); (3) assess conformity to rules (monitor); (4) apprise 
results and take action (enforcing); (5) monitor effects of action and learn 
(evaluation) (Kirwan et al., 2002). Both perspectives promote underlying 
values of regulation as a continuous learning process, which in practice 
implies that learning is a collective capacity that produces organizational and 
inter-organizational risk management practices (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000; 
Weick et al., 1999; Rosness, 2002; Dekker et al., 2007; Dekker, 2007). Given 
the complexity of the explored regimes in this thesis, producing this collective 
capacity entails processes across different system levels and occupational 
groups, requiring a multilevel exploration in order to address aspects 
promoting or counteracting these learning processes (Catio et al., 2005; 
Büssing et al., 2000).  
 
Viewing risk regulation as a learning process poses a dilemma for the 
regulator-regulatee interface (Wilpert, 2006; Baram, 1997). The issue of how 
to manage and learn from undesired events in the relationship between 
regulators and regulatees is sensitive and can be drawn between the liability 
aspect and the need for openness to obtain important information (Wilpert, 
2006). Regulators face difficulties in accomplishing the dual mission of 
regulatory enforcement and learning (Tamuz, 2001). Formal activities and 
enforcing regulation may interfere with learning activities since the incentives 
designed for regulatory enforcement affect the collection and interpretation of 
knowledge (Wilpert, 2006; Tamuz, 2001). According to Tamuz (2001) there 
is a need for research on how regulatory authorities carry out this dual mission 
in order to create a healthy learning environment. This aspect has attracted 
only limited attention in the literature, and therefore this thesis analyzes the 
mode of regulatory enforcement strategies from a learning perspective  (e.g. 
Aase & Nybø, 2004; Hansen et al., 1999; Tamuz, 2001; Tucker et al., 2001; 
Tucker & Edmondson, 2003). It analyzes activities related to deterrence and 
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compliance strategies, with regard to their potential to promote or constrain 
the learning processes of the regulatees (Baram, 1997).  
 
2.4 Risk perception in risk regulation regimes 
Very few risks are perceived and experienced similarly across constitutive 
groups and sub-systems within organizations and society. It is more likely that 
there is a variance, which has implications for risk identification, risk 
management, and learning from risk events (Hutter, 2005, Hutter & Power, 
2005; Krimsky & Golding, 1992). The previous subchapters have 
demonstrated that risk regulation regimes are complex systems comprising 
multiple subsystems which are themselves subject to different pressures and 
which have their own sub-cultures (Rothstein, 2003a, Hood et al., 2001). As a 
consequence, officials and employees in different subsystems of the regimes 
may have divergent perception of and attitudes towards risks and their 
regulation (Rothstein, 2003a, Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock, 1992; Hutter, 2001a). 
Such divergences may result in policy being implemented in unintended ways 
if the officials monitoring and enforcing regulation perceive the magnitude 
and the need for controlling certain risks in ways that policy makers do not 
(Rothstein, 2003a; Rasmussen, 1997). Scant attention has been paid to the 
factors shaping regulatory officials’ risk perception and their attitudes towards 
the regulation of those risks (Rothstein, 2003a); more attention should be paid 
to the role of organizations and institutions in social amplification and 
attenuation of risk in order to understand how risk signals may be denied, de-
emphasized, overemphasized, or misinterpreted (Hutter & Power, 2005; 
Kasperson et al., 2003; Freudenburg, 2003; Pidgeon et al., 2003). 
 
Risk perception is based on how information on the risk source is 
communicated, the psychological mechanisms for processing uncertainty, and 
previous experiences of danger. People construct their own reality and assess 
risks according to their subjective perceptions (Renn, 2004; 1992). Various 
models have been developed to represent the relationship among perceptions, 
behaviors, and qualitative characteristics of risk. Within the psychometric 
paradigm (e.g. Slovic, 2000; Slovic et al., 2000) research demonstrates that 
perceived risk is affected by characteristics such as voluntariness, lack of 
control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and inequitable 
distribution of risk and benefits; it is also affected by whether or not hazards 
are unobservable, unknown, new, or delayed in their manifestation of damage. 
Risk perception research rooted in the psychometric paradigm can offer 
insights into the individual’s processing of hazard information (Slovic, 2000; 
Pidgeon et al., 1992).  
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In a broader sense, the cognitive heuristics and biases that shape individuals’ 
risk perceptions are themselves shaped by organizational and institutional 
contexts, processes, and decisions. In terms of risk regulation, rules and 
regulations are powerful, and unavoidable, imposing structure and procedure 
on a wide variety of organizational forms while stimulating the strategic 
interactions of organizations. Strategic interaction occurs among regulators, 
managers, and employees; thus, the understanding of risk is drawn in different 
directions (Jaeger et al., 2001). In order to see the broad picture of risk 
perception, to understand influencing factors on risk perception across 
organizational interfaces, and to assess contextual implications on risk 
perception, the social amplification of risk framework (SARF) has been 
applied in this thesis (e.g. Pidgeon et al., 2003; Kasperson, 1992; Kasperson et 
al., 1988). In brief, the SARF is an integrative framework serving to describe 
the dynamic social processes underlying risk perception and response 
(Kasperson et al., 2003). It is founded on the belief that hazards interact with 
psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways that may 
increase or decrease the perception of risk and shape risk behavior. The 
experience of risk is not just an experience of physical harm; it is also the 
result of a process by which individuals or groups learn to acquire or interpret 
hazards (Kasperson et al., 1988; Kasperson, 1992; Renn, 2003). Hazardous 
events hold a signal value, which individuals and social groups may perceive 
differently. These signals are subject to transformations as they are filtered 
through individual and social amplification stations (e.g. mass media, groups 
of scientists, governmental agencies, and politicians). Social amplification 
may have repercussions far beyond the initial impact of the event, bringing 
effects such as demands for regulatory constraints, litigation, or loss of 
credibility and trust. These processes imply that diverse hazards are given 
more or less attention due to the diverse understanding of signals among 
individuals and groups, causing an amplification or attenuation of risks. This 
thesis argues in favor of the need to link risk amplification and attenuation to 
the role of organizations and institutions in the social processing of risk. Since 
several contemporary risks originate in socio-technical systems, risk 
management and regulatory processes governing the institutional behavior, 
are key parts of a broader amplification process (Pidgeon et al., 2003; 
Kasperson et al., 2003).   
 
2.5 Research questions 
The theoretical contributions presented in this chapter indicate that the study 
of risk management processes in the public sector is a promising and 
challenging area of research. This chapter has demonstrated a need for 
knowledge about how humans at different levels of a socio-technical system 
perceive risk, as an aspect of public risk management processes. Moreover, 
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managing risk requires feedback and feed forward processes across 
organizational interfaces in order to learn from undesired events and improve 
public risk management processes. The theory has also revealed that 
regulatory enforcement is a vital aspect, because it constitutes a control 
mechanism enforced by the state to ensure high quality of public risk 
management processes.  
 
In light of my research purpose and problem (Paragraphs 1.5 and 1.6), the 
theoretical framework becomes the basis of four research questions:  
 
1. How can a socio-technical system approach explain important 
organizational interfaces in public risk management processes?  
 
2. How do different risk regulation regimes shape risk perception 
among officials and employees within the regimes? 
 
3. How can the interface between risk regulator and regulatee affect risk 
management processes? 
 
4. How can regulatory enforcement strategies influence information 
exchange and learning processes within the regulated? 
 
2.6 Thesis working model  
In previous subparagraphs (2.1-2.4), the theoretical contributions of the thesis 
are elaborated, and the research questions are presented (2.5). In order to 
demonstrate the use of the theoretical contributions and to demonstrate how 
the thesis answers the research questions in an empirical multilevel case 
study, I have developed a thesis working model (Figure 2). 
 
The working model depicts the socio-technical systems involved in risk 
management (Rasmussen, 1997; 2000) in municipal emergency management 
and specialized healthcare. In the model system levels are described according 
to a blunt end - sharp end dimension (Rosness et al., 2004; Hollnagel, 2004; 
Reason, 1997). The organizational interfaces (Büssing et al., 2000) explored 
in the thesis exist across these system levels. The system levels covered in the 
thesis within each sector are highlighted in grey. The working model depicts 
the risk regulation regimes according to a risk characteristics dimension 
(Slovic et al., 2000; Slovic, 2000). The risk characteristics serve to explain 
why the public sector needs to develop different risk regulation regimes 
(Hood et al., 1999a; 2001).  
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Figure 2. Thesis working model 
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3 Methodology 
 
In this chapter I describe my the philosophy of science positioning, research 
strategy, research design, data collection, data analysis, and how I establish 
trustworthiness in the research process. Furthermore, I reflect on the 
methodological advantages and disadvantages of conducting a multiple 
embedded case study of risk management in the public sector. 
 
3.1 Philosophy of science positioning 
There exist numerous perspectives on risk management, depending on 
underlying risk perspectives (Jones & Hood, 1996; Renn, 1992), ranging from 
a positivist to a constructivist perspective on the edges of a continuum. The 
positivist view conceives risk as a physically given attribute of hazardous 
technologies where objective facts can be explained, predicted, and controlled 
by science and be separated from subjective values. In the constructivist 
perspective, risk is a socially constructed phenomenon, rather than a physical 
entity that exists independently of the humans who assess and experience its 
effects. In this perspective, decisions are never value-free (Renn, 1992; 
Shrader-Frechette, 1991; Bradbury, 1989). Shrader-Frechette (1991) refers to 
these two philosophical positions as naive positivist and cultural relativist, 
and argues that they both fail, in part because they are reductionistic, and that 
there is a need for a middle position denoted scientific proceduralism. Naive 
positivists reduce risk evaluation to be value-free, independent of 
methodological value judgements; while the cultural relativists reduce risk to 
a collective construct and overemphasize the value judgements. I agree with 
Shrader-Frechette (1991), and contend that societal risk evaluation is neither 
wholly objective nor merely a construct. Constructs do not kill people – faulty 
reactors, improperly stored toxics, and poor risk evaluation do. At least some 
hazards are real and measurable. As a consequence there is a need for a 
middle position, scientific proceduralism, founded on a rationale in which the 
ability of societal risk evaluations to withstand criticism by both scientists and 
lay people affected by hazards; the ability of risk evaluations to change, as 
new facts and information are discovered; and the ability of risk evaluations to 
explain and predict both risks and the human responses to them (Shrader-
Frechette, 1991).  
 
Kasperson (1992) offers a synthetic view of risk: “as in part an objective 
threat of harm to people and in part a product of culture and social 
experience. Hence, hazardous events are “real”: they involve transformation 
of physical environment or human health as a result of continuous or sudden 
(accidental) releases of energy, matter, or information or involve 
perturbations in social and value structures” (Kasperson, 1992: p. 158). In 
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other words, this view expresses the idea that risk comprises both an 
ontological and an epistemological domain. As an objective threat or harm to 
people, risk enjoys an ontological realism. As an element of the world subject 
to interpretation, filtered by social and cultural factors, risk enjoys an 
epistemological domain. Eugene Rosa uses the synthetic view to offer a 
corresponding definition of risk, used in this thesis, as a situation or an event 
where something of human value (including humans themselves) is at stake 
and where the outcome is uncertain (Rosa, 1998; 2003). How humans 
according to this perspective select issues of concern and how they model 
likelihood within a risk regulation regime may indeed be a result of cultural 
conventions and social constructions within the regimes. However, the threat 
of being affected by these consequences is real in the sense that humans might 
suffer or die once the risk manifests itself in an accident or release of 
hazardous material (Renn, 1998). 
 
Relating the philosophical considerations to societal safety, which is the 
scientific tradition this thesis is conducted within, it is a new research area that 
applies theories and methodological framework from established research 
traditions such as sociology, psychology, economy, technology, and political 
science (Kruke et al., 2007; Kjærland, 2007; Nilsen, 2007). The societal safety 
tradition in general, and this study in particular, argue for a multidisciplinary 
approach to risk management. Since this study incorporates several aspects of 
risk management, there is a need for an eclectic application of scientific 
contributions regarding research on risk perception, organizational learning, 
and regulatory enforcement to provide insight to the field and a theoretical 
framework for the thesis. Consequently, the study applies diverse theoretical 
perspectives and theoretical contributions, and takes advantage of previous 
research in fields such as sociology, psychology, medicine, and anthropology. 
Hence the study cannot be strictly theoretically positioned. However, the 
study emphasizes contributions inspired by social construction, but not in an 
absolute manner. As an example, I argue for a practice-based perspective that 
views safety as a social construct that depends on collective processes. 
Nevertheless, the risks whether they are perceived as, and acquired knowledge 
from collective processes or not, in some way involve physical harm to 
people, meaning there is ontological realism. However, the elements of the 
world in which people interpret and create safety from are socially 
constructed. The example shows that my philosophy of science positioning is 
consistent with Kasperson’s (1992) argument for a synthetic conceptualization 
of risk.  
 
A synthetic view is also methodologically desirable. Because ontological 
realism presupposes that the world exists independent of percipient actors and 
their social construction of it, there is a world in which research about 
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phenomena can be conducted and in which the results will have potential 
impact.   
 
3.2 Research strategy 
In order to explore organizational interfaces and processes, a qualitative 
research strategy was chosen to provide insight into organizational matters, 
risk management processes, and discourses in different public risk regulation 
regimes (Benson-Rea & Myers, 2006). The main research strategy is a case 
study approach (Ragin & Becker, 1992; Yin, 1999; 2003; 2004). The case 
study can provide descriptions, and test, generate and refine theory, models or 
concepts (Eisenhardt, 2002; Vaughan, 1992).  
 
There are diverse perspectives with regard to the meaning of  “case” and 
“case study” (e.g. Gerring, 2004; Ragin, 1992, Stake; 1994). Ragin (1992) 
applies two key dichotomies to explain how cases are conceived: 1) whether 
cases involve empirical units or theoretical constructs, and 2) whether these 
are understood as general or specific. In this study, cases are conceived as 
empirical units existing prior to the study, not as theoretical constructs 
developed in the course of the research process. In the overlap of philosophy 
and methodology, this perspective places the study in a realist perspective, 
viewing cases as objects. Proponents of cases as empirically real (e.g. 
Vaughan, 1992) often view cases as instrumental (Ragin, 1992), meaning that 
cases are examined to provide insight into an issue or to refine theory, and the 
case itself is of secondary interest (Stake, 1994). In this study, regulated 
organizations along with the regulatory authority, defined as the cases, are not 
of primary interest, but they are scrutinized to understand public risk 
management processes.  
 
A case study is not a method but a research strategy (Hartley, 2004; Yin, 
1999; 2003). According to Yin (2003) a case study can be conceived as an 
empirical research investigation of a contemporary phenomenon, within its 
real life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon 
and the context, are not evident. The strategy is preferable when exploring a 
complex phenomenon, and enables the researcher who deliberately wants to 
cover contextual conditions to incorporate them in a holistic manner (Yin, 
2003; 1999; Ragin, 1999). This study covers ongoing risk management 
processes in socio-technical systems, implying that processes are complex and 
interconnected involving multiple organizational interfaces among system 
levels; and are influenced by contextual conditions such as public interests, 
political and financial pressure, technological development, and changes in 
marked conditions (Geels, 2005; Rasmussen, 1997), that are beyond the 
researcher’s control. Consequently, there is a need for a flexible research 
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strategy and multiple methods to capture the phenomenon holistically, in 
order to understand how behavior and social processes occur and are 
influenced by contextual conditions (Hartley, 2004; Yin, 1999). Moreover, the 
case study approach is particularly applicable in this study due to its multiple 
levels of analysis. Gaining insight into and understanding the structure of a 
complex system and how its interdependent individuals, groups, and 
institutional components function (or fail to) (Berkwits & Inui, 1998; Hurley, 
1999; Yin, 1999; Vaughan, 1992), is vital in order to explore risk 
management processes within socio-technical systems.  
 
3.3 Research design  
Two primary distinctions in designing case studies are 1) between single and 
multiple case studies, and 2) between holistic or embedded case studies (Yin, 
2003; Hartley, 2004). This research design is a multiple embedded case study 
of two risk regulation regimes in the Norwegian public sector: municipal 
emergency management and specialized healthcare. A case is defined as the 
regulator along with the regulated organization in each sector. The embedded 
case study design means that the single cases entail more than one unit of 
analysis, as opposed to the holistic case study. Within the single cases, 
subunits such as regulators, management, and staff are analyzed to arrive at 
insights into processes across organizational interfaces among system levels 
in the socio-technical systems of the different regimes.  
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the levels of analysis within the embedded cases and 
how the phenomenon of risk management is studied in its context. The figure 
is based on a design-oriented case study perspective and depicts the studies 
conducted in specialized healthcare and municipal emergency management 
(Yin, 1999). Moreover, the figure depicts the levels in the respective sectors 
that have been covered (in grey colour), and the organizational interfaces that 
are related to the system structure and processes between e.g. regulator and 
hospital management, between hospital management and division 
management, and between division management and the staff. 
 
Methodology 
 28 
Figure 3. Case study definition, illustrated by the two public risk regulation regimes 
(inspired by Yin, 1999, pp. 1212). 
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The study is designed in accordance with principles for theory elaboration 
(Vaughan, 1992). Theory elaboration is a method for developing general 
theories of a phenomenon through qualitative case analysis. Theory 
elaboration begins with a theory or model (e.g. Rasmussen, 1997: p. 185) to 
guide the research. Cases are chosen because 1) they are potential examples of 
the research topic; 2) they vary in size and complexity; and 3) they vary in 
function. The cases are analyzed sequentially and treated independently, so 
that the idiosyncratic details can maximize the theoretical insight. As the 
analysis proceeds, the guiding theoretical notions are assessed in light of the 
results. As an analytic induction the data can contradict or reveal previously 
undiscovered aspects of the theoretical framework and provide a basis for 
reassessment or rejection. Moreover, the data can confirm the theory, force 
the researcher to develop new hypotheses, add details to the theory, models or 
concepts, and more fully specify it (Vaughan, 1992).  
 
3.4 Case selection 
The case selection in this thesis is based on a most dissimilar approach 
(Andersen, 1997; Stake, 1994; Vaughan, 1992) in order to emphasize the 
contrasts among the cases. The approach enables a comparison among cases 
within the state (Hood et al., 1999b) regarding how risks are regulated and 
managed under highly different public regimes. However, the main reason for 
selecting most dissimilar cases is not for the purpose of comparison, but to 
provide empirical material from different areas of the public sector to 
illuminate the research problem from several angles. The cases are selected 
because of their variance in the risk profiles involving different regulation 
regimes. Within specialized healthcare the potential for catastrophe is low, but 
the there is a high probability of undesired events. Within municipal 
emergency management some of the hazards present, represent a significant 
potential of catastrophe; however the probability of undesired events is low 
(Wiig & Lindøe, 2007b). Moreover, the cases are chosen due to their variance 
in complexity and size, and in varying organizational form and function. This 
approach produces not only extensive data, but also different kinds of data, 
which is beneficial for theory elaboration. First, the multiple units of analysis 
within the embedded cases produce qualitatively different information, and 
the case comparison generates contrasts that enable the researcher to discover, 
reinterpret and improve theoretical constructs. Alternating units of analysis is 
made possible by the hierarchical nature of organizational forms. Second, 
when cases vary in their organizational form it permits analysis across varying 
system levels, this can lead to theory elaboration that more fully merges 
micro- and macro-level understanding of risk management processes. The 
approach is also chosen because it is particularly favorable when the research 
focus on large complex systems which are difficult to study. The shift among 
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organizational forms can create access to data that had previously been 
unavailable; and it may enable measurement of aspects that had previously 
been precluded by the size and the complexity of the research context 
(Vaughan, 1992). 
 
3.4.1 Municipal emergency management 
The structure and complexity of the case study within municipal emergency 
management is determined by the following hierarchical levels of the 
Norwegian Governmental system: the governmental level (the Norwegian 
Parliament, government, and ministries), regulators and associations (national 
directorates and regulatory authorities), regional regulators (local regulators), 
municipalities, and public organizations governed by the municipalities, such 
as public schools and nursing homes. The risk regulation regime in this study 
covers: 1) the Ministry of Justice and the Police; 2) the Directorate of Civil 
Protection and Emergency Planning (DCPEP); 3) the County Governor as the 
governments’ chief representative constituting the regional regulatory 
authority; and 4) the municipal emergency management structure. A case is 
defined as a regulated municipality along with the regulator (County 
Governor) responsible for supervising and guiding municipal emergency 
management. The municipal emergency management regime relies on self-
regulation. Self-regulation regimes vary in their structure, enforcement, and 
rule type (Hutter, 2001b, Rothstein, 2003b). No specific municipal emergency 
management act exists in the regime. However, according to the Norwegian 
land use act (Act-1985-06-14-77; DSB, 1997; DSB, 2001) the regulator can 
object to municipal plans with insufficient risk assessments, or when risks are 
assessed and accepted by the municipality, but disapproved by the regulator. 
Internal control was implemented as a vital mean to ensure continuous 
municipal emergency management processes. The municipal emergency 
organizations are required to develop risk management systems and 
procedures to secure and monitor compliance to standards established by the 
state (Report to the Parliament, 2001-2002:17). The contextual conditions are 
vital because risks regulated within the regime are rooted within diverse risk 
sources that vary across municipalities (geographical and natural conditions 
causing floods, avalanches, and rockslides; infrastructural and industrial 
conditions causing large traffic accidents, power outages, water supply 
failures, pollution, and fire). A municipality is supposed to adopt an overview 
of the local risk sources through risk and vulnerability analyses as well as 
apply strategies to prevent accidents (Nilsen, 2007). Since the regime involves 
a variety in risk profiles and characteristics among municipalities, I chose to 
conduct a multiple case study of six municipalities in two counties. Three case 
municipalities in each of the counties were selected to provide comprehensive 
data and enhance the quality of the study by providing elements of contrast 
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and comparison among municipalities and counties. Furthermore, similar 
structure of the chosen cases enables the exploration of how contextual 
aspects, organizational size and regulatory enforcement influenced risk 
management processes.  
 
In designing the study and selecting the case municipalities, frequent contact 
with regulators was crucial. I analyzed evaluation reports of all Norwegian 
county governors when selecting the counties, and then analyzed inspection 
reports covering most municipalities within the two counties in order to 
achieve variance in the case municipalities. The selection criteria were 
population, size, location, risk sources, size of emergency management staff, 
whether or not a severe accident had occurred within the municipality, and 
how regulators evaluated plans and exercises pertaining to municipal 
emergency management. The two counties varied in the number of regulatees 
and inspectors. Table 1 provides an overview of the six case municipalities. 
 
Contextual 
aspects 
County 1 
(15449 km2) 
County 2 
(7281 km2) 
 
Cases Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
Population 1200 
 
7500 3800 75000 1700 12000 
Location In a fjord 
surrounded 
by high 
mountains 
In a fjord 
surrounded 
by high 
mountains 
A mix of 
coastline, 
fjords, 
rivers, and 
high 
mountains 
Costal area, 
hosting a 
large town 
Inland area Inland area 
Risk 
sources 
Avalanche, 
rockslide, 
tunnel risk, 
fire 
Avalanche, 
rockslide, 
industrial 
waste, 
tunnel risk 
Flood, 
tunnel risk 
Infra-
structural 
risk (road 
traffic, ferry 
transport), 
industrial 
waste 
Water 
reservoir 
breakage, 
avalanche, 
rockslide 
Railway 
accident, 
industrial 
waste 
Severe 
accident 
experience 
Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Plans and 
exercises  
Sufficient Insufficient Insufficient Good Good Insufficient 
Tabell 1 Contextual description of the six case municipalities 
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3.4.2 Specialized healthcare  
Norwegian public healthcare services consist of primary and specialized 
services. This study is limited to specialized healthcare. The regime structure 
is a complex hierarchy governed by the Ministry of Health and Care Services, 
which runs Norwegian hospitals and the Directorate of Health and Social 
Services, which performs technical and administrative functions. The 
Norwegian Board of Health Supervision and the Chief County Medical 
Officer are the national and local level regulators responsible for supervising 
health services and healthcare personnel. Norwegian specialized healthcare 
services are organized in four regions; hospitals are accountable to these 
regional structures. The hospital organization comprises several levels: top 
management, division management, department management, and physicians, 
nurses and other patient treatment providers. Ensuring safe patient care 
depends on processes across these regime levels. The types of risk covered 
within specialized healthcare are related to medical errors such as 
misdiagnosis, malpractice, and medication error. The healthcare system’s 
complexity, sophisticated technology, specialized professions, and tightly 
coupled interactions between employees and divisions in the hospital 
hierarchy, causes a complex and interconnected causality of medical errors. 
 
Within the specialized healthcare sector, a case is defined as the hospital 
organization along with the regulatory authority responsible for supervising 
healthcare services (Norwegian Board of Health Supervision at the national 
level and the Chief County Medical Officer at the local level). However, the 
governmental level is also incorporated in the study via second order data to 
explore the effects of governmental decisions on framework conditions for the 
lower system levels. Due to the complexity, interconnectedness, 
organizational size, and number of sub units involved in the specialized 
healthcare sector, I chose to conduct one single embedded case study. The 
objective was to explore all system levels in order to gain in-depth knowledge 
of the status and influences on risk management processes. The case hospital 
is a Norwegian regional university hospital with approximately 5000 
employees offering specialized healthcare services to a population of 300 000 
people. The Norwegian healthcare system consists mainly of state funded 
hospitals that treat Norwegian citizens at no charge. There is no system of 
additional private health insurance as there is in many other countries. The 
specialized healthcare regime is based on self-regulation similar to the 
municipal emergency management regime. However, a strict legal framework 
that gives the regulator extensive legislative power to sanction both 
individuals and organizations characterizes the regime. Hospitals are 
supposed to establish a risk management system to ensure sound patient 
treatment and sound error management routines and procedures. The regulator 
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supervises the risk management systems according to legal demands, and 
whether individual healthcare employees perform patient treatment according 
to sound professional standards. 
 
3.5 Data collection 
A vital element in conducting and enhancing the quality of case studies is to 
collect data through a variety of methods (Yin, 1999; 2003, Hartley, 2004, 
Eisenhardt, 2002). The data collection was therefore conducted using method 
triangulation (Patton, 1990; 1999; Seale 1999) involving interviews, 
observation, document analysis, statistical analysis, and application of second-
order data. Table 2 summarizes data collection methods and data sources in 
specialized healthcare and municipal emergency management. 
 
The table illustrates how methods and data have been applied according to the 
system levels from a socio-technical system perspective. The study 
triangulated the data sources, to compare and cross check the consistency of 
information obtained at different times by different means (Patton, 1999; 
1990). I compared interview with documentary and observational data; I 
compared perspectives of different occupational groups at different system 
levels by triangulating the views of regulatory inspectors, hospital top 
management, division management, and staff. The triangulation of methods 
and data sources improves the understanding of discrepancies. Different kinds 
of data produce different results and capture different parts of the research 
phenomenon. However, consistency in patterns of data from varying sources, 
and reasonable explanations of differences among those sources, contribute to 
the credibility of the results (Patton, 1999; 1990).  
 
Table 2 illustrates that the study of specialized healthcare involves a more 
comprehensive data material with data collection activities from governmental 
level to work operation level than the study of municipal emergency 
management. This is a result of my participation in a research project that 
yielded extensive data in specialized healthcare. 
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Public Sector Specialized healthcare Municipal emergency management 
System level Methods Data sources  Methods Data sources  
Government Document 
analysis 
Krogstad (PhD thesis, 
2005), White Paper 
(NoU, 1997:2), 
healthcare legislation  
Document 
analysis 
Norwegian white papers, 
legislation, reports to the 
parliament 
Regulator 
(national/ 
local)  
Associations 
Document 
analysis 
Labour inspection 
report, directive 1-
54/2000, annual reports, 
policy documents 
Document 
analysis 
Evaluation report (AGENDA, 
2002), annual reports, 
municipal survey (DSB 2002; 
2005), Guidelines for 
regulatory inspection and 
objection (DSB, 1997; DSB, 
1998; DSB, 2001)  
Structured 
interviews 
National level: 4 
Local level: 5 
Patient representative 
association: 2 
Structured 
interviews 
DCPEP: 2 
Inspectors: 8 
Observation Regulator-hospital 
meeting 
Observation System audit, and two seminars 
covering regulatory issues; one 
arranged by the DCPEP, second 
by a county governor 
Municipality 
and 
Hospital 
Document 
analysis  
Labour inspection 
report, annual reports 
from the Chief County 
Medical Officer 
Document 
analysis 
 
Inspection reports, municipal 
plans, emergency plans, crisis 
information plans, municipal 
surveys (DSB, 2002; 2005), 
guidelines for municipal risk 
and vulnerability analysis, crisis 
information, internal control. 
Structured 
interviews 
Top management: 6 Structured 
interviews 
None 
Observation Hospital-regulator 
meeting 
Observation System audit 
Management Document 
analysis 
Labour inspection 
report, inspection 
reports from the Chief 
County Medical 
Officer, guidelines for 
hospital quality 
committee  
Document 
analysis 
None 
Structured 
interviews  
Middle management: 
16 
Structured 
interviews  
Municipal emergency 
managers: 10 
Observation None Observation A system audit involving 6 
interviews with chairman, chief 
administrative officer, assistant 
chief administrative officer, 
chief fire officer, municipal 
physician and a rector. 
Staff Document 
analysis 
Regional psychosocial 
environment survey 
(Holte et al., 2004). 
Document 
analysis 
None 
Structured 
interviews  
Hospital staff: 16 Structured 
interviews 
None 
Work 
operation 
Statistical 
analysis  
894 written error 
reports 
Statistical 
analysis 
None 
Tabell 2 Data collection methods and data sources summarized for both public sectors 
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3.5.1 Municipal emergency management  
Data collection in municipal emergency management was carried out through 
qualitative interviews, document analysis, and observations (Patton, 1990; 
1999). Prior to the main data collection I interviewed three inspectors from 
one county governor and two informants from the DCPEP in order to get a 
sense of the main challenges facing municipal emergency management. I also 
attended in a seminar on regulatory issues initiated by one county governor, 
and attended a national seminar covering regulatory issues, organized by the 
DCPEP. These activities and interviews prior to the main data collection 
shaped my research problem, helped me choose a theoretical framework, and 
refined my interview guides. Subsequent to the main data collection I re-
interviewed one of the three inspectors in order to test and verify the quality 
of my findings.  
 
The main data collection was performed over eight months in 2003. The data 
collection consisted of qualitative tape-recorded interviews with ten municipal 
emergency managers and four regulatory inspectors. The interviews were 
followed an interview guide (Appendices I and II) emphasizing the interface 
between the regulatory authority and the regulated municipalities. The 
questions pertained to safety learning, risk perception, risk communication, 
and trust. These issues were included to explore how regulatory inspectors 
and municipal emergency managers identify and communicate risks 
(Rothstein, 2003a; Jensen & Kleivan, 1999; Stern & Fineberg, 1996), how 
municipalities apply risk information for learning purposes (Nilsen, 2007; 
Reason, 1997), and how the aspect of trust influences risk management 
activities between the risk regulator and the municipalities (Hawkins & 
Thomas, 1984). Data collection also involved observation of a planned system 
audit within one municipality. The system audit included data from interviews 
with six municipal informants conducted by the regulatory inspectors, in 
addition to information concerning how the inspectors and emergency 
managers interact and communicate during the most common inspection 
activity. The data collection also involved collection of municipal plans, risk 
and vulnerability analyses, crisis management plans, crisis information plans, 
annual reports, DCPEP guidelines provided for the municipalities, legislation, 
policy documents, and inspection reports.  
 
Second-order data were applied to gather information about emergency 
management processes from Norwegian municipalities and regulatory 
authorities in general. For this purpose, annual municipal surveys (DSB, 
2002; 2005) and an evaluation report (AGENDA, 2002), all conducted on 
behalf of the DCPEP were integrated in the current study. 
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3.5.2 Specialized healthcare 
Data collection in specialized healthcare covers the system levels of 
government, regulator, hospital, management, staff, and work operations 
according to a socio-technical system perspective (Rasmussen, 1997; 2000). 
A research group consisting of three other researchers and myself carried out 
the data collection. Extensive material was crucial to exploring the complex 
structures and processes involved in specialized healthcare. Data were 
collected through interviews, statistical analysis of reported errors and near 
misses, observation, and document analysis (Patton, 1990; 1999). The data 
collection was performed over eighteen months in 2005 and 2006.  
 
Table 2 shows that the application of methods has varied, owing to 
practicalities, time constraints, and information needs. At the governmental 
level, document analysis (Healthcare legislation; Krogstad, 2005; Norwegian 
White paper, NoU 1997:2) was used to describe vital changes the Norwegian 
healthcare sector has undergone over the past years. At the 
regulator/association level, we conducted 11 structured interviews 
(Appendices III and IV) with inspectors at the national and local level and 
with representatives from the patient representative association. Inspection 
reports, annual reports and policy documents were analyzed, and I observed a 
regulator-hospital meeting. Data collection at the healthcare institution level 
was divided into four subsystem levels: hospital, management, staff, and work 
operation. At the hospital level, including the top management, we performed 
six structured interviews (Appendix V) with top managers and division 
managers, analyzed inspection reports from the Norwegian Labour Inspection 
Authority and the Chief County Medical Officer, and observed the interaction 
between the hospital and the regulator in their meeting. At the management 
level, including hospital middle management, we performed 16 structured 
interviews (Appendix VI) with head nurses and head physicians at two 
hospital divisions, and we examined inspection reports and guidelines for the 
hospital quality committees. At the staff level, we interviewed 16 nurses and 
physicians within two hospital divisions (Appendix VI). In addition, we 
studied a regional psychological environment survey (Holte et al., 2004) as 
second-order data. The work operation level included work operations and 
processes carried out within the hospital that were at risk for medical errors. 
To obtain data about such work operations, 894 written error reports from two 
hospital divisions were registered and analyzed in an Excel spreadsheet.  
 
To summarize, 49 tape-recorded interviews were conducted using the 
structured interview guides. Seventeen interviews focusing on the relationship 
between the local health regulator and the regulatee (hospital) with regard to 
managing errors were performed using an interview guide covering 
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legislation, error reporting, learning, risk perception, and prevention. 
Informants included inspectors, the patient representative association, and 
hospital management. Thirty-two interviews focusing on how two hospital 
divisions managed errors were performed using an interview guide covering 
amount and categorization of medical errors, human and organizational 
factors, learning, power issues, and the regulators’ role.  
 
3.6 Data analysis 
The way data is analyzed is essential to build theory from case studies (Yin, 
2003; Eisenhardt, 2002; Gherardi & Turner, 2002; Miles, & Huberman, 
1994a; Vaughan, 1992). However, analysis often turns out to be both 
complicated and challenging. The current data collection produced an 
extensive empirical material from multiple researchers, using different 
methods and data sources within different subunits of the embedded cases. 
However, data have been systematically displayed and analyzed within cases 
and across cases (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 2002; Miles and Huberman, 1994a).  
 
3.6.1 Within cases 
The cases were analyzed sequentially and independently in order to 
understand the risk management processes and the characteristics of the two 
regimes covered in the study (Vaughan, 1992). I started with the municipal 
emergency management regime and continued with the specialized healthcare 
regime, before searching for cross patterns between the two.  
 
The analytic processes within the single cases can be described as a ladder of 
analytical abstraction (Miles & Huberman, 1994b: 92), in which the first rung 
summarizes and packages the data. I transcribed all tape-recorded interviews, 
wrote summaries and memos of all relevant quotations from data collection. 
To analyze risk management processes and activities within each socio-
technical system level of the two regimes, data were categorized, structured 
and analyzed by system level. This step was characterized by interaction 
between the displayed empirical material and the written analytic text. 
Patterns and themes that called for new analytic moves entailed new 
relationships and explanations leading to more differentiated and integrated 
text (Miles & Huberman, 1994a; 1994b). Furthermore, the analysis involved 
alternation between units, meaning that data collected within different system 
levels was analyzed separately before searching for relationships among 
system levels to identify trends (Wiig & Aase, 2007; Wiig & Lindøe, 2007b).  
 
Data analysis within municipal emergency management was carried out 
separately within each of the six case municipalities before all of the material 
was analyzed. The categorization according to themes in the interview guides 
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provided an oversight that enabled me to assess the findings according to the 
theoretical framework as the analytic process proceeded (Vaughan, 1992). 
Moreover, I searched for similarities and differences in population, location, 
risk profiles, and accident experience among the case-municipalities. This 
cross-case analysis of the six municipalities constituted the basis for 
comparison between the two regimes. 
 
Data analysis within specialized healthcare across system levels and 
organizational interfaces posed a substantial methodological challenge due to 
the complexity of the data material, covering system levels from government 
to work operations (Rasmussen, 1997; 2000). To overcome the challenge we 
applied analyst triangulation, meaning that multiple researchers participated in 
the analytic process (Patton, 1990; 1999). In the analysis of organizational 
interfaces, two researchers independently analyzed the material and developed 
categories according to their general interpretation of the material, not 
according to specific system levels or interview guide categories (Wiig & 
Aase, 2007). We then discussed and questioned each other’s interpretations, 
resulting in modified and improved categories (Miles & Huberman, 1994a; 
Patton, 1999; 1990). Approaching the analytic process of organizational 
interfaces by a multiple analyst triangulation enriched the quality of the 
analysis and minimized the potential biases that could come from one person 
analysing complicated empirical material.  
 
The quantitative data material, covering 894 written error reports collected 
from two hospital divisions, was analyzed using an Excel spreadsheet. We 
analyzed the quantitative data by statistical analysis of frequency with regard 
to error type, error severity, error causality, and personnel categories. 
 
3.6.2 Across cases  
The final step in the analytic process consisted of cross-case analysis (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994a; 1994b; Eisenhardt; 2002; Yin 2003) between municipal 
emergency management and specialized healthcare. The objective of the 
cross-case analysis was to create and in-depth understanding of risk 
management processes across different public sectors by stressing the 
contrasts between the two cases (Wiig & Lindøe, 2007b).  
 
In the cross-case analysis I searched for patterns across the cases and was 
forced to move behind the initial impressions of risk management through the 
application of structured and diverse lenses (Eisenhardt, 2002). Furthermore, 
the idea of comparing two dissimilar cases is to move towards general theory 
that spans the levels of analysis by refining theoretical constructs and 
clarifying their relevance for different organizational forms (Vaughan, 1992). 
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According to Eisenhardt (2002), the cross-case analysis increases the 
likelihood of a reliable theory that fits closely with the data.  
 
Different approaches can be employed in cross-case analysis; mine has been 
to select categories based on an analytic framework developed for comparison 
among different risk regulation regimes. The Risk Regulation Regime 
framework (RRR) was used to analyze the cases based on the categories of 
regime context and regime content. The two dimensions consist of three 
subcategories; regime context is disaggregated into: 1) type of risk, 2) public 
preferences and attitudes, and 3) organized interests; regime content is 
disaggregated into 1) size, 2) structure, and 3) style (Hood et al., 1999a; 
2001). The cross-case analysis emphasized similarities and differences among 
the cases in order to understand how these disaggregated categories shaped 
understanding of risk among different groups of informants at different 
system levels. 
 
3.7 Research quality  
There exist numerous concepts and definitions of criteria for evaluating the 
quality of research. These vary according to the scientific traditions and 
research perspectives supported by different paradigms (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994b). Most of these criteria have emerged out of 
quantitative research traditions that have traditionally applied the conventional 
criteria of internal validity (the extent to which variations in outcome, 
dependent variable, can be attributed to controlled variation in an independent 
variable), external validity (the extent to which casual propositions are likely 
to hold true in different settings, meaning an generalizability of the findings), 
reliability (the extent to which repetition of the application of the same, or the 
supposedly equivalent, instruments to the same units will result in similar 
measurement), and objectivity (the extent the findings of an inquiry are 
determined by the subjects and conditions of the inquiry, and not by biases, 
motivations, interests, or perspectives of the inquirer) (Seale, 1999; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994b). However, these criteria are not 
necessary applicable for qualitative research traditions. Therefore I apply the 
criteria suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985) to establish trustworthiness in 
the research process as these better reflect the challenges facing the qualitative 
researcher. 
 
The work of Lincoln and Guba has been particularly influential in developing 
criteria in qualitative research in order to demonstrate changes that reflect the 
growth in constructivist and postmodernist influence (Seale, 1999). Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) argue that establishing the trustworthiness of research lies in 
the heart of issues conventionally discussed as validity and reliability. They 
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have proposed replacing the conventional formulation with four new terms: 
credibility, in place of internal validity; transferability in place of external 
validity; dependability in place of reliability; and confirmability in place of 
objectivity. Lincoln and Guba (1985) also describe ways in which qualitative 
researchers can operationalize trustworthiness. I have applied these criteria to 
ensure the quality of my research, and below I will describe how I have 
addressed them.  
 
Credibility means to perform the research so that the probability for the 
findings to be found credible is enhanced, and to demonstrate the credibility 
of the findings by having them approved by the original constructors (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985). Possible techniques to enhance credibility are prolonged 
engagement in the field, persistent observation, triangulation (data, method, 
investigators), peer debriefing, negative case analysis, referential adequacy, 
and member checks, showing material such as interviews and research reports 
to the people to whom research has been conducted so they can approve or 
disapprove with the way the researcher has represented them. This study 
therefore applies several of these techniques. Prolonged engagement in the 
field was ensured by previous research experience within both municipal 
emergency management (Scharffscher et al., 2001; Nuland et al., 2001) and 
specialized healthcare (Wiig, 2002) before I started writing the thesis. 
Persistent observation was ensured by identifying the main characteristics and 
elements relevant for public risk management and focusing on them to 
provide in-depth knowledge of the phenomenon. Triangulation was ensured 
by applying both data and method triangulation in both sectors, and by using 
analyst triangulation within specialized healthcare. Peer debriefing was 
ensured by discussing the fieldwork and my empirical findings with 
colleagues, the patient safety research team, and my supervisors. Referential 
adequacy (recording or archiving data available for critics) was ensured by 
tape-recording and transcribing all interviews, storing observational 
summaries, and all documents. Member checks were ensured by presenting 
the results in open meetings or by providing the informants with written texts 
(Seale, 1999; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
 
Transferability means that the conclusions of the study can be transferred to 
other contexts (Miles & Huberman, 1994b). Transferability is not ensured by 
random sampling but through purposeful sampling, and by providing a 
detailed and rich description of the setting studied, so that the reader has 
sufficient information to be able to judge the applicability of the findings and 
conclusions in other contexts (Seale, 1999; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In this 
thesis I have selected the cases using a most dissimilar approach with the 
purpose of contrasting two cases to improve understanding of risk 
management processes in different areas of public sector. This provided an 
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opportunity to consider the transferability of results among different settings 
of the cases. However, this thesis has illustrated the large diversity within the 
public sector by studying two different public risk regulation regimes. It is 
therefore appropriate to reflect on whether or not conclusions are transferable 
to other contexts, and whether or not it is possible to define the public sector 
as a single sector. The public sector incorporates completely different areas 
and regulation regimes with totally different risks. In this thesis, the municipal 
emergency management and specialized healthcare together provide new 
knowledge about risk management processes within areas of public sector. 
Some aspects are similar across public sector regimes while other aspects 
differ, therefore I have provide a detailed description of context and setting 
(as far as the article format allows and in thesis Part I), so that the reader can 
assess the applicability of the conclusions in other settings.  
 
Dependability refers to the consistency of the research process, its stability 
over time and across researchers and methods (Miles & Huberman, 1994b). 
Techniques to enhance dependability are overlap in methods (triangulation), 
stepwise replication, and inquiry audit (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Within this 
thesis, data were obtained through triangulation of structured interviews, 
observation, document analysis, statistical analysis, and second-order data 
sources. Moreover, stepwise replication was ensured within specialized 
healthcare by a research team performing separate data analysis prior to joint 
discussions. Inquiry audit was ensured by enlisting the aid of a supervisor 
throughout the research process, and by submitting my written analysis for 
assessment. Within specialized healthcare I was a part of a research team in 
which the team members and the project manager performed quality control 
of the research process and product. Furthermore, a reference group at the 
case hospital ensured the quality of the research process and product by 
participating in the research design, the selection of hospital divisions, and by 
giving feedback on results. 
 
Confirmability is related to the freedom of unacknowledged research biases 
and explicitness about the inevitable biases that exists (Miles & Huberman, 
1994b). The major way to establish confirmability is the confirmability audit, 
similar to the inquiry audit, triangulation, and by keeping a reflexive journal 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The confirmability audit is sought by giving rich 
description of methods and procedures, allowing the reader to follow the 
actual sequence of how data were collected, processed, transformed, and 
displayed for the specific conclusion. Moreover, all interview data were tape-
recorded and stored, with the written documents and observation notes in 
order to be available for reanalysis. Furthermore, I have kept an audit trail 
including project proposal, theoretical orientation and reorientation, interview 
guides, and notes about changes in the research process over the four years of 
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this study. I have attempted to be explicit and conscious of my personal 
assumptions, values and biases and how they might have affected the study. 
This was vital because of my decision to incorporate municipal emergency 
management and specialized healthcare into the thesis. Because of the two 
sectors’ dissimilarity it was crucial to be continuously aware of this aspect and 
describe the differences accurately before drawing conclusions.   
 
3.8 Methodological advantages and disadvantages 
There is limited research on risk management and regulation processes in the 
public sector and when I started my research in 2003 I needed to take a broad 
approach to the field. The flexibility of the case study strategy was crucial in 
order to adjust the research design as knowledge about the phenomenon 
improved. My research process began in 2003 with an independent multiple 
embedded case study in municipal emergency management. However, in late 
2004 I was engaged in a patient safety project and realized the potential of 
incorporating a single embedded case study on risk management processes in 
specialized healthcare into my thesis, as they were both involved in public 
risk management and both studies covered similar topics related to my 
research problem.  
 
The main methodological disadvantage is the inequality between the case 
studies regarding units of analysis, and the differences in the amount of 
empirical material between the two cases. In addition, being part of a research 
team in specialized healthcare, and conducting my research independently in 
the municipal emergency management, have influenced my research process. 
These aspects have been subject to considerations about whether or not to 
incorporate the two independent case studies. I argue for the benefits of the 
multiple case study to provide new insight into public risk management and 
regulation in different contextual settings. Different contexts, and the 
emphasis on exploring two public sectors faced with large diversity with 
regard to risk sources and risk characteristics is depicted in the thesis’ 
working model (Paragraph 2.6), is one of the study’s main methodological 
advantages. I have explored public risk management in these contexts in order 
to assess whether or not these findings can be transferred. A multiple case 
study usually increases the transferability of the findings (Yin, 2003). 
Furthermore, this study was inspired by Vaughan’s (1992) belief that different 
regulation regimes, organizational forms, and complexity improve the ability 
to develop better models, concepts and theory. Approaching the field by using 
contrasting cases has revealed data that would have otherwise remained 
hidden. 
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To explore risk management in a socio-technical system perspective 
constitutes another strength of the study. To study important organizational 
interfaces in risk management processes it is necessary to explore activities 
and relations among system levels. This perspective is open to criticism 
because it is difficult to obtain the high quality information at all units of 
analysis that enhances the credibility of the findings. To meet this criticism, I 
have concentrated on the vital issues and processes at the different system 
levels, described them in detail, in order to establish the clarity of how I have 
reached my conclusions in this multilevel analysis. I argue that this approach 
to risk management processes can improve the knowledge of organizational 
interfaces across system levels, because this is how these processes appear in 
a dynamic society.  
 
What could have been done differently? The qualitative researcher faces 
challenges and dilemmas and must assess where to put his or her emphasis 
and when to finish data collection and analysis. For instance, I could have 
chosen another research strategy and other data collection methods. Using an 
ethnographic strategy with a much stronger emphasis on fieldwork could have 
provided different types of data and knowledge of the risk management 
processes and decisions. However, due to complexity of the organizations 
involved, information needs from multiple system levels, time constraints, 
and my participation in a research project involving predefined constraints 
regarding research strategy and methods, made an ethnographic approach 
impractical. The study could also have employed a better method 
triangulation between quantitative and qualitative methods (Patton, 1999; 
1990). My study included triangulation within qualitative methods and a 
statistical analysis within specialized healthcare. However, I could have 
applied data material from a survey (Hospital Survey On Patient Safety, 
developed by Sorra & Nieva, 2004) that we conducted within specialized 
healthcare (Aase et al., 2007; Olsen, 2007) but data collection was not 
completed in time for the process of writing articles. 
 
I have tried to conduct my research according to the quality criteria for 
trustworthiness in qualitative research, as described in Paragraph 3.7. To 
ensure dependability and confirmability the data collection has taken place 
over four years. I have used my research team and my supervisors to ensure 
inquiry audit of my process and my product. However, there may be aspects 
of change that have been difficult to cover as these sectors changes due to a 
constant focus on efficiency and production. Nevertheless, recent studies of 
municipal emergency management (Nilsen, 2007) and specialized healthcare 
(Olsen, 2007; Høyland & Aase, 2007; Aase et al., 2007) support some of my 
findings.
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4 Results  
 
The overall research problem of the thesis is how organizational interfaces 
across system levels explain risk management processes in the public sector. 
This chapter summarizes the research problem in the main findings of the 
research articles, and the relationship among results documented in the four 
articles.  
 
4.1 Research articles and research focus 
To operationalize the research problem, four research questions are 
formulated:  
 
1. How can a socio-technical system approach explain important 
organizational interfaces in public risk management processes?  
2. How do different risk regulation regimes shape risk perception among 
officials and employees within the public sector? 
3. How can the interface between risk regulator and regulatee affect risk 
management processes? 
4. How can regulatory enforcement strategies influence information 
exchange and learning processes within the regulated?  
 
Table 3 provides an overview of the four research articles; their respective 
foci; the operationalized research question they address; and the specific 
research question presented in the articles. The overall research problem itself 
is complex. Therefore the four articles are nested together and are 
thematically overlapping. Each article is related to one main research question 
numbered above from 1 – 4 (the bold numbers in column 4), however they 
help to answer some of the other research questions (illustrated by unbolded 
letters in column 4).  
 
The four research articles all describe organizational interfaces among system 
levels in public risk management processes. However, the articles vary in the 
degree to which they detail the system from the governmental to the street 
level. Articles I and IV map interfaces in the entire socio-technical system, 
and Articles II and III emphasize the regulator-regulatee interface.  
   
 
Articles Main focus Sector  Overall research question Specific research question in 
articles 
I: Fallible 
humans in 
infallible 
systems? 
Learning from 
errors in health 
care 
Explores the 
multilevel system of 
managing errors in 
healthcare, and maps 
organizational 
interfaces of 
importance for 
learning from 
medical errors. 
Specialized  
healthcare 
1. How can a socio-technical system approach explain 
important organizational interfaces in public risk 
management processes? 
 
3. How can the interface between risk regulator and 
regulatee affect risk management processes? 
 
4. How can regulatory enforcement strategies influence 
information exchange and learning processes within the 
regulated?  
The aim of the study is to explore the 
multilevel system of managing errors in 
Norwegian Healthcare and to map interfaces of 
importance for learning from errors. 
II: Risk 
regulation 
strategies in 
public 
emergency 
management – A 
learning 
perspective 
Analyzes regulatory 
enforcements 
strategies according 
to their influence on 
learning within the 
regulated 
municipalities.  
Municipal  
emergency 
management
4. How can regulatory enforcement strategies influence 
information exchange and learning processes within the 
regulated?   
 
3. How can the interface between risk regulator and 
regulatee affect risk management processes? 
 
How do regulatory enforcement strategies 
impact learning processes within the regulated 
municipalities? 
 
What kinds of learning constraints can be 
identified in the regulator–regulatee interface 
obstructing learning processes within the 
regulated municipalities? 
III: Patient safety 
in the interface 
between hospital 
and risk regulator 
Analyzes how 
systematic and 
incidental regulatory 
activities affect 
patient safety 
improvement. 
Specialized  
healthcare 
3. How can the interface between risk regulator and 
regulatee affect risk management processes? 
 
4. How can regulatory enforcement strategies influence 
information exchange and learning processes within the 
regulated?  
 
How does the interface between hospital and 
risk regulator affect patient safety?  
 
How does systematic or incidental regulatory 
activities contribute to patient safety? 
 
Does an individual or a system focus in the 
interface have different effects on patient 
safety?  
IV: Risk 
perception within 
different risk 
regulation 
regimes 
Explores how 
regulatory officials 
and employees 
perceive risk within 
different risk 
regulation regimes. 
Specialized 
healthcare 
&  
Municipal 
emergency 
management
2. How do different risk regulation regimes shape risk 
perception among officials and employees within the 
public sector? 
 
1. How can a socio-technical system approach explain 
important organizational interfaces in public risk 
management processes? 
 
3. How can the interface between risk regulator and 
regulatee affect risk management processes? 
 
How do contextual and content elements of 
risk regulation regimes shape risk perception 
among officials and employees within different 
regimes? 
Tabell 3 Article title and main focus, the related overall research question, and the specific research questions presented in the articles 
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4.2  Results article I 
The title of the first article is “Fallible humans in infallible systems? Learning 
from errors in health care.” The article is concerned with Research Questions 
1, 3 and 4 (see Table 3). The objective of the article is to explore the 
multilevel system of managing errors in the Norwegian healthcare and to map 
interfaces of importance of learning from errors. Despite a substantial 
literature on patient safety during the last ten years (e.g. Institute of Medicine, 
2000; 2001; Rosenthal & Sutcliffe, 2002; Spath, 1999), empirical studies with 
a multilevel system approach are limited. Such studies are required to improve 
the understanding of causal chains and spread responsibility throughout all 
system levels to reduce errors in the sharp end (Ruchlin et al., 2004; Firth-
Cozens, 2001; West, 2000). A multilevel case study was therefore conducted 
using Rasmussen’s (1997) socio-technical risk management system as a 
framework for studying government, regulators and associations, company, 
management, staff, and work operation. 
  
Results document that different system levels depend on each other in the 
process of error prevention in Norwegian healthcare. The contextual 
descriptions of the entire healthcare risk management system revealed that 
learning from errors is sporadic, individual and occurs separately within the 
single system levels, with limited information and knowledge exchange 
among system levels. The healthcare system’s ability to prevent and learn 
from errors was negatively affected by reforms initiated at the governmental 
level. Structural reforms concerning hospital financing and institutional 
management altered important framework conditions at all system levels. The 
reforms resulted in a compound pressure concerning efficiency and safety at 
hospital, management, staff, and work operation levels. The effects were time 
pressure, stress, increased workload, and understaffing with a negative impact 
on the learning conditions within and across system levels. Results also show 
that the regulator-regulatee interface has limited impact on learning from 
errors in the healthcare system. Furthermore, the results show that the error 
reporting system applied in healthcare focuses on statistics and not systematic 
feedback processes or proactive searches for new risk sources and prevention 
of errors across system levels.  
 
In sum, the study has shown that the premises on which error prevention in 
the healthcare system are based, and the processes of importance for error 
prevention, are all top-down, accumulating expectations and strain towards 
the lower levels of the system (staff and work operation). As a counteractive 
measure, the article suggests that bottom-up structures and upward feedback 
mechanisms should be strengthened. Error preventive needs and constraints 
should be clarified at the work operation level and communicated to all 
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upward levels for responses and measures; and safety impact studies should 
be conducted prior to future healthcare reforms. 
 
4.3 Results article II 
The title of the second article is “Risk regulation strategies in public 
emergency management – A learning perspective.” The article answers 
Research Questions 3 and 4 (see Table 3). Article II examines how 
government, despite limited legislation, uses enforcement strategies to 
regulate risks exposed to municipalities. The study explored how risk 
regulation strategies in the public sector contribute to information exchange 
and learning on the part of the regulated. The article is based on empirical 
data from a qualitative multiple case study of six municipalities in two 
Norwegian counties.  
 
Results were categorized according to two contrasting regulatory enforcement 
strategies denoted deterrence approaches (representing a formal control style, 
involving a strict imposition of standards) and compliance approaches 
(representing an informal style of regulation emphasizing diplomacy, 
persuasion, and education). The main emphasis in all municipalities was the 
compliance approaches. The regulators stressed a wide range of activities 
related to the compliance enforcement strategy, not necessarily with a 
learning perspective in mind. Nevertheless, by using compliance approaches 
the regulator provided healthy learning conditions. In organizing the 
compliance approaches, the regulator emphasized discussion, reflection, and 
networking in the regulator-regulatee interface. Learning within the 
compliance approaches fostered a co-operative and open climate, promoted 
knowledge circulation, and generated knowledge through actions and 
reflections among individuals, groups and communities of emergency 
managers and inspectors. The positive influence from compliance approaches 
on learning depended on the regulatees’ priority and willingness to participate 
in the activities facilitated by the regulator. In contrast, the deterrence 
approaches implied control activities focusing on compliance. Objections and 
inspections often caused adjustments, corrections, and attempts to comply, but 
the activities implied short-term solutions that could not be characterized as 
learning processes. Aspects of the deterrence approaches could constitute 
learning constraints in the regulator-regulatee interface. Formal written 
documents and written information exchange were important aspects, and the 
inspectors were usually preoccupied with document quality, rather than 
process quality. Learning constraints were the lack of priority and positions 
within emergency management in the municipalities. Lack of education and 
knowledge among municipal employees, and conflicting demands between 
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emergency management and mandatory work tasks, were also identified as 
learning constraints within the municipalities.   
 
In sum, the study has shown that different regulatory enforcement strategies 
have different effects on the regulatee’s learning, and that different learning 
constraints needs to be considered. The article has emphasized the learning 
processes in the regulated municipalities. Future studies should include how 
the regulatory authorities and inspectors learn in the regulator-regulatee 
interface.  
 
4.4 Results article III 
The title of the third article is “Patient safety in the interface between hospital 
and risk regulator.” The article answers Research Questions 3 and 4 (see 
Table 3). The research design is based on a multilevel case study within the 
Norwegian healthcare system.  
 
The regulator-regulatee interface is studied using two-dimensions: systematic 
or incidental regulatory activities (process) and system or individual focus in 
performing regulatory activities (structure). Four types of systematic activities 
were covered: 1) system audits, 2) event based inspections, 3) mandatory 
error reporting system, and 4) error investigations. The systematic activities 
are performed in multiple ways but are all characterized by formal procedures. 
In addition, three types of incidental activities were covered: 5) courses, 6) 
meetings, and 7) exchange of personal knowledge. Figure 4 illustrates how 
the regulatory activities were categorized according to the process and 
structure dimensions.  
 
There are two main types of systematic regulatory activities: system audit and 
event based inspection. The system audit is performed within specific medical 
domains or organizational levels. The system audit improves patient safety 
locally, but strives to improve patient safety across intra-organizational 
borders. 
 
Results 
 49 
Figure 4. Regulatory interface matrix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The event-based inspection is reactive and more individually oriented. It is 
initiated by mandatory error reports (3), patient complaints, or by suspicion of 
insufficient practice. Based on the severity of the reported errors or 
complaints, the regulator opens cases (4) against either an individual 
healthcare worker or the hospital. The incidental regulatory activities (5,6,7) 
are activities “standing on their own” and are not part of a systematic and 
consistent “safety-control-system”. These incidental activities are 
characterized by advice rather than control. They improve the knowledge of 
hospital staff and contribute to positive communication, but they are not 
predominant activities in the regulator-regulatee interface. 
 
The results demonstrated a paradox in the regulatory legal framework. The 
law on the one hand focuses on the system responsibility to provide safe 
health care, but on the other hand provide a more extensive sanctioning 
repertoire towards individuals than organizations. Inspectors at both national 
and local levels admit that their ability to sanction individuals is stronger than 
the system’s. However, inspectors argue that individuals are in most cases 
sanctioned for reasons other than medical error.  
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In sum, the study shows that the regulatory activities holding a system 
perspective, such as system audit (1) and courses (5), promote openness and 
dialogue, and affect patient safety more positively than activities holding an 
individual perspective. The individual perspective characterizing event-based 
inspections (2), error reporting (3) and error investigations (4), contributes to 
underreporting, fear of sanctions, and hampers openness, discussion, and 
information exchange. From a risk management process perspective, the 
approaches within the regulator-regulatee interface need improvements to 
move systematic regulatory activities (event-based inspection, error reporting, 
error investigation) towards a system perspective, and to emphasize incidental 
regulatory activities (courses, meetings).  
 
4.5 Results article IV 
The title of the fourth article is “Risk perception within different risk 
regulation regimes.” The article answers Research Questions 1,2, and 3 (see 
Table 3). The article explores how regime contextual aspects (type of risk, 
public preferences and attitudes, organized interests) and regime content 
aspects (size, structure, style) shape risk perception among officials and 
employees within two highly different Norwegian public risk regulation 
regimes. The article is based on empirical data from a most dissimilar case 
study approach covering specialized healthcare and municipal emergency 
management.  
 
Findings in specialized healthcare and municipal emergency management 
show that risk perception differs among employees and officials within 
various system levels of the risk regulation regimes. Risks are amplified and 
attenuated throughout the hierarchical regime structures through risk 
management processes depending on interaction among humans, 
organizations, and regulators; external pressure from public and organized 
interests; technological changes, and financial circumstances causing 
compound pressure between efficiency and safety. The social amplification 
and attenuation of risks were more prominent in the specialized healthcare 
regime.  
 
The study revealed differences in the degree of heterogeneous and 
homogenous risk perception across regime levels between specialized 
healthcare and municipal emergency management. We argue that the 
explanation for this variance lies in the differences between the two regimes. 
Although both regimes rely on self-regulation, a regime involving complex 
structures and formal regulatory enforcement of a detailed legislation will 
involve occupational and hierarchical variations in understanding risk 
(specialized healthcare). However, a regime with informal regulatory 
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enforcement styles, limited legislation, and low complexity will imply less 
variation in risk perception (municipal emergency management). These 
content-related aspects alone do not shape risk perception; contextual aspects 
also have to be taken into account. Among contextual elements, type of risks 
was the most vital factor in shaping risk perception. Within municipal 
emergency management, risks were usually observable and therefore 
commonly conceptualized across the regime. Within specialized healthcare, 
some risks were observable and managed, but several risk types emerged 
because of the changes and complexity within the regime, and were therefore 
perceived differently across the regime, if perceived at all.   
 
4.6 Relationship among articles 
In sum, the four research articles documented that organizational interfaces 
across system levels can explain risk management processes in the public 
sector. Articles I and IV describe organizational interfaces across the entire 
socio-technical system; how risk amplification and attenuation and learning 
function in the interfaces; and how regulatory enforcement influences risk 
management processes in both positive and negative direction. Articles II and 
III investigated how the organizational interface between regulators and 
regulatees affects public risk management; how enforcement strategies 
promote or counteract learning processes; and how a system or individual 
focus in enforcement activities make different contributions to public risk 
management processes. 
 
Article I demonstrates how error prevention and safe patient treatment in 
healthcare depends on processes, decisions, and interdependencies among all 
system levels. The article also shows how a multilevel socio-technical system 
perspective applied to risk management processes can be used empirically to 
map and analyze important activities and barriers among system levels. The 
analysis reveals difficult framework conditions for safe patient treatment and 
learning from errors at staff and work operation level. Article IV describes 
risk management processes across the socio-technical system, using empirical 
material at all system levels. The article applies the Risk Regulation Regime 
framework (Hood et al., 1999a; 2001) for comparing risk regulation regimes 
and analyzes the two public sectors in this thesis. The article explains how the 
context and content of the two regimes shape how employees and regulatory 
inspectors perceive and respond to different types of risk. The RRR 
framework and the socio-technical perspective have several similarities 
although they appear in different forms. The contextual aspects of the RRR 
framework: type of risk, public attitudes and preferences, and organized 
interests correspond to the socio-technical system aspects of hazards at work 
operation level, environmental stressors in forms of political and public 
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awareness, and market conditions. Moreover, the content aspects of the RRR 
framework: size, structure, and style, correspond to the socio-technical system 
perspective in forms of the regulatory legislation and rule making, the 
multilevel hierarchical structure, and regulatory enforcement and feedback 
loops (Rasmussen, 1997; Hood et al., 1999a; 2001). By applying both a socio-
technical system perspective and the RRR framework, Articles I and IV 
contribute to an improved understanding of the relationship between 
employees and operators in the sharp end, managers and regulatory inspectors 
in the blunt end, and the organizational systems and contextual settings in 
which they are all embedded. Both articles show that these organizational 
interfaces and contexts shape risk perception and the ability to learn from and 
improve public risk management processes (Wiig & Aase, 2007; Wiig & 
Lindøe, 2007b). 
 
Articles II and III focus on the regulator - regulatee interface and study how 
regulatory enforcement through application of different strategies and 
activities may or may not gain compliance with the law and improve the risk 
management within the regulated organizations. Individually, these articles 
approach regulatory enforcement by using different theoretical frameworks to 
explore and analyze the regulator-regulatee interface. Article II approaches 
the regulatory enforcement debate by applying a learning perspective to 
different enforcement strategies (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000; Hansen et al., 
1999; Argyris & Schön, 1996). Article III analyzes the regulatory activities in 
specialized healthcare according to their systematic or incidental appearance 
(Kirwan et al., 2002; Hood et al., 1999a; 2001), corresponding to the 
compliance and deterrence strategies presented in Article II. However, in 
Article III a second dimension is included in analyzing the regulator-regulatee 
activities, concerning whether the regulator uses an individual or system focus 
in the regulatory activities (Reason, 2000, Mulcahy & Rosenthal, 1999; 
Leape, 1994). Both articles argue that different regulatory enforcement 
strategies and their related activities may promote or counteract risk 
management and learning within the regulatee depending on the organizing of 
the activities; the system or individual focus emphasized by the regulator; and 
the regulatees’ willingness to participate. They also reveal a need to integrate 
feedback and learning when planning and performing regulatory activities in 
order to improve public risk management processes. 
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5 Discussion  
 
The overall research problem of the thesis has been: How can organizational 
interfaces across system levels explain risk management processes in the 
public sector? In the following chapter I will discuss the findings, and 
describe the research contribution made by the thesis. 
 
5.1 Discussion of main findings 
The exploration of the two different risk regulation regimes, with contrasting 
risk profiles (depicted in the thesis working model, Paragraph 2.6), provides a 
sound basis for exploring risk management processes in the public sector, and 
explains the importance of organizational interfaces in these processes. The 
thesis has applied several theoretical contributions to analyze comprehensive 
empirical data. This makes multiple interpretations of the findings possible, 
according to several theoretical perspectives. The results could have been 
interpreted strictly according to a socio-technical system perspective 
(Rasmussen, 1997; 2000; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Leveson, 2004; 
Leveson et al., 2005; 2006) emphasizing constraints and adaptations in the 
organizational interfaces to explain risk management processes in the public 
sector. Results could have been analyzed according to a learning perspective 
(Reason, 1997; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000; Weick et al., 1999), interpreting 
risk management as a collective learning process in the risk regulation 
regimes. Otherwise, results could have been analyzed according to risk 
regulation theory (Hood et al., 1999a; 2001; Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992), interpreting the results as a matter of diverse strategies to 
control risk in different contextual settings. 
  
To structure the discussion, I discuss the findings according to three 
headlines, drawing on the multiple theoretical contributions applied in the 
thesis. The first paragraph discusses whether or not the socio-technical system 
perspective adds to the explanation of risk management processes in the 
public sector (Research Question 1). The second paragraph discusses whether 
or not risk perception can be seen as a multilevel process across 
organizational interfaces in risk regulation regimes (Research Question 2). 
The third paragraph discusses the importance of the regulator-regulatee 
interface in risk management processes in the public sector (Research 
Question 3 and 4).  
 
5.1.1 The explanatory power of the socio-technical system 
perspective   
The application of a socio-technical system approach to real life risk 
management processes, revealed how work processes at the staff or work 
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operation level of importance for patient safety or emergency management, 
depend on framework conditions and decisions established by higher 
hierarchical levels. The approach enables the study of effects of changes at the 
governmental level on framework conditions for the lower structural levels 
exposed to these changes (Wiig & Aase, 2007). These are aspects that are not 
sufficiently understood in the public sector (e.g. West, 2000). The explanatory 
power of the socio-technical system perspective is the ability to document the 
dependability regarding decision-making and information flow at all system 
levels in a regime. The perspective provides a framework that facilitates a 
comprehensive understanding of technical, managerial, organizational, and 
regulatory issues and demonstrates how these factors can be integrated in 
order to understand and improve risk management processes. Furthermore, 
the perspective illustrates the responsibility of governments, ministries, 
regulators, and regulated organizations, and that their decisions and actions 
cannot be understood separately. They constitute framework condition and 
constraints that combine to affect the regime’s ability to perform safely. Thus, 
a comprehensive understanding of risk management according to a socio-
technical system perspective provides a better understanding of factors that 
need to be addressed to prevent accidents and improve risk management 
processes in the public sector (Wiig & Aase, 2007; Wiig; 2007; Wiig & 
Lindøe, 2007a;b).  
 
In normal work operations the socio-technical system perspective reveals that 
emergency managers, hospital staff and middle managers on a daily basis had 
to balance a compound pressure between efficiency and safety. The pressure 
can be interpreted as a constraint directed downwards from higher levels 
(Leveson, 2004; Leveson et al., 2005; 2006). More specifically, municipal 
emergency managers found mandatory work operations more urgent than 
emergency management tasks that were not established by law (Wiig, 2007). 
As a consequence, emergency management is vulnerable and is often given 
less priority than mandatory work operations, due to lack of legislation 
(Reason, 1997; Rasmussen, 1997). Similarly, specialized healthcare staff must 
adapt their normal work practice to meet demands to provide safe patient 
treatment, yet simultaneously treat more patients, faster, and with better 
quality (Wiig & Aase, 2007; Flin, 2006; Woods 2006). These are conflicting 
goals, depending on processes across the entire regime, in which a socio-
technical system approach documents due to its multilevel perspective, 
bringing in aspects beyond organizational boundaries. The application of a 
socio-technical system perspective furthermore enabled the shift of units of 
analysis, e.g. revealing that the present communication mechanisms across 
organizational interfaces within the healthcare are insufficient. Due to the 
focus on different system levels within an organization, the socio-technical 
system perspective revealed that structural deficiencies and inadequate 
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managerial decisions within the hospital organization reduced the influence of 
the mandatory internal risk management system. The system was not able to 
communicate upwards the constraints and error preventive needs required to 
invoke necessary changes at the work operation level (Wiig & Aase, 2007).  
 
Exploring risk management processes in a socio-technical system perspective 
raises a methodological dilemma. Overemphasizing the multilevel perspective 
may cause a loss of substance knowledge at each system level; 
overemphasizing the details at each system level may sacrifice oversight. It is 
difficult to capture processes across the entire healthcare system or the 
municipal emergency management system. One of the implications is that 
delimitations are required in order to be specific on the issues to be covered 
across system levels. Moreover, complex environmental stressors and changes 
imposed may be difficult to cover at each system level. In the research process 
this may mean that organizational interfaces, change processes, and 
environmental stressors must be defined and selected in order to be 
scrutinized for the sake of a multilevel understanding of their implications. 
Such prioritization could neglect issues of importance for risk management. 
Thus it is vital to be transparent in methodological choices and delimitations 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994b).  
 
Both the socio-technical system perspective (Rasmussen, 1997; 2000; 
Leveson, 2004) and the RRR framework (Hood et al., 1999a; 2001), applied 
in the thesis, rely on an underlying cybernetic control perspective. One may 
question whether or not a cybernetic perspective delimits the explanatory 
power of these models. In the cybernetic perspective it is possible to control 
risk by feedback processes starting out with defining goals or standards, 
monitor these, and implement actions to change the behavior of the system. 
However, in real life risk control processes it may be hard to achieve pre-set 
standards due to conflicting goals, conflicting viewpoints, and no common 
agreement among involved stakeholders (Hood, 1996). Le Coze (2007) raises 
a critique of the application of the socio-technical system perspective, as it is 
approached by Rasmussen (1997; 2000) and Leveson (2004) classifying these 
approaches as normative or prescriptive, due to predefinitions in the models 
and basic components to be filled. He pinpoints that the foundations of these 
models integrates simplifications for practical purposes, that may put 
constraints on the data as these should fit the models, rather than the models 
fitting the data (Le Coze, 2007). However, all models embody simplifications, 
and the consequence is the need to acknowledge their simplifications, and to 
assess their advantages and disadvantages, implying that the model is chosen 
consciously (Hollnagel & Woods, 2006; Le Coze, 2007). 
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5.1.2 Risk perception as a multilevel process 
When exploring risk management processes at different system levels, the 
empirical results have revealed contrasting views and understandings of risk 
(Wiig & Lindøe, 2007b), implying a need to interpret how these divergent 
perspectives emerge, and how social, cultural, and structural factors shape risk 
perception. By interpreting the results from a risk perception perspective 
(Pidgeon et al., 2003; Rothstein, 2003a; Kasperson et al., 1988) results 
demonstrated that risk management processes were affected by amplification 
and attenuation processes implying that some risks were emphasized while 
others were de-emphasized in the different regimes.  
 
Results showed that risk perception within the specialized healthcare regime 
was heterogeneous and varied across regime levels, while risk perception 
within municipal emergency management turned out to be more homogenous 
across the regime. The diverse risk profiles between specialized healthcare 
and municipal emergency management, demonstrated that contextual aspects 
of the regime in terms of risk types and differences in risk perception invoked 
consequences for the organizational interfaces across both socio-technical 
systems. Moreover, the amount of legislation, regime enforcement style, and 
structural complexity were determinants of the amplification and attenuation 
processes (Wiig & Lindøe, 2007b).   
 
The specialized healthcare case demonstrated a regime regulating internally 
imposed risks, in terms of medical errors, often triggered by individual 
healthcare employees in the sharp end. However, the risk causality was 
complex because of latent conditions and insufficient processes across 
organizational interfaces in the entire socio-technical system. Diverse 
occupational groups across hospital wards and clinics interact in tightly 
coupled patterns of interaction, often prone to role ambiguity, communication 
failure, and information loss. The patient treatment moreover depends on 
complex technology, medication, and more specialized professions. Thus, a 
common conceptualization of risk is difficult due to the multiple amplification 
and attenuation stations through which risk is socially processed (Pidgeon et 
al., 2003; Rothstein, 2003a), such as strong occupational groups and 
subcultures, powerful regulatory authorities and sanctioning means, media 
cover, and handover or transitions. These amplification stations cause 
contradictory risk perceptions among regulators, top managers, middle 
managers, and occupational groups (Wiig & Lindøe, 2007b; Wiig & Aase, 
2007). The heterogeneous risk perception contributes to complicate risk 
management processes across organizational interfaces. Since there is no 
common conceptualization of risk, sharing of relevant information is difficult 
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both vertically and horizontally in the regime, and so is the management of 
risk (Wiig & Lindøe, 2007b; Wiig & Aase, 2007).  
 
In the municipal emergency management case the usual risk type is 
observable and externally imposed, but can also be amplified by insufficient 
local planning, insufficient risk analysis, or understaffing (Wiig, 2007; Wiig 
& Lindøe, 2007b). For example, during and after risk exposure, amplification 
processes occur across organizational interfaces through stations such as 
national and local level regulatory authorities, media, or the public. 
Consequently, the pressure on the emergency management staff, and street 
bureaucrat levels will increase. Simultaneously, the pressure upwards the 
regime increases because the regulator is involved in coordination and 
managing risk events of a certain extent. Nevertheless, the established regime 
does not address culpability; and the legislation does not provide the regulator 
with a legal authority to sanction individuals or the organizations. Instead, the 
regulator uses the accidents for learning purposes (Wiig, 2007). The regime is 
prone to risk attenuation due to the legislative framework making the 
regulator incapable of enforcing authority and sanctions in times of amoral 
calculators, or when the regulatee, imaged as a political citizen, is not 
convinced by the regulators’ arguments (Kagan & Scholz; 1984; Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992). This legal aspect allows for a regulatee who for multiple 
reasons disapproves of the performance of municipal emergency 
management, to do so. This may allow risk conditions to exist within the 
regulatee. In particular, it makes the regulatee vulnerable when facing 
unexpected risks dissimilar to the types they have previously experienced. 
There is a possibility that the regulatee’s norms and beliefs with regard to the 
risk profile (Turner, 2006), will direct attention to and amplify certain types of 
risk and not others.  
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5.1.3 The regulator - regulatee interface – does it matter? 
Risk regulators are described in the literature as vital institutions in risk 
regulation regimes (Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Hood et al., 1999a; 2001; 
Walshe, 2002). The nature of the regulatory institution affects not only the 
style and strategies employed, but also the success or failure of which 
regulatory ends are met. This thesis has investigated the organizational 
interface between the risk regulator and the regulatee by emphasizing 
systematic and incidental activities performed in the interface; by assessing 
the regulators’ underlying models of understanding errors (Wiig & Lindøe, 
2007a); and by exploring different enforcement strategies employed in 
regulatory practice and their belonging learning effects within the regulatee 
(Wiig, 2007).  
 
The legal framework regulates responsibilities, systematic processes, and 
structures for managing risk across organizational interfaces within both 
studied regimes (Wiig 2007; Wiig & Lindøe, 2007a; b; Wiig & Aase, 2007). 
The contrasts between the regimes regarding statutory authority and power 
(Walshe, 2002) implied a substantial diversity in their ability to enforce 
compliance or deterrence strategies. Neither of the regimes approached 
regulation strictly according to deterrence or compliance enforcement 
strategies. Due to absence of an emergency management act, the regulator in 
municipal emergency management relied on compliance approaches. 
However, some activities in this interface were characterized as more formal 
and systematic, implying a stronger control aspect in accordance with 
deterrence approaches, but not in a strict sense. The success in terms of 
compliance with regulatory demands and increased level of emergency 
management performance, depended on the regulatees’ willingness to 
participate in regulatory activities, and the regulators’ ability to persuade, 
educate, and increase commitment within the regulatees (Wiig, 2007). The 
specialized healthcare regime enforced a strict detailed legislation, enabling 
the regulator to use deterrence approaches. Still, the regulator preferred 
compliance approaches in practice (Wiig & Lindøe, 2007a). The healthcare 
legislation required several systematic activities in the regulator-regulatee 
interface that usually relied on a distant and formalistic relationship, related to 
deterrence strategies (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). The performance of the 
systematic activities was characterized by written information exchange, 
involving limited face-to-face communication implying proneness to 
information loss in the interface. The systematic activities increased risk 
awareness and attention to patient safety issues among the hospital top and 
middle management. Furthermore, they fostered corrective action to 
accomplish mandatory work operations in the hospital. The incidental 
activities in the interface were characterized by openness, dialogue, and 
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advice. They improved competence among hospital employees and managers. 
However, the incidental activities were not predominant in the interface, due 
to fear of conflicting roles among the regulatory inspectors, and changes in 
the legal framework over the past years. In sum, the regulator-hospital 
interface did not have substantial influence on patient safety improvement and 
learning from errors within the hospital (Wiig & Lindøe, 2007a; Wiig & 
Aase, 2007).  
 
Interpreting risk regulation as a learning process demonstrates the effects of 
underlying error models (Wiig & Lindøe, 2007a) and the employed regulatory 
enforcement strategies (Wiig, 2007) within the studied regimes. Regulation 
then requires vertical information flow across organizational interfaces within 
the regimes, and requires regulators, organizations, and employees to focus on 
systems instead of individuals (Allsop & Mulcahy, 1996; Reason, 2000; 
Berwick, 1989). In addition, learning processes require activities and arenas 
for reflection and discussion on current practices and improvements (Aase & 
Nybø, 2004; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000).  
 
In the specialized healthcare regime, it can be argued that a lack of system 
perspective, limited provision of advice-related activities and support from the 
regulator, and limited use of tripartism have obstructed learning processes. It 
has contributed to fear of blame and defensiveness (Berwick, 1989). Lack of 
tripartism reduces sources of information and narrows the possibilities of 
proper oversight (Walshe, 2003). An underlying individually oriented error 
perspective caused difficulties for the regulator in obtaining vital information 
due to problems related to managing the dilemma between liability and 
learning involving mixed roles for the inspectors (Tamuz, 2001; Wilpert, 
2006; Reiman & Norros, 2002); it has been documented to cause 
underreporting and information loss (Wiig & Aase, 2007); and lack of 
commitment to the formal risk management system within the hospital (Wiig 
& Lindøe, 2007b). The study revealed a need to integrate a system orientation 
into regulatory tools and strategies. The regulator should continue the ongoing 
effort to bridge the gap between an articulated desire for a system perspective 
and an individually oriented investigative practice (Wiig & Lindøe, 2007a). 
The specialized healthcare regime holds the legal framework conditions to 
control risk through responsive regulation (Walshe, 2003; Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992) in terms of sanctioning and enforcement pyramids at an 
individual and organizational level. However, the regime seems to lack 
flexibility, and a complete hierarchy of sanctions at the organizational level. 
This results in an unwillingness to use the strongest sanctioning means against 
the hospital (Wiig & Lindøe, 2007a), because these consequences are so 
drastic that it is hardly ever appropriate to use them (e.g. closing a hospital 
ward or a hospital).  
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 Within municipal emergency management the regime directed responsibility 
towards the system, preparing the municipal organization to manage risk. This 
regime to a certain degree involves tripartism in the form of for example 
efforts from volunteer organizations during emergencies. The regulator 
applies a mix of regulatory activities in the interface and promotes persuasion, 
education, and facilitates several learning arenas for information flow across 
the regulator-regulatee interface. These activities were described and 
evaluated as positive, promoting discussion, reflection, increased competence, 
and experience transfer in the regulator-regulatee interface. The compliance 
approaches thus contributed to defining regulation as a learning process 
(Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000; Reason, 1997). The activities categorized 
according to the deterrence approaches implied short-term adjustments and 
were not defined as a learning process. Learning barriers such as time 
pressure, competing demands, and financial circumstances were identified in 
the regulator-regulatee interface, complicating the improvement of risk 
management processes (Wiig, 2007).  
 
The most prominent aspect of the regulator-regulatee interface concerns the 
different learning impacts of practicing different regulatory enforcement 
strategies. In both regimes, the compliance approach activities had a stronger 
tendency to invoke second-order learning processes in the regulatees, 
involving new ways of solving problems, compared to deterrence activities. 
The deterrence activities contributed to first-order learning processes, 
characterized by local adjustments and adaptations to regulatory demands 
rather than engaging the regulatees in second-order learning processes 
involving a long-term improvement perspective. The discrepancy between the 
regimes was illuminated by the diversity in regulatory practice. More 
specifically, regulatory practice in specialized healthcare was characterized by 
signs of deterrence, compared to the municipal emergency management, and 
learning processes were sporadic, individual, and occurred separately within 
the system levels (Wiig & Aase, 2007). Several factors beyond regulatory 
enforcement strategies, contribute to determine the success or failure of 
learning processes. However, this thesis found that the regulators’ choice and 
practice of regulatory enforcement strategies, influence the quality of 
regulatees’ learning processes (Wiig & Aase, 2007; Wiig, 2007; Wiig & 
Lindøe, 2007a;b). 
 
Thus, keeping the learning aspect in mind and interpreting it according to the 
RRR framework (Hood et al., 1999a; 2001), one question is the degree to 
which the framework incorporates a learning perspective. This thesis 
documented that the size element, involving diverse legal framework; 
systematic/incidental activities; and sanctioning power (Wiig & Lindøe, 
2007a; Wiig, 2007); the style element and the use of deterrence or compliance 
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enforcement strategies (Wiig, 2007; Wiig & Lindøe, 2007b); and the structure 
element and the degree of structure complexity, communication mechanisms, 
and information flow altogether were regime content elements affecting the 
regulatee’s learning processes and barriers (Wiig & Aase, 2007; Wiig & 
Lindøe, 2007b). The thesis also showed that the regime context in forms of 
the type of risk and media cover, were related to learning implications. 
Learning processes depended on the sharp end – blunt end dimension and 
whether or not people are exposed to risk (Wiig & Lindøe, 2007b; Slovic, 
2000), and need strategies to cope with risk in their work. Simultaneously, the 
fear of media cover implied negative learning implications due to collegial 
cover-ups and limited discussion of errors (Wiig & Aase, 2007). These 
learning aspects of regime content and context are relevant when performing 
the control components (standard setting, information collection, and 
behaviour modification) in regulatory practice. According to the thesis results, 
an explicit discussion regarding the extent to which the control components 
should emphasize the learning aspect would strengthen the RRR framework 
(Hood et al., 1999a; 2001).  
 
5.2 Research contribution 
In sum, the thesis contributes to the study of risk governance (Renn, 2005; 
2007), by providing new knowledge on risk processes in vertical governance 
structures in two risk regulation regimes. The thesis has contributed with an 
empirical exploration of organizational interfaces from a socio-technical 
system perspective (Rasmussen, 1997; 2000, Leveson, 2004). There is a lack 
of multilevel empirical studies of risk management in the public sector, and 
this thesis studies practical risk management processes across system levels. 
The emphasis on organizational interfaces has refined the socio-technical 
system perspective by providing new knowledge about implications of 
structures (e.g. legal framework, institutional design, framework conditions, 
defined roles, and responsibilities) and processes (e.g. interaction among 
subsystems, regulatory practice, information flow, role conflicts), defining the 
organizational interfaces as key transitions points among the different 
organizational subsystems and their members, involved in risk management 
processes. Thus, the thesis has improved our theoretical and empirical 
conceptualization of the organizational interface concept.  
 
The research contribution refines risk regulation theory by incorporating the 
learning perspective. The thesis explores risk regulation as a learning process 
by studying learning effects from different regulatory enforcement strategies 
and activities in the regulator-regulatee interface. Moreover, it has called for 
an explicit development of the RRR framework (Hood et al., 1999a; 2001) to 
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integrate learning implications from content and context aspects on the control 
components in performing regulatory practice.  
 
By approaching risk perception from a broad perspective, the thesis adds to 
the risk perception research (Kasperson et al., 1988; Pidgeon et al., 2003), 
viewing it as a multilevel process depending on structural, cultural, and 
process elements across organizational interfaces. The thesis has explored risk 
perception across regime levels and pinpointed how the contextual and 
content aspects (Hood et al., 1999a; 2001) of the regimes themselves shape 
risk perception of inspectors and employees. Only a few studies (Rothstein, 
2003a; Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock, 1992) have addressed risk perception in a 
similar manner. Thus, the thesis provides a foundation for further theoretical 
and empirical development of a multilevel understanding of risk perception 
among diverse occupational groups across levels of risk regulation regimes.
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6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I answer the overall research problem: how can organizational 
interfaces across system levels explain risk management processes in the 
public sector? Moreover, I recommend relevant implications for risk 
management processes in the public sector, and suggest focal areas for further 
research.  
 
6.1 Answering the research problem 
This thesis has demonstrated that risk regulation regimes will be exposed to 
pressures from internal mechanisms (e.g. occupational subcultures, regulatory 
styles, underreporting) and external mechanisms (e.g. public attitudes, 
governmental reforms, media cover), with consequences that have to be 
managed across organizational interfaces. Thus, the understanding of vertical 
risk governance processes and organizational interfaces is vital, and 
particularly important in relation to restructuring processes in the public sector 
(e.g. New Public Management reforms). 
 
The socio-technical system perspective is appropriate to structure and 
understand risk management processes across multiple organizational 
interfaces. It structures both theoretical and methodological choices in 
research on vertical risk governance processes. These processes across 
organizational interfaces moreover shape risk perception among officials and 
employees in different risk regulation regimes. By improving knowledge on 
social, cultural, structural, and contextual determinants of risk perception one 
may understand why certain types of risks are emphasized and managed, 
while others are neglected in socio-technical risk management processes.  
 
The regulator-regulatee interface can both facilitate and obstruct risk 
management processes. The study of activities in the interface between 
regulators and regulates documented that learning and improvement within 
the regulatees depended on compliance enforcement strategies; system 
oriented error models; and frequent activities both systematic and incidental in 
the interface. Deterrence enforcement strategies along with individual error 
models and sporadic regulatory activities counteracted the influence from the 
regulator-regulatee interface on long-term improvement and learning in the 
risk management processes.  
 
To conclude, the study of two most dissimilar cases has demonstrated that 
contrasts between structures (e.g. legal framework, institutional design, 
framework conditions, roles, and responsibilities) and processes (e.g. 
interaction among subsystems, regulatory practice, information flow, 
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conflicting objectives) provided new insight into how organizational 
interfaces add explanatory power to the success or failure of risk management 
processes, with potential relevance beyond municipal emergency management 
and specialized healthcare. Socio-technical systems involving a 
comprehensive legal framework, defined roles and responsibilities; complex 
institutional design; and tightly coupled interaction processes among diverse 
occupational groups create multiple subsystems and organizational interfaces 
in which risk management processes are highly dependent on common 
conceptualization of risk, sufficient communication mechanisms, and 
continuous information flow across the organizational interfaces to succeed. 
Socio-technical systems involving less structural complexity; fewer legally 
predefined roles and responsibilities; and more loosely coupled interaction 
processes create fewer interfaces among subsystems and their members, 
implying better conditions for communication processes, information flow, 
and oversight. This leaves the organizational interfaces less prone to 
contribute to complicate the risk management processes. According to the 
thesis findings, a multilevel understanding of organizational interfaces 
requires a broad theoretical perspective in order to interpret their implications 
from the governmental level in the blunt end to street level bureaucrats in the 
sharp end. Thus, the research results create foundation for further theoretical 
and empirical development, and suggest focal areas in order to develop an 
understanding of public risk management as a multilevel process.  
 
6.2 Implications for risk management in the public sector 
The implications are discussed according to the system levels in the thesis 
working model (Paragraph 2.6). 
  
Governmental level: 
• Public sector should improve the management of future change 
processes by incorporating risk management impact studies prior to 
implementing changes and reforms.  
• The governmental level should adopt a multilevel risk management 
perspective. Changes and reforms imply new administrative 
structures, responsibilities, and duties within different regime levels 
that may represent alterations of organizational interfaces with 
possible consequences for the ability of regulators, managers, and 
employees to relate their risk management work to other system 
levels. 
• The government should focus on the role of slack (time, personnel, 
resources), the importance of competence, and sound communication 
channels as success factors in order to maintain framework conditions 
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for improved risk management processes in complex socio-technical 
systems. 
 
Regulatory level: 
• The specialized healthcare regulator should make stronger use of 
tripartism and empowerment towards the regulated organizations. 
Tripartism would favour stronger involvement of e.g. patients and 
patient representative associations, and regulators responsible for 
occupational health and safety regulation that could extend the 
regulator’s sources of information and improve their oversight. 
Empowerment could imply an increased focus on long-term 
improvements within the regulatees, beyond short-term adjustments 
demonstrated in present practice.  
• A promotion of empowerment along with system-oriented models of 
medical errors within specialized healthcare would be in accordance 
with the idea of regulation as a continuous learning process. By 
emphasizing learning aspects, the thesis has showed that regulators 
should adopt these in order to improve regulatory practice.  
• Due to the absence of legislation, the aspect of voluntariness was 
predominant in the regulator-regulatee interface within the municipal 
emergency management. An implementation of an emergency 
management act is recommendable. It would be beneficial and 
provide improved framework conditions for regulatory compliance 
for both regulators and regulatees. To provide a hierarchy of sanctions 
for the regulator would strengthen the regulator’s position in 
enforcing regulations. Simultaneously, the regulator should continue 
to facilitate learning arenas and activities that are vital for information 
flow, second order learning processes, and homogenous risk 
perception across the regulator-regulatee interface.    
 
Organizational level: 
• The internal risk management system in the hospital should increase 
its commitment to managing medical errors. It should analyze 
repetitive errors; search for trends and emerging risk sources; and it 
should emphasize experience transfer across organizational interfaces 
more strongly.  
• Hospital top management should continue to emphasize patient safety 
as a competitive advantage. However, specific strategies, goals, and 
resources visible at lower organizational levels (managerial, staff, and 
work operation) should be developed in order to counteract the 
conflicting goals of patient safety and efficiency in the sharp end.  
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• Within municipal emergency management, financial resources should 
accompany an implementation of the recommended emergency 
management act. Such a legal act along with financial resources 
would give emergency management processes equal status with other 
mandatory work processes.  
 
Managerial level: 
• Inspection reports, distributed by the regulator, should be applied 
more systematically at the managerial level to increase knowledge of 
common errors across hospital divisions and wards. Similarly 
inspection reports from divisions across Norwegian hospitals are 
published and available at the website of the Norwegian Board of 
Health Supervision. 
• Patient safety issues should be included and discussed regularly in 
shift handovers, managerial meetings, involving feedback from error 
reports followed by discussions of possible preventive measures.  
• Municipalities should establish learning arenas to bring together 
representatives from different sub-sectors. Learning arenas will 
increase the competency within emergency management, bring in 
multiple perspectives, and reduce the reliance of emergency 
management on certain individuals.  
 
Staff level: 
• There is a need to develop learning arenas at the staff level within 
specialized healthcare. These learning arenas should be based on 
multidisciplinary teams, gathering members from several professional 
groups. Presently, learning processes suffer from cultural diversity 
between professional groups, cover-ups, different risk perception, and 
different thresholds to report errors. Multidisciplinary teams will 
improve common understanding of medical errors, and learning 
arenas such as plenary sessions, minor group meetings within or 
across wards should be established. Learning arenas could 
furthermore counteract the characteristics a blame culture by 
addressing medical errors from a system perspective, sharing 
experiences, and improving current practice in a healthy learning 
environment.  
• A stronger collaboration among emergency managers across 
neighbouring municipalities should be promoted because of limited 
number of emergency management positions in each municipality.   
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Work operation level: 
• There is a need to strengthen bottom-up structures and 
communication mechanisms across organizational interfaces in the 
specialized healthcare regime. Measures are needed to ensure 
sufficient functioning of communication structures and mechanisms. 
The mandatory error reporting system and the hospital’s internal risk 
management system, should be more involved in upward information 
flow to decision-making levels in the socio-technical system. 
Decision-making levels need to act on information about error 
preventing needs and constraints and initiate appropriate responses to 
improve risk management at the work operation level.  
• In practice, the staff and work operation level need greater reserve 
capacity to enable work operations beyond the short-term production 
objective. More specifically, this means providing sufficient time to 
write error reports and provide feedback to build a stronger reporting 
culture; to reduce understaffing on wards with constant patient 
overload; and to train and educate employees to manage sophisticated 
technology, new procedures and routines, new medications, and to 
improve teamwork skills. 
 
6.3 Further research  
Further studies are recommended to increase the knowledge of organizational 
interfaces in socio-technical systems involved in risk regulation regimes. I 
suggest the following areas for future research:  
 
• Current research results should relate the empirical material to survey 
results obtained by a Hospital Survey On Patient Safety conducted in 
2006 (Olsen, 2007; Aase et al., 2007). Moreover, it would be 
beneficial to perform a similar risk management survey within 
municipal emergency management to include street level bureaucrats 
and end users.  
• To explore the long-term implications of New Public Management 
reforms on organizational interfaces involved in risk management 
processes in different public sectors (Ferlie, 2007; Hale, 2006).  
• To improve the knowledge of the relationship between regime content 
and context (Hood et al., 1999a; 2001), and learning processes 
(Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000; Aase & Nybø, 2004) within different risk 
regulation regimes. 
• To study the role of knowledge brokers (Wenger, 1998) in 
organizational interfaces within complex socio-technical systems 
(Wiig & Aase, 2007). 
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• To conduct studies on how regulators learn and improve their 
regulatory practice in the regulator-regulatee interface (Reason, 1997; 
Wiig, 2007). 
• To develop tools to visualize risk amplification and attenuation 
processes (Rothstein, 2003a; Kasperson et al., 1988; Pidgeon et al., 
2003) through action research involving different regime levels in 
order to promote common conceptualization of risk.  
• To perform comparative studies of contrasting risk regulation regimes 
(Rothstein et al., 2006) to reveal strengths and weaknesses of self-
regulation (Hutter, 2001b; Rothstein, 2003b) in the public sector.  
• To include stakeholders beyond the regulator and the regulated 
(Drennan & McConnell, 2007) to explore the role of tripartism in 
public sector risk management processes (Walshe, 2003; Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992); and perform specific studies on current practice of 
tripartism within specialized healthcare and municipal emergency 
management, including stakeholders such as hospital patients and 
municipal citizens in the studies. 
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N-4036 Stavanger, Norway. Phone: +47-51831513/ 51831534, Fax: +47-
51831550, Email: siri.wiig@uis.no, karina.aase@uis.no 
 
Abstract 
This study both explores the multi-level system of managing errors in Norwegian 
health care and maps interfaces of importance for learning from errors. A multi-level 
case study has been conducted using Rasmussen’s (1997) socio-technical risk 
management system as a framework for studying the following levels: Government, 
regulators and associations, company, management, staff, and work operations. The 
results document that different system levels are dependent on each other in the 
process of error prevention in Norwegian health care. Healthcare reforms constitute 
framework conditions that complicate error management, and the blame culture 
characterising the healthcare system counteracts learning from errors. The systems for 
error prevention and learning from errors are fallible due to imperfections at all levels. 
Fallible humans are prone to cultural aspects such as underreporting and occupational 
differences, organisational aspects such as workload and error reporting demands, and 
societal aspects such as healthcare reforms’ demand for higher production and an 
individualistic control system.  
 
1. Introduction 
Treating patients is a complex process involving sophisticated technology, 
dangerous medicines, diverse patients, multiple work processes, and various 
professional disciplines experiencing an increasing level of specialization (Spath, 
1999; West, 2000). Delivering health care in a wider context is even more 
complicated, involving governmental healthcare legislation and budgets, regulatory 
authorities’ control activities, and a loosely coupled system of numerous 
organisations. This paper studies the management of errors in this setting. By errors 
we mean misdiagnosis, medication errors, or erroneous processes of medical 
treatment in general. The aim of the study is to explore the multi-level system of 
managing errors in Norwegian health care and to map interfaces of importance for 
learning from errors.    
Norwegian health care is currently subject to structural changes involving 
reorganizing and cost effectiveness so that more patients can be treated with better 
quality and the same number of employees. Presently, not only do inspections from 
the regulatory authorities indicate errors and deficiencies in health care, but there is 
also a growing media focus on patient safety. Given these framework conditions, the 
system of managing errors in the healthcare sector involves several challenges. 
Despite an increasing workload, employees in healthcare institutions are supposed to 
report, correct, and learn from errors. Healthcare institutions are expected to build 
routines and systems to report, analyse, and learn from errors, despite reduced 
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budgets. Regulatory authorities must maintain their systems for reporting of serious 
errors and their ability to sanction employees and institutions, despite an increase in 
cases.  
Viewing error prevention as a continuous process, rather than a product of certain 
activities or behaviours (e.g., Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000), involves the exploration of 
the entire healthcare system to map dependencies and interfaces that influence the 
error prevention process. Furthermore, a process view implies that learning from 
errors is a collective capacity that produces organisational and inter-organisational 
error prevention practices. Given the complexity of the healthcare system, producing 
such a collective capacity involves learning processes across different levels and 
occupational groups. 
 
2. Previous research  
2.1 Error prevention as a multi-level process 
Different levels of healthcare processes and framework conditions constitute 
what Rasmussen (1997) has named a socio-technical risk management system, 
involving the following levels: Government, regulators and associations, company, 
management, staff, and work operation. All levels are interconnected, and, in different 
ways, will influence the bottom-level work operations. At each level, changes or 
environmental stressors may be introduced, including new legislation, a changing 
political climate, changing market conditions, changes in company competency 
levels, and technological changes. Given the interconnectedness between levels, such 
changes will affect the entire system. A few studies within other industries have been 
conducted using this relational approach to safety (van der Geest et al., 2003; 
Leveson, 2004; Snook, 2000). 
Despite a substantial literature on patient safety during the last ten years (e.g., 
Kohn et al., 2000; Rosenthal & Sutcliffe, 2002; Spath, 1999), empirical studies with a 
multi-level system approach are limited. Most likely due to the complexity of the 
healthcare system, studies are conducted within one level of the system, often with an 
organisational, group or individual focus (Ruchlin et al., 2004). Research has often 
failed to follow the causal chains back to the managers, civil servants, or politicians 
who may have failed in their decisions to provide an environment conducive to 
patient safety (West, 2000). Firth-Cozens (2001) argues that using the systems 
approach is important for spreading responsibility throughout all levels and thereby 
reducing the focus on errors in the sharp end.    
  
2.2 Error prevention as a learning process 
The ideal error prevention approach is to view errors as symptoms of underlying 
problems so they become sources of information to understand how systems work. 
Accidents and near misses should be seen as useful tools that contribute to defining 
margins of risk and safety and to learning how to prevent harm (Edmondson, 2004; 
Johnstone & Kanitsaki, 2005; Morath & Turnbull, 2005). This approach is based on 
the premise that humans are fallible, errors must be expected, and individuals’ poor 
performance is a non-issue; instead, the focus is on the failure in the group, team, 
organisation or procedure. Emphasis is on feedback from work processes, accurate 
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information, rules of inference, reflection and discussion between colleagues, and 
possibly dialogue with users (Allsop & Mulcahy, 1996). 
Research on patient safety has applied the concept of the clinical microsystem 
(Mohr et al., 2004) as a framework for approaching learning from errors. Healthcare 
organisations comprise smaller interconnected microsystems; some argue that 
opportunities for cross-microsystem learning are essential for learning about the 
systemic errors within institutions. Fostering collaborative relations among 
microsystems should be an important goal for healthcare organisations (Mohr et al., 
2004). The microsystem approach has much in common with theories of communities 
of practice (e.g. Brown & Duguid, 1991; Gherardi, 2000; Wenger, 1998; Wenger & 
Snyder, 2000). Communities of practice are informal groups of people that evolve 
over time on the basis of shared expertise and joint activities and where dialogue, 
analysis, reflection and socialization are important learning conditions (Aase & Nybø, 
2004; Aase & Tjensvoll, 2003). Other studies have highlighted the role of teamwork 
to improve learning and error prevention (Adorian et al., 1990; Firth-Cozens, 1998; 
2001; Reith, 1998). Due to the size and complexity of the healthcare system, Firth-
Cozens (2001) argues that, unless an appropriate culture and structures are created to 
enable smaller groups and teams to create safe work practices, error prevention can 
only be achieved to a limited extent by interventions at an organisational level. 
 
2.3 Barriers to error prevention 
According to Leape (1994; 1999), there are several reasons for the substantial 
error rate within medical practice. One reason is a lack of awareness regarding error-
related patient injuries within medical practice. Another reason is that most errors do 
no harm. But the main reason is found in the culture of medical practice. Medical 
personnel are socialized to strive for error-free practice during education; role models 
in medical education reinforce the concept of infallibility; and in the hospital practice, 
the sense of duty to perform faultlessly is strongly internalized. This need to be 
infallible generates a pressure that encourages intellectual dishonesty; that is, to cover 
up rather than admit mistakes. Almost every medical employee experiences mistakes 
that harm patients in their career, but the fallible physician rarely admits or discusses 
errors (Leape, 1994; 1999). Physicians also find it difficult to criticize a colleague’s 
unprofessional or unethical conduct (Aasland & Førde, 2005) due to a widespread 
tradition in health care of naming, shaming and blaming individuals involved in 
unsafe acts (Reason, 2000). The blame culture (Morath & Turnbull, 2005; Vuuren, 
1999) has counteracted the exploration of weaknesses in work processes at different 
levels, causing a loss of rich information about how individuals, medical work, and 
organisational processes interact. The implication for learning from errors is that 
individuals may learn from errors and change their practice, but the adjustments often 
take place in a vacuum. Lessons learned are shared privately (if at all), and external 
evaluations of what went wrong seldom occur (Førde, 2000; Leape, 1994; 1999; 
Vuuren, 2000). 
Errors also tend to be underreported (Kohn et al., 2000). In Norway, research 
indicates that more than half of the mandatory reportable errors are not reported 
(Aasland & Førde, 2005). Despite a substantial change in thinking in recent years 
with regard to practicing error management in health care, the fear of negative 
Article I 
 93 
reactions, media publicity and being criminalized still leads to underreporting (Firth-
Cozens, 2001; Johnstone & Kanitsaki, 2005; Mulcahy & Rosenthal, 1999). Studies on 
cultural barriers to error reporting (Waring, 2005) revealed that physicians viewed 
errors as an ‘inevitable’ and unmanageable feature of medical work; reporting was 
thus regarded as pointless. Reporting was also discouraged by an anti-bureaucratic 
attitude and by rejection of excessive administrative duties. 
 
3. Methodology 
A study of the multi-level system of managing and learning from errors in health 
care requires multiple methods and multiple data sources. A qualitative research 
perspective and methods were chosen to explore and map the dynamics of 
organisational change and learning in health care to provide insight into 
organisational matters, error management processes, and discourses (Benson-Rea & 
Myers, 2006). More specifically, our main research design is a case study approach 
(Ragin & Becker, 1992; Yin, 1994; 1999; 2004) within a regional Norwegian hospital 
whose regulatory authorities belong to both local and national levels. We apply the 
case study approach due to the characteristics and conditions of the healthcare system, 
which comprises multiple components, complex processes, and rapid changes. The 
case study approach is particularly applicable for gaining insight into, and 
understanding the structure of, a complex system and how its interdependent 
individuals, groups, and institutional components function (or fail to function) 
together (Berkwits & Inui, 1998; Hurley, 1999; Yin, 1999). The study covers the 
levels of government, regulator, company, management, staff, and work operations 
according to a socio-technical system perspective (Rasmussen, 1997). Table 1 shows 
the different system levels with the accompanying data collection methods, data 
sources, and informants included in the case study. 
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System levels Methods Data sources and informants 
 
Government Document analysis  Krogstad (PhD thesis, 2005), White Paper 
(NoU, 1997:2), healthcare legislation  
Regulator 
(national/local)  
Associations  
 
11 structured interviews (A) National level: 4 
Local level: 5 
Patient representative association: 2 
Document analysis 
 
Labour inspection report, directive 1-
54/2000, annual reports, policy 
documents 
Observation Regulator-Hospital meeting 
Hospital 6 structured interviews (A) Top management: 6 
Document analysis Labour inspection report, annual report 
from the Chief County Medical Officer 
Observation Regulator-Hospital meeting 
Management  16 structured interviews (B) Middle management: 16 
Document analysis Labour inspection report, inspection 
reports from the Chief County Medical 
Officer, guidelines for hospital quality 
committee  
 
Staff 16 structured interviews (B) 
 
Hospital staff: 16 
Document analysis Regional psychosocial environment 
survey (Holte et al., 2004). 
Work operations Statistical analysis of error 
reports  
894 written error reports 
 
Table 1.  Data collection methods within a multi-level system approach. 
 
Data were collected using method triangulation of qualitative and quantitative 
methods, such as interviews, statistical analysis of reported errors and near misses, 
observation, and document analysis (Patton, 1990; 1999). Within the different system 
levels, the application of methods has varied (as illustrated in Table 1) due to 
practicalities, time constraints, and information needs. At the governmental level, 
document analysis (Health care legislation; Krogstad, 2005; Norwegian White paper, 
NoU 1997:2) was used to describe the vital changes the Norwegian healthcare sector 
has undergone in past years. At the regulator/association level, we performed 11 
structured interviews (interview guide A) with inspectors at the national and local 
level regulator and with representatives from the patient representative association. 
Furthermore, documents such as inspection reports, annual reports and policy 
documents were analysed, and the first author observed a regulator-hospital meeting. 
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Data collection at the health care institution level was divided in four sub-system 
levels: hospital, management, staff, and work operation. At the hospital level, which 
included the top management, we performed six structured interviews (interview 
guide A) with top managers and division managers, analysed inspection reports from 
the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority and the Chief County Medical Officer, 
and observed the interaction between the hospital and the regulator in a hospital-
regulator meeting. The management level included hospital middle management, in 
which we performed 16 structured interviews (interview guide B) with head nurses 
and head physicians at two hospital divisions, and we conducted document analysis of 
inspection reports and guidelines for the hospital quality committees. At the staff 
level, we interviewed 16 nurses and physicians within two hospital divisions 
(interview guide B). In addition, we analysed a regional psychological environment 
survey (Holte et al., 2004) as second order data. The work operation level included 
work operations and processes carried out within the hospital that were at risk for 
medical errors. To get data about such work operations at the case hospital, a total of 
894 written error reports from two hospital divisions were registered and analysed in 
an Excel–database.  
A total of forty-nine tape-recorded interviews were performed using two 
structured interview guides. Seventeen interviews focusing on the relationship 
between the local health regulator and the regulatee (hospital) with regard to 
managing errors were performed using interview guide A (legislation, error reporting, 
learning, risk perception, and prevention). Informants included inspectors, the patient 
representative association, and hospital management. Thirty-two interviews focusing 
on how two hospital divisions managed errors were performed using interview guide 
B (amount and categorization, human and organisational factors, learning, power 
issues, and regulators role).  
Qualitative data were analysed by transcribing summaries and memos with 
relevant quotations from all data collection activities. To enhance the credibility of the 
qualitative analysis, the two authors used a multiple analyst approach to review the 
findings. This technique is termed analyst triangulation (Patton, 1990; 1999), and both 
authors independently examined the total amount of data material. To analyze 
processes and activities important for error management within each system level, 
data were categorized, structured and analysed according to system levels and themes 
within the structured interview guides. To analyse the data material across system 
levels and map vital system interfaces of importance for error management involved a 
substantial methodological challenge due to the complexity of the data material. In the 
first stage of system interface analysis, both researchers independently analysed the 
material and developed categories according to their interpretation of the material as a 
whole, not according to specific system levels. In the second stage, the researchers 
discussed and challenged each other’s interpretation of the material, resulting in 
modified and improved categories (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Quantitative data were 
analysed by statistical analysis of frequency with regard to error type, error severity, 
error causality, and personnel categories. Within analytic triangulation, it is common 
to have those who were studied review the findings. In this study, results were 
presented at the hospital in several announced open meetings, and informants were 
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given the opportunity to react to the findings and the researchers’ descriptions (Patton, 
1990; 1999). 
 
4. The health care risk management system 
The Norwegian health care risk management system is presented by giving 
contextual descriptions of the different system levels with regard to framework 
conditions and learning from errors.  
 
4.1 Governmental level 
The governmental level involves legislation and governmental funding within 
five health regions, where hospitals are organised separately from primary care. The 
Norwegian healthcare sector has undergone several changes in the last ten years. New 
public management and its characteristics of cost control and effectiveness form the 
backdrop of the major changes at the governmental level (Krogstad, 2005). Three 
structural reforms are essential: 1) A change in hospital financing, which had a central 
purpose to reduce patient waiting lists, was implemented in 1997. This reform was 
intended to pay the hospitals based on the number of patients treated, thereby 
reducing the previous over-all payment to the hospitals. 2) A change in institutional 
management, first suggested in 1997 (NOU 1997:2) and followed up by a new law 
(Specialized Health Service Act, 1999); its rationale was to strengthen the leadership 
and management as a response to the growing complexity in the hospital 
organisations. This reform represented an explicit desire for increased efficiency and 
an inexplicit shift from clinical to managerial rationality. 3) A change in hospital 
ownership and central management, implemented in 2002, which involved a transfer 
of hospital ownership from the counties to the central government. This reform placed 
the responsibility with one owner. Furthermore, the hospitals were organised as 
enterprises that were legal subjects and no longer subjects to local political 
interference or influence (Krogstad, 2005). 
 
4.2 Regulatory level 
The Norwegian Board of Health is responsible for general supervision of health 
and social services at a national level. At a local level (county), this responsibility is 
delegated to the Chief County Medical Officer. Normally, it is the local-level 
regulator1 who interacts with the hospitals through activities such as inspections, 
inspection reports, error reports, phone calls, and meetings. The regulator enforces 
extensive health care legislation and has the power to sanction at both individual and 
organisational levels. Informants at both the national and local regulatory level assess 
the legislation as powerful and satisfying for performing the regulatory tasks, 
ensuring quality and safety in health care.  
                                                 
1 In addition to the Board of Health and the Chief County Medical Officer, the 
Directorate of Labour Inspection enforces legislation concerning health, safety, and 
environment for hospital employees. 
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Hospitals are obliged to report to the regulator both those errors causing serious 
patient injury and any serious near misses. All error reports are stored in a national 
database. The purpose of this mandatory reporting system is to clarify why errors and 
near misses occur and to prevent their reoccurrence. According to policy documents, 
the regulator should take an active part in vitalizing the hospital’s obligation to report 
and to manage errors internally. The regulator expects the hospital’s error 
management system to include an internal reporting system and an active use of these 
error reports within the hospital divisions. The hospital’s quality committee should 
play an important role in this work. The committee is mandatory with a mandate 
concerning overall hospital quality and safety. In practice, the local-level inspectors 
are not satisfied with the hospital’s internal error management system or the work of 
the quality committee: 
 
The internal error management system is vital to patient safety. It is mandatory, just like 
the obligation to report, and should act as a tool to increase quality and learn from errors. 
The reporting culture is one matter; all reports should not necessarily be addressed to us. 
The hospital has to select reports related to degree of severity and manage them in the 
quality committee. This means they should learn from their errors, but here they fail. That 
doesn’t work within the hospital (local-level inspector). 
 
Based on the severity of reported errors, the regulator can open cases against 
medical personnel at an individual level, or against the hospital at an organisational 
level. Medical personnel can thus be individually liable for errors reported by 
themselves or others. The local-level regulator collects information to evaluate 
whether someone is liable and should be sanctioned. The information collection 
mainly consists of written information such as journals and reports from the involved 
medical staff and departments. In cases of liability, the case is sent to the national-
level regulator who holds the power to sanction. Informants within the regulator find 
the written information collection satisfactory for evaluating the cases, while 
informants within the hospital and the patient representative association are doubtful 
of this investigative practice, characterising it as too narrow and distant: 
 
They should be out there talking directly to the personnel, doing interviews to get rich 
information. Employees close to the accident often have the experience and knowledge 
that could contribute to better learning and understanding of the error. In addition, 
personnel indirectly involved in the error are not even asked for written information 
regarding the event. This results in mediocre error investigation, taking too long before the 
results are available. In the mean time dangerous routines go on (hospital employee). 
 
The regulator performs two types of inspections: Planned system revisions (all 
hospitals yearly) and event-based inspections (reactive response to reported errors or 
suspicion of insufficient practice). The planned system revision involves document 
analysis, meetings, and interviews and results in an inspection report that documents 
deviations and demands for correction. In the regulator’s opinion, Norwegian 
hospitals in general apply inspection reports only to a certain degree to improve safety 
at an organisational level: 
 
The hospitals are not learning organisations and it is quite unbelievable. It’s like they’re 
happy that they’re neighbour departments are caught and not themselves. Instead we want 
Article I 
 98 
the hospital as a whole to read the inspection reports and correct deviations often current 
in all departments. Today, we write good reports but we don’t get the hospitals to read 
them (manager, national-level regulator). 
 
In addition to enforcing the legislation, the regulator is supposed to give advice to 
the healthcare organisations to promote patient safety. Such activities are not 
predominant in the current study. Two regular meetings a year without a fixed agenda 
other than information exchange are held between regulator and hospital. 
Furthermore, the regulator does not seem to play an important role in the hospital’s 
feedback and learning from errors. There was little knowledge of participation by 
regulators in knowledge transfer between hospitals or training activities to improve 
competence within error management. Several informants within the regulator see the 
advice part as important, since it involves dialogue and discussions without fixed 
answers, trying to encourage the hospital to find its own solutions. Despite this, the 
tendency during the last few years has been a clearer separation between the inspector 
role and the advice role. Informants are worried about mixing roles and becoming 
biased: 
 
It is obvious that it is difficult for us as a regulator to give advice and at the same time be a 
regulator, but we are supposed to do both. We can give advice in matters of internal 
control, juridical matters and patient rights. Usually, these advices are given in relation to 
an inspection (local-level inspector). 
 
4.3 Hospital level 
Healthcare reforms have changed the framework conditions for the case study 
hospital. According to the annual report from the local regulator, the hospital is 
underfinanced compared to other regional hospitals. In the period 2002 to 2004, the 
health region had operational budgets about 10% lower per inhabitant than the 
national average. This demanded that the hospital optimize production and increase 
efficiency and patient flow. The number of errors reported to the regulator during the 
last three years has indicated a falling tendency, resulting in an assumption of less 
safety focus at the hospital. Meetings between the local regulator and hospital 
managers were held, focusing on error reporting and learning from errors. Regulator 
representatives expressed their worries concerning obvious underreporting, since 
information from other channels (media, police, phone calls, complaints) indicated a 
higher number of factual errors than the hospital reported. One of the hospital top 
managers explained his view after the regulator-hospital meeting: 
 
Well, I have lived in a world believing we were quite good at error reporting. But the 
regulator claims there exists an underreporting. We must get this in order and 
communicate to the employees that they must report. The other thing they are preoccupied 
with is the learning loop on reported errors within the divisions and the quality committee. 
We haven’t been especially preoccupied with managing errors within the quality 
committee, but I recognize that the regulator is, so we have to keep this in mind and get it 
in place (top manager, hospital). 
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At the hospital level, patient safety and quality improvement has been 
emphasized as an area of priority to promote patient safety as a competitive 
advantage: 
 
We focus on safety and quality. It’s going to be our competitive advantage to get patients 
in the future. I believe patients will choose hospitals according to treatment survival rates 
(top manager, hospital).  
 
Putting safety on the agenda has been perceived positively by the hospital 
employees, but specific results and activities are asked for. One example has been the 
introduction of an electronic error reporting system (EERS) that replaced the former 
written error reports. The former system was characterized by statistical exercises 
rather than learning processes. The intention behind the new EERS is to gather 
information and manage errors close to where they occur, to investigate active and 
latent errors, and to implement preventive measures. Informants characterized the 
new system as not properly implemented, with insufficient or no training. This 
resulted in a program of training “super users” within different parts of the 
organisation to spread knowledge of the system use. Further, the EERS was originally 
developed for the oil and gas business. Transferring it to the health care system 
without sufficient adjustments resulted in underreporting and frustration after the 
implementation: 
 
The EERS hasn’t worked good enough and it is not made for our system. I know that for 
my division, and I believe it’s current for all other divisions as well, it exists an 
underreporting of errors during the implementation phase. The system was “perfectly” 
introduced: here you’ve got it! Then the people involved disappeared, the training was not 
taken care of and we still struggle with it. You can’t just throw a new system into the 
organisation. I haven’t seen any training. We have super users, but this is established in 
theory and doesn’t work in practice. Of course this worries me because I have insufficient 
knowledge of the errors in my division (division manager).  
 
4.4 Managerial level 
Changes in hospital financing and demands to reduce waiting lists have caused 
several changes at the managerial level, and the focus on economy, production and 
competition continuously influences decisions affecting the medical personnel. These 
changes are considered to have the potential to create a new set of emerging risks: 
 
It is one of the greatest challenges, I won’t call it a risk, but it can turn out to be one. It’s a 
challenge for us to deal with the yearly increase in patient volume, within the same 
buildings, and with no increase in total resources (HSE manager). 
 
The organisational changes have been challenging and caused internal conflicts. 
The hospital management encourage all divisions to report errors and prioritize 
patient safety, yet simultaneously express the importance of cost savings and budget 
balance. This compound pressure causes conflicts and limited time to error reporting, 
follow-up, and feedback to the involved medical personnel. Department managers 
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refer to the pressure for budget balance and express feelings of powerlessness and 
worries about understaffing and corridor patients due to lack of space: 
 
…there is a higher focus on deviation from budget, than on deviation from 
safety…(middle manager). 
 
In other words, the hospital organisation has limited resource slack (time, 
personnel, economy), and in practice, patient safety loses against budget balance. The 
hospital is organised to manage normal daily work operations, but has low reserve 
capacity to manage activities outside the short-term production perspective, such as 
error reporting, feedback, and training. These cross pressures are more present at the 
divisional and departmental level, since error management and the implementation of 
new routines and procedures to prevent errors are delegated to managers at these 
levels.  
Different practices related to error management exist across divisions and 
departments. Results show a low degree of experience transfer concerning error 
management between divisions, and the quality committee that is formally 
responsible for this experience transfer is regarded as not fulfilling its obligation. 
 
4.5 Staff level 
Almost all informants at the staff level had experience with errors and believed 
errors occurred more often than were formally reported. Several types of errors were 
repetitive and not prevented, and the informants agreed that stress and work pressure 
had a negative impact on the error rate:  
 
I think there is a large number of errors, probably every day. An example of a repetitive 
error type is giving the wrong medication to the wrong patient (assistant physician). 
 
Underreporting is a challenge within the hospital. Most informants believe 
underreporting exists, which is confirmed by numbers from a psychosocial 
environment survey carried out in 2004 (Holte et al., 2004). Its results showed that 
10.8% never report, 6.6% seldom report, 17.2% sometimes report, 44.3% usually 
report and 21.2% always report errors.  
Informants referred to an open culture for discussing errors, but said that such 
discussions usually were characterized by informal person-to-person communication. 
Near misses were even more seldom discussed. The openness for discussing errors 
was to a certain degree hampered by fear of a negative response to error reporting, 
such as a feeling of awkwardness, loss of reputation, or media coverage. The results 
also indicated that collegial cover-ups occurred, especially among physicians.  
Practices for error reporting varied between occupational groups, as did the 
perception of what should be considered as reportable errors. Physicians were not 
especially preoccupied with error reporting, and they did not view errors as a 
precondition for learning. Among the nurses, there was more systematic training 
related to error reporting, resulting in a higher degree of reported errors:  
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Nurses definitely report the most, partly because they have a lower threshold to do so, and 
partly because they are more aware of these things (physician). 
 
The results of an analysis of written error reports within two hospital divisions 
show that nurses reported 65% of the total amount of errors. Compared to other 
occupational groups, physicians reported 4.6 %, auxiliary nurses 5.5 %, and 
bioengineers 9.5 %. Nurses are by far the largest occupational group at the hospital, 
so based on the numbers, one could not conclude that nurses commit errors more 
often than others. The difference between occupational groups is rather a result of 
different risk perception, different thresholds to report, and different reporting 
cultures. According to the informants, analysis and feedback on reported errors also 
varied, and learning from errors was sporadic. 
 
It would be better if we could see that error reports resulted in something, that it was used. 
For instance if someone outside the department participated at department meetings, 
analysed errors and deviations, and explained this to us (head nurse). 
 
4.6 Work operation level 
The nature of medical work implies that risk is continuously involved in the work 
operations. Patients arrive at hospitals with illnesses or physical injuries and thereby 
introduce risks that may complicate the work operations. This fact can cause 
difficulties when comparing safety in health care with other industries:   
 
Risk is in the nature of medicine because we cut in peoples’ bodies. People arrive with 
dramatic stuff, serious illnesses that we are supposed to treat with surgery. That is a risk in 
itself. There is a grey zone where you must assess if surgery is beneficial or harmful to the 
patient. You are in focus, and the results of your professional assessments always appear 
after your actions. If you choose not to do surgery and the patient dies it might be 
blameworthy, and if you choose to do surgery and the patient dies it might be 
blameworthy as well. That is probably why we receive complaints, because expectations 
to the results are unrealistic (division manager). 
 
To get a picture of the frequency, severity, and types of errors in medical work 
operations, the written error reports within two hospital divisions (approximately 500 
employees in division A, 420 employees in division B) were analysed. During the 
years 2003 and 2004, 894 errors were reported at the two divisions, corresponding to 
0.52 reports per employee in 2003 and 0.45 reports per employee in 2004. The 
reporting frequency was slightly higher within division A than within division B. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of reported errors related to degree of severity at the 
two hospital divisions. 
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 Division A Division B 
Severity degree 2003 2004 2003 2004 
Unnatural death 2 4 1 1 
Considerable injury 15 17 5 3 
Less serious personal injury 86 127 58 53 
Incidents that could lead to injury 199 115 88 74 
No severity degree registered 15 13 11 7 
Table 2.  Reported errors related to severity degree at two hospital divisions.  
The table shows eight unnatural deaths at the two divisions during 2003 and 
2004, and 40 considerable injuries. The following error types were identified on the 
basis of the 894 reported errors: Patient falls (66%), medication errors (16%), lack of 
patient identification (9%), complications (7%), infection (1%), and equipment 
damage (1%). Only minor differences were identified amongst the two hospital 
divisions regarding severity degree and error types. The substantial number of 
reported patient falls (66%) compared to other error types was explained by the 
harmlessness of the error type and the difficulty in preventing patients from falling. 
5. Learning interfaces 
In summary, the contextual descriptions of the health care risk management 
system have revealed that learning from errors is sporadic, individually based and 
occurs separately within the system levels, with limited knowledge transfer and 
activities between system levels (Department of Health, 2001; Donaldson et al., 
2000; Edmondson, 2004). In the following section, we highlight some of the most 
striking learning conditions and interfaces in our study. 
 
5.1 The effect of changes at the governmental level 
The healthcare system’s ability to prevent and learn from errors was negatively 
affected by reforms initiated at the governmental level. Structural reforms 
concerning hospital financing and institutional management altered important 
framework conditions at all system levels. The reforms resulted in a cross-pressure 
concerning production, efficiency and safety at hospital, management, staff and work 
operation levels. The effects were time pressure, stress, increased workload, and 
understaffing (Bone, 2002), with a negative impact on the learning conditions within 
and across system levels. Studies of the UK National Health Service (NHS) showed 
similar results, stating that, although the UK government has given clear messages 
that safety takes priority over other goals, this goal is simultaneously subverted by 
the inadequacy of funding provided for the NHS (West, 2000).   
Article I 
 103 
 
5.2 The regulator–hospital interface 
The regulator-hospital interface has a formally stated purpose of ensuring safe 
healthcare delivery and preventing errors, but in practice, the regulatory level has 
limited impact on learning from errors at the hospital level. There is a limited degree 
of feedback from the regulator to the hospital, management, and staff levels in cases 
of error reports. The hospital applies inspection reports only to a certain degree as a 
means for learning across divisions and departments. We claim that the control focus 
within this interface, and the individual focus usually taken in investigation and 
reactions, hamper openness, discussion and reflection related to errors (Johnstone & 
Kanitsaki, 2005; Morath & Turnbull, 2005; Reason, 2000). Furthermore, the 
regulator-hospital interface is characterized to a large extent by written information 
exchange, such as error reports, inspection reports and investigations. From a 
learning perspective, this does not foster reflection on, or discussion of, the error 
prevention processes (Hansen et al., 1999; Wiig & Lindøe, 2007). The regulator 
expressed concerns regarding the combination of advice and regulation tasks, fearing 
a loss of reputation and trustworthiness. In this study, this resulted in a lack of 
experience transfer initiatives from the regulator, for instance from other hospitals in 
the region.  
 
5.3 Error reports as an upward feedback system? 
Ideally, error reporting systems should be viewed as learning mechanisms giving 
feedback on active and latent errors at the work operation level to all upward system 
levels in order to apply improvements and/or changes. Today, the error reporting 
system more or less focuses on statistics and is not systematically applied in 
feedback processes or proactive searches for new risk sources and prevention of 
errors across system levels (Kohn et al., 2000). The newly-introduced electronic 
error reporting system within the hospital is not yet working properly and causes 
frustration, underreporting and difficulties in learning from errors. Thus, errors, if 
reported and managed, only have an impact close to where they occurred, resulting 
in local corrections and new routines. Individuals may learn and adjust their practice, 
but the learning processes occur in a vacuum (Leape, 1994; 2005).  
 
5.4 A multi-level individual focus 
Our results indicate that a blame culture (Firth-Cozen, 2001; Johnstone & 
Kanitsaki, 2005; Mulcahy & Rosenthal, 1999; Reason, 2000) is still institutionalized 
in the Norwegian healthcare system. This promotes an individual focus in cases of 
medical error and causes learning difficulties within all system levels. According to 
legislation (governmental level), the ability to sanction at the individual level is 
much stronger than at the organisational level. Furthermore, investigation in cases of 
errors (regulatory level) is individually focused to a large extent, and there is an 
overweight of sanctions against individuals, compared to the organisational or 
system levels (Norwegian Board of Health, 2006). At the hospital level, error 
prevention work tasks are delegated to management and staff levels, distributing the 
responsibility to lower levels (Carthey et al., 2001). Additionally, media focus is 
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often related to the individual healthcare employee, contributing to their fear of 
media coverage and negative reactions. At the staff level, an open climate to talk 
about errors has a positive effect on learning processes, but is negatively influenced 
by collegial cover-ups and fears of negative reactions and bad reputations. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Our multi-level case study in Norwegian health care has shown that different 
system levels are dependent on each other in the process of error prevention. 
Healthcare reforms constitute framework conditions that complicate error 
management, and the blame culture characterising the healthcare system counteracts 
learning from errors. The systems for error prevention and learning from errors are 
fallible, due to imperfections at all levels. Fallible humans are prone to cultural 
aspects such as underreporting and occupational differences, organisational aspects 
such as workload and error reporting demands, and societal aspects such as healthcare 
reforms’ demand for higher production and an individualistic control system.  
 
6.1 Implications for health care  
Our study has shown that the premises on which error prevention in the 
healthcare system are based, and the processes of importance for error prevention, are 
all top-down driven, accumulating expectations and strain towards the lower levels of 
the system (staff and work operation). To prevent errors in health care in the future, 
we believe that bottom-up structures and upward feedback mechanisms should be 
strengthened. Error preventive needs and constraints should be clarified at the work 
operation level and communicated to all upward levels for responses and measures. 
We recommend the following areas of priority:     
• Performing safety impact studies prior to future healthcare reforms. 
• Introducing person-to-person approaches in regulatory error investigations. 
• Prioritizing the advice role within the regulatory level. 
• Developing measures to counteract the focus on individuals relative to 
errors. 
• Conducting searches for emerging risks and trends based on error reports. 
• Developing measures to support and integrate electronic error reporting in   
work operations.  
 
6.2 Further research 
Further studies are needed to explore the multi-level error prevention system in 
health care. We suggest the following focal areas for future research: 
• The study of knowledge brokers (Wenger, 1998) or the interface between 
clinical microsystems (Mohr et al., 2004) or communities of practice (Brown 
& Duguid, 1991; 2001) across different levels of the health care system.  
Article I 
 105 
• The study of informal or mindful learning practices (Weick, 2002; Aase et 
al., 2005) within single system levels to develop common learning features 
across levels. 
• The study of conflicting goals or cross pressures between efficiency and 
safety (Bone, 2002; West, 2000), and the study of safety consequences as a 
result of changes at different system levels. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Regulation is a defining feature of modern society and can be viewed as centrally 
concerned with the control of risks (Hopkins & Hale, 2002; Hutter, 2001; Baldwin & 
Cave, 1999) and often imposed by the government on the behalf of the society. It is 
challenging for risk regulators to choose the appropriate enforcement strategies to 
target the optimal method of regulating risks. Regulators seek to gain compliance with 
the law not merely through formal enforcement and prosecution, but also by applying 
a host of informal techniques, including education, advice, persuasion, and 
negotiation (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). 
Previous research on risk regulation conducted within both public and private 
sectors regarding specific safety areas often involved regimes holding strong 
legislation and sanctioning power, such as nuclear power, oil and gas, and 
biotechnology (Kirwan et al., 2002). Less research has been conducted on how the 
government regulates risk exposed to the local society in areas of limited legislation, 
such as natural hazards facing the public sector. The number and severity of natural 
disasters have increased in recent years, resulting in rapidly increasing unexpected 
expenditures for society (Newkirk, 2001; Kleindorfer & Kunreuther, 2000). It is 
important for local planners and government officials to understand such events if 
they hope to be able to prevent and respond to them effectively (Seiler, 1996; 
Balamir, 2002). Research has shown that, despite the increasing impact of 
emergencies and disasters, local governments in general invest limited resources in 
emergency management, although emergency management at the local level is vital 
for effective preparedness and response to undesired events within society (Newkirk, 
2001).  
This paper addresses how government, despite limited legislation, uses 
regulatory enforcement strategies to regulate risks exposed to municipalities. The aim 
of the study is to explore how risk regulation strategies in the public sector contribute 
to learning within emergency management in the regulated municipalities. The 
strategies applied by the regulator entail diverse activities involving interaction and 
communication between regulator and regulatee (Black, 1998). Regulatory activities 
are important aspects by which a system can learn and improve (Kirwan et al., 2002; 
Reason, 1997). Therefore, the paper applies a learning perspective of the regulatory 
enforcement debate and analyses the learning aspects of regulatory activities. The 
research questions are as follows: 
 
• How do regulatory enforcement strategies impact learning processes within 
the regulated municipalities?  
• What kinds of learning constraints can be identified in the regulator–
regulatee interface obstructing learning processes within the regulated 
municipalities? 
 
Although the regulatory enforcement strategies involve interaction and reflection 
between the regulator and the regulatee, this paper is delimited to address learning 
processes within the regulated municipalities, exploring how the regulatory activities 
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and interface constraints contribute or hamper learning processes within municipal 
emergency management. 
 
 
1.1  Context  
 
The structure of the Norwegian Governmental system includes several levels: the 
governmental level (the Norwegian Parliament, government, and ministries), 
regulators and associations (directorates and regulatory authorities at the national 
level), regional regulators (local level regulators), municipalities, and public 
organizations governed by the municipalities, such as public schools and nursing 
homes. The risk regulation regime studied in this paper covers the top four levels:  
 
1 the governmental level—namely, the Ministry of Justice  
 
2  the Directorate of Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DCPEP)  
 
3 the County Governor as the governments’ chief representative constituting 
the regional regulatory authority  
 
4 the municipal emergency management structure.  
 
The current study focuses on the interface between the County Governor, hereafter 
referred to as the regulator, and the municipality as the regulatee.  
The risks regulated within the regime are rooted within diverse risk sources that 
vary across municipalities; such risks are usually related to geographical and natural 
conditions causing natural hazards such as floods, avalanches, and rockslides, or to 
infrastructural and industrial conditions causing vulnerability within society, such as 
large traffic accidents, power outages, water supply failures, pollution, and fire. The 
municipality is not supposed to manage these risks, but instead adopt an overview of 
the local risk sources through risk and vulnerability analyses as well as apply 
strategies to deal with these in planning processes to prevent accidents stemming from 
insufficient planning and prepare for potential exposure to these risks (Nilsen, 2007).  
In accordance with governmental expectations regarding emergency 
management, municipalities are expected to perform risk and vulnerability analyses, 
compose an emergency management plan, execute emergency exercises, develop an 
internal control system that ensures continuous work processes within emergency 
management, and incorporate this system into the local municipal plan processes. The 
regulator supervises that the municipal emergency management processes comply 
with these governmental expectations. Within this risk regulation regime, emergency 
management is based on the principles of responsibility, similarity, and subsidiary, 
meaning that the institution responsible for a sector in normal situations is also 
responsible during times of emergency; furthermore, an emergency situation should 
be managed at the lowest level possible within the governmental system (NOU, 
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2000:24). Therefore, municipalities have the primary responsibility for emergency 
management.  
A vital aspect within this regime is the lack of statutory law behind the demands 
placed on municipal emergency management—only governmental expectations exist. 
The strongest sanctioning power for the regulator is to reject municipal plans without 
sufficient risk and vulnerability analyses required by law. For the regulator, this 
implies that inspectors must emphasize aspects other than command and control in 
enforcing the regulation. The regime is founded on a belief in dialogue and advice as 
vital aspects of the regulatory enforcement strategies to manage undesired events at 
the lowest level possible. 
 
2 Theoretical approach 
 
The theoretical framework of the paper is based on theories of regulatory enforcement 
strategies (e.g., Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Black, 2002, 1998; Hood et al., 2001) and 
theories of safety learning (e.g., Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000a, 2000b; Aase & 
Tjensvoll, 2003).  
 
2.1  Regulatory enforcement strategies 
 
The concept of risk regulation regime denotes the overall manner in which the state 
regulates risk in a particular policy domain. The term regime describes the complex 
institutional geography, rules, practice, and institution of ideas associated with the 
regulation of risk (Hood et al., 1999, 2001).  
Enforcement is a challenging component of risk regulation, and regulators use 
diverse strategies in enforcing regulation (Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Hutter & Lloyd-
Bostock, 1992). One of the debates in the regulation literature concerns the use of 
compliance versus deterrence approaches as strategies for applying legal standards. 
Compliance approaches represent an informal style of regulation emphasizing 
diplomacy, persuasion, and education rather than the routine application of sanctions 
to produce a compliance culture within the regulatee. The regime promoting 
compliance approaches is flexible and tolerant, and its regulators are discriminating 
and pragmatic in their application of the law. The basic goal is to achieve compliance 
without invoking the formal legal process. Meanwhile, deterrence approaches are 
based on penal responses to regulatory violations and rely heavily on penalties or 
punishment to prevent those regulated from breaking the rules (Hood et al., 2001; 
Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Braithwaite et al., 1987). A regime promoting deterrence 
approaches is excessively legalistic, involving a strict imposition of standards. 
Proponents of deterrence approaches tend to argue that compliance approaches imply 
relationships between regulators and regulatee through shared experiences, contacts, 
and staff exchanges or familiarity, making routine prosecution unthinkable. On the 
other hand, proponents of compliance approaches argue the deterrence approaches fail 
to identify the best ways to improve regulatee performance, causing resentment, 
hostility, and a lack of cooperation in those regulated (Baldwin & Cave, 1999).  
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Some researchers argue for a hybrid approach, referred to as responsive 
regulation; in short, this approach promotes compliance responses for those regulatees 
identified as poorly informed or morally concerned about the regulatory requirement, 
while deterrence approaches are promoted for regulatees who demonstrate themselves 
to be opportunistic and amoral. These proponents argue that the trick of successful 
regulation is to establish a synergy between punishment and persuasion (Baldwin & 
Cave, 1999; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). 
 
2.2  Risk regulation as a learning process  
 
The risk regulation process can be characterized as a process of problem solving and 
learning (Hopkins & Hale, 2002:6; Kirwan et al., 2002:258), forming a learning cycle 
involving legislators, regulators, and the regulated—and hopefully generating 
systemic improvements (Reason, 1997:187).  
Learning within risk regulation can be studied according to how the regulator 
organizes and performs activities in the inter-organizational interaction with the 
regulated (Black, 2002, 1998; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000a, 2000b). According to 
Hansen et al. (1999), organizations have diverse strategies for managing learning. 
They describe two different strategies: the codification strategy and the 
personalization strategy. The codification strategy implies that knowledge is stored in 
databases to which people have access, making the knowledge easily useable. 
Organizations codify knowledge in “people-to-document” approaches, where 
knowledge is made independent of the originator and reused in different purposes. 
Various learning activities relate to the people-to-document approach, such as formal 
documents or written documentation including reports on requirements, standards, 
procedures, and evaluations (Aase & Tjensvoll, 2003; Pedersen et al., 2004). On the 
other hand, the personalization strategy implies that knowledge is closely tied to its 
originator and shared through direct people-to-people approaches. Organizations 
applying the personalization strategy focus on dialogue to enable people to arrive at 
deeper insights by going back and forth on problems they need to solve. It is 
important for these organizations to build networks of people so that organizational 
members can share knowledge in various manners, such as over the telephone, by e-
mail, or in face-to-face meetings (Hansen et al., 1999). Examples of learning activities 
related to people-to-people approaches include personal contacts, informal networks, 
meetings, forums, emergency exercises, tabletop exercises, and debriefings (Aase & 
Tjensvoll, 2003). In the regulation context, some regulatory enforcement strategies 
may emphasize activities according to people-to-people approaches, such as dialogue 
and guidance, where knowledge is closely tied to municipal emergency management 
staffs and spreads through personal contacts. Other regulatory enforcement strategies 
may emphasize learning activities according to people-to-document approaches, such 
as written information or inspection reports, where knowledge is kept independent of 
the municipal emergency management staff and reused.  
Different levels of learning exist: zero, single-loop, double-loop, and triple-loop 
learning (Argyris & Schön, 1996). Zero learning means that no learning occurs; 
people fail to take in any new information. Single-loop (also denoted as first order) 
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learning occurs when people make simple adaptive responses. It is a routine, 
incremental, conservative process that serves to maintain stable relations and sustain 
existing rules. It is basically a process in which learners gain competence in a certain 
activity, routine, or technology. Double-loop learning (also denoted as second order) 
takes place when people see things in totally new ways. This learning is characterized 
by the search for and exploration of alternative routines, rules, technologies, purposes, 
and goals rather than merely learning how to perform present routines more 
efficiently. The highest learning level, triple-loop learning (“learning how to learn”), 
occurs when people create new ways of developing new structures of thought and 
action (Snell & Chak, 1998; Lant & Mezias, 1996).    
Despite the different learning approaches, barriers may exist that hamper the 
regulatees’ learning in emergency management. According to Aase and Tjensvoll 
(2003), a lack of priority regarding emergency management is a common barrier. 
Emergency management should be incorporated into ordinary work tasks; however, it 
is often supplementary to the daily work tasks, causing a priority problem. The lack of 
competence, lack of variation in emergency exercises, and time pressures are other 
barriers causing difficulties in the learning processes (Aase & Tjensvoll, 2003).  
 
3 Methodological approach 
 
The current paper is based on empirical data from a qualitative study carried out in 
2003. The study is a multiple case study (Yin, 1994) that includes six municipalities 
in two Norwegian counties. A case is defined as a municipality along with the risk 
regulator responsible for supervising municipal emergency management.  
In designing the study, frequent contact with respective regulators regarding 
case selection within the counties was crucial. The case municipalities varied across 
factors such as population, size, location, risk sources, number of emergency 
management employees, whether or not a severe accident had occurred within the 
municipality, and how regulators evaluated the plans and exercises regarding 
emergency management. Table 1 provides an overview of the six case municipalities 
according to these aspects. 
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Table 1. Contextual description of the six case municipalities. 
 
Contextual  
aspects 
County 1                                                             County 2 
(15449 km2)                                                       (7281 km2) 
Case Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
Population 1200 
 
7500 3800 75000 1700 12000 
Location In a fjord 
surrounded 
by high 
mountains 
In a fjord 
surrounded 
by high 
mountains 
A mix of 
coastline, 
fjords, 
rivers, and 
high 
mountains 
Costal area, 
hosting a 
large city 
Inland area Inland area 
Risk 
sources2 
Avalanche, 
rockslide, 
tunnel risk, 
fire 
Avalanche, 
rockslide, 
industrial 
waste, tunnel 
risk 
Flood, 
tunnel risk 
Infra-
structural 
risk (road 
traffic, ferry 
transport), 
industrial 
waste 
Water 
reservoir 
breakage, 
avalanche, 
rockslide 
Railway 
accident, 
industrial 
waste 
Severe 
accident 
experience 
Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Plans and 
exercises3  
Sufficient Insufficient Insufficient Good Good Insufficient 
 
The two counties varied in aspects such as the number of regulatees within the county 
and the number of inspectors. County 1 (Cases 1, 2, and 3) included 33 municipalities 
and 8 inspectors; County 2 (Cases 4, 5, and 6) included 15 municipalities and 3 
inspectors. 
Data collection was carried out using method triangulation that involved 
qualitative interviews, document analyses, and observations to gather rich data 
(Patton, 1990). The study included 12 qualitative interviews with municipal 
emergency management employees and regulatory inspectors as well as the 
observation of a planned system audit within one municipality. Documents such as 
municipal plans, risk and vulnerability analyses, crisis management plans, crisis 
information plans, and inspection reports were collected, analysed, and compared 
with the interview data. Furthermore, second order data were applied to gather rich 
information about emergency management processes across Norwegian 
                                                 
2 Based on emergency management plans, risk and vulnerability analysis, and 
interview data. 
3 Based on inspection reports and conversations with regulatory inspectors in the case 
selection phase.  
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municipalities and regulatory authorities. For this purpose, annual municipal surveys 
(DSB, 2002; 2005), conducted by the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency 
Planning, were integrated into the current study. The second order data were applied 
particularly to describe frequency and method application related to emergency 
management exercises as well as how municipalities evaluated their performance and 
the benefits achieved with improved emergency management.  
The interview guide included questions related to learning, risk perception, risk 
communication, and trust. These issues were included in order to conduct a broad 
exploration of how risks are identified and communicated by regulatory inspectors 
and municipal emergency managers (Rothstein, 2003; Jensen & Kleivan, 1999; Stern 
& Fineberg, 1996), how municipalities apply risk information for learning purposes 
(Nilsen & Olsen, 2004, 2007; Reason, 1997), and how the aspect of trust influences 
the activities between risk regulator and municipalities (Hawkins & Thomas, 1984). 
This paper focuses on data covering the learning aspect within the regulatory 
activities.  
Data are categorized according to the regulatory enforcement strategies identified 
earlier—namely, compliance approaches and deterrence approaches (Baldwin & 
Cave, 1999; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).  
 
4 Results 
 
This study found similarities and differences in the regulatory enforcement strategies 
depending on geographical location, number of regulated municipalities, and 
population of the municipality. All aspects of enforcement strategies from both 
deterrence and compliance approaches were observed in the different cases. However, 
most emphasis fell to compliance approaches in both counties. A large number of 
regulatees and extensive geographical distances within the county caused difficulties 
in using personal contact and advice during interactions. Such difficulties appeared 
within County 1 (Cases 1, 2, and 3), which was twice the size in square kilometres 
and number of regulated municipalities as well as having a more prominent control 
aspect.  
In municipalities with typical natural risks present and with previous accident 
experience (Cases 1, 2, and 5), working on emergency management was less 
dependent on the interaction with the regulator, compared to municipalities without 
natural risks present and no accident experience. Municipalities with accident 
experience did not necessarily comply with governmental expectations, but 
informants explained how they lived with natural risks; such experience provided 
them with competence in managing emergencies. In practice, preventive measures 
were usually implemented after an undesired event or accident.  
The regulator, as an external driving force reminding and encouraging 
municipalities to comply with governmental expectations, provided an important 
reason for municipalities to prioritize emergency management issues. The 
municipalities’ ability to learn and improve upon practices was closely related to 
interaction with the inspectors. Different regulatory enforcement strategies involved 
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different learning activities; the results will be presented according to compliance 
approaches and deterrence approaches. 
 
4.1.  Learning within compliance approaches  
 
Several learning arenas existed in the regulator-regulatee interface, and inspectors and 
emergency managers interacted and communicated on a regular basis in meetings, 
courses, seminars, phone calls, etc. In meetings and seminars initiated by the 
regulator, emergency managers across the county met and discussed common 
challenges and risk sources facing their respective municipalities. The regulators’ 
rationale for these meetings and seminars was, among others, to assemble emergency 
managers to build networks across municipalities and facilitate possible future 
collaboration. The network of municipal emergency managers was valuable in terms 
of informal contacts and distribution of emergency plans among the municipalities, 
but the active networking seemed dependent on activities initiated by the regulator. 
Results indicated several instances in which regulators, due to the lack of legislation, 
developed different innovative activities to increase municipal risk awareness, 
disseminate new knowledge, and develop municipal emergency management. For 
example, inspectors within County 2 visited almost every municipality in order to 
inform politicians and emergency management staffs about their responsibility to 
respond to governmental expectations and the regulators’ ability to sanction non-
compliance. Furthermore, the inspectors prepared presentations of worst-case 
scenario examples, such as houses struck by rockslides or buildings located in 
extreme avalanche- and rock slide-exposed areas. They presented these examples for 
the politicians treating area plans and plan permissions, with the purpose of 
illustrating the importance of conducting risk analyses and incorporating them into the 
planning processes. One municipal informant said:  
 
I think this is part of a process of increasing our awareness in emergency management. It 
affects our work, and the regulator is strongly involved and very good at communicating 
the message. The regulator also arranges meetings where representatives from several 
municipalities attend and get information about safety issues. 
 
The inspectors considered themselves to be consultants and collaborators and were 
usually reluctant to adopt a strong control approach towards the municipalities. 
Performing the activities related to compliance approaches, the regulators used an 
informal bottom-up approach. Results provided several examples of activities in 
which inspectors cooperated and actively assisted in developing and improving the 
municipal emergency management. In one municipality (Case 6) with limited 
financial resources and experience with emergency management, an inspector 
participated in the entire process of developing the first municipal risk and 
vulnerability analysis. In this way, the regulator contributed knowledge and tried to 
influence the emergency managers’ mindset. Most municipal informants were 
satisfied with the inspectors’ advice, assistance, and cooperation in these emergency 
management improvement processes.  
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Inspectors within County 2 facilitated the municipalities by distributing 
emergency management tools and artefacts. More specifically, inspectors 
manufactured electronically based templates for municipal risk and vulnerability 
analysis. Based on guidelines developed by the DCPEP, the inspectors also prepared 
and distributed document templates for creating municipal emergency plans and 
maintaining internal control. The inspectors explained that the distribution of a simple 
checklist was the most popular tool among the municipalities; the checklist was a 
straightforward, simplified risk and vulnerability analysis that the municipalities 
could apply in specific cases of land use and tick off certain issues before returning 
the completed list to the regulator. However, the DCPEP did not approve of the 
distribution practice and criticized the inspectors in County 2. Despite this 
disapproval, the inspectors continued the distribution because, in practice, the tools 
and artefacts simplified and improved the municipal emergency management as well 
as reducing the burden, and municipal informants valued them as time and resource 
savers. One informant in a mid-sized municipality with limited financial resources 
(Case 6) said:  
 
I think the regulator is a resource in several ways. They give advice and guidance and to 
some extent they do the job for us, which is very useful for the municipality. They have 
capabilities that we do not possess. 
 
None of the municipal informants were formally educated in emergency management. 
Only the most densely populated case municipality (Case 4) had a 20 percent 
emergency management position; in the other case municipalities, emergency 
management tasks were additional to everyday work tasks. Municipal informants and 
inspectors perceived the lack of formal education and emergency management 
positions as substantial barriers. All municipal informants explained how they learned 
by practicing their assigned emergency management tasks, by taking courses, and by 
completing emergency exercises. The regulator organized courses covering various 
topics to educate municipal emergency managers, and the municipal informants who 
had attended such courses expressed increased risk awareness and indicated that they 
had searched for new alternatives and solutions. One municipal informant said:  
 
I’ve recently participated in a course at the Emergency Planning College4. It was a course 
arranged by the regulator on municipal safety and vulnerability. It was designed for 
municipal emergency managers and several municipal representatives participated. The 
course made me realize the value of the risk and vulnerability analysis and what a useful 
tool that is in a planning context. 
 
According to all municipal informants as well as results from the municipal surveys 
(DSB 2002, 2005), the emergency exercise was the most important learning activity 
                                                 
3 A college administered by the Directorate of Civil Protection and Emergency 
Planning. It is used for different courses and learning activities for staffs at all levels 
within the studied risk regulation regime. 
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initiated by the regulator. On a national basis, 70 percent of all Norwegian 
municipalities had completed exercises in the two years prior to 2002; the numbers 
for 2005 indicated 95 percent had completed them in the four years prior. Through the 
exercises, municipalities tested emergency plans and management in practice, which 
contributed to gaining important experience in managing various emergency 
situations and provided an excellent opportunity for the evaluation and improvement 
of emergency plans. Different methods were utilized, but usually the exercises were 
based on role-plays (applied by 83 percent of participants in 2002), often in 
collaboration with a neighbouring municipality. One municipality exercised according 
to a scenario prepared by the regulator, while the neighbouring municipality observed 
the entire process. Municipalities could, to a certain extent, adjust scenarios according 
to relevant risks. The scenarios were perceived as realistic, increased the attention to 
relevant risks, and contributed to an improved understanding of the importance of 
emergency management. Other exercise methods were tabletops (applied by 15 
percent in 2002) and full-scale exercises, but only 13 percent of all municipalities 
conducted full-scale exercises involving external emergency services, such as the 
police, fire brigade, and healthcare professionals. Usually the municipality’s top 
administrative and political management participated, and the most common exercise 
elements were the distribution of roles and responsibilities, decision-making, and 
media- and information management. Through emergency exercises, the 
municipalities prepared for managing new situations, and 70 percent of those who 
participated reported that they made improvements regarding crisis information 
management, role clarity, and updated risk and vulnerability analysis (DSB, 2002). 
One informant explained how the regulator contributed to learning within emergency 
management: 
 
Their controls increase our attention, and their reports identify conditions for 
improvement, but it’s definitively the emergency exercises that are most useful for us and 
there is a need to exercise once in a while. 
 
Despite the assessment of informal regulatory activities as relevant and interesting, 
inspectors expressed concern regarding municipalities’ priority of emergency 
activities. Although regulators encouraged the municipalities to participate, they had 
no means to force them to do so. Due to the lack of legislation, the voluntary aspect 
was vital in the interactions between regulator and municipality. The voluntary aspect 
could manifest itself in both positive and negative ways regarding compliance with 
governmental expectations. Positively, municipal staffs became involved in learning 
processes; negatively, the voluntary aspect made ignorant behaviours possible. 
Emergency management was sometimes given less priority than mandatory tasks. 
One inspector said:  
 
It is obvious that, when our demands are not legally established, these tasks are given less 
priority than mandatory tasks.  
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4.2  Learning within deterrence approaches  
 
This section describes and analyses activities with a more formal and systematic 
character in the regulator-regulatee interface. These activities included a stronger 
control aspect than the compliance activities, but they cannot be characterized as 
deterrence approaches in a strict sense. Regulators imposed these activities on the 
municipalities, and sanctions were used to seek compliance and state examples with 
preventive purposes.   
By orders from the government, the regulator inspected each municipality every 
fourth year conducting a system audit. The system audit involved several activities: 
pre-meeting, document review, interviews, verifications, post-meeting, and an 
inspection report. Usually, a pre-meeting prior to the actual inspection initiated the 
system audit to trigger processes within the municipalities, such as plan reviews. 
Before the inspection, inspectors reviewed documents, such as emergency plans and 
risk and vulnerability analyses, to assess their status and reveal deviations in the 
municipal emergency management. Inspectors were preoccupied with the quality of 
the written plans, and the inspection focused on how deeply rooted these plans were 
in the organization. The inspection included interviews with vital members of the 
municipal organization, such as the chairman, chief officer, emergency management 
staffs, the technical department manager, and the municipal physician. The purpose of 
the interviews was to reveal whether the emergency managers were familiar with their 
responsibilities, duties, and plans. Following the interviews, the inspectors gathered 
all the informants in a post-meeting to summarise and agree upon needs for 
improvement. Finally, the regulator prepared a written inspection report stating the 
regulatory demands, submitted the report, and required municipal response in the 
form of a schedule for compliance. Despite the requirement for a written response, no 
such response was guaranteed. One inspector said:  
 
Remember that this is not established by law. In fact, one of the municipalities in the 
county has proclaimed that it has no intention to comply with our demands. Such language 
is very uncommon for us.  
 
The informants within this case municipality explained the rationale behind the 
resistance to respond to requirements as related to a difficult financial situation, low 
priority, low perceived risk of catastrophic accidents, close location to a large city 
hopefully capable of assisting them, and a belief in the internal municipal competence 
to manage emergency situations. 
The learning aspect was not predominant in performing the inspection activities 
within the deterrence approaches. The purpose of the inspections was to be an eye-
opener, forcing the municipalities to improve their documents and plans and comply 
with requirements in the inspection report. One inspector said:  
 
I think the inspection in itself is a verification of the state of the emergency management, 
but I don’t think they learn anything from it. It’s as if some are better liars than others. But 
in fact they don’t have to lie, because usually we find the reality in their documents. What 
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municipalities learn from are advice, meetings, courses, and emergency exercises in 
particular. In my opinion these activities keep up the emergency level. 
 
A general finding was the positive view of the inspectors and their authoritative role 
in performing the formal control activities. According to the municipal informants, 
the inspectors were not preoccupied with revealing deviations, and they would rather 
engage in finding opportunities to develop emergency management and focus on 
important improvement areas. The regulator had the power to raise objections against 
municipal plans that could bring harm to society. The regulator used the opportunity 
to sanction in cases where emergency management considerations were poorly 
conducted or absent in municipal plans. Usually, municipalities exposed to sanctions 
complied with the demands by completing the necessary adaptations and corrections. 
For example, when one of the case municipalities (Case 1) received an objection 
concerning the overall municipal plan due to lack of emergency considerations, the 
municipality chose the easy way out. A municipal informant explained:  
 
We corrected it and got away with it. We wrote a short chapter and stated that we will 
consider societal safety and emergency management in all our work and especially in the 
land use planning. They approved it with some doubt. 
 
5 Discussions 
 
Data from the two counties have indicated how regulatory enforcement strategies 
have different impacts on learning processes among the regulatees and how different 
constraints affect the regulatees’ learning ability.  
To summarize, the regulator applied regulatory enforcement strategies with a 
strong emphasis on dialogue-based activities, characterized by informal 
conversations, advice, and discussions under conditions of openness and mutual trust. 
The regulators stressed a wide range of activities related to compliance enforcement 
approaches and not necessarily with a learning perspective in mind; nevertheless, the 
regulator provided a healthy learning climate. The compliance approaches contributed 
to defining the process of risk regulation as a learning process. However, the positive 
influence depended on priority and willingness to participate in the activities 
facilitated by the regulator (Black, 2002; Aase & Tjensvoll, 2003).  
The deterrence approaches implied control activities focusing on compliance 
with demands (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). Objections and inspections often caused 
adjustments, corrections, and attempts to comply, but the control activities implied 
solutions that were short-term in nature and could not be characterized as learning 
processes. 
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5.1  Risk regulation as a learning process? 
 
Municipal emergency management is not legally established. Nevertheless, 
municipalities, with some variation regarding effort and quality, perform these tasks. 
Norwegian cultural traits and social values characterizing the society as consensus-
oriented, involving participatory approaches among employers, employees, and 
regulatory authorities (Karlsen & Lindøe, 2006; Lindøe & Hansen, 2000), may to 
some degree explain the municipal work effort and interest in participating in 
regulatory activities. Risk perception may be another explanatory factor—particularly 
for the variation aspect in work effort and quality (Slovic et al., 1985). Experience 
with incidents and accidents as well as living close to natural risk sources (Cases 1, 2, 
and 5) influenced how informants perceived risks, took responsibility and acted if 
something happened in the local community. Real accidents and incidents increased 
perceived risk, made people realize that accidents could strike any time, and revealed 
the need for working proactively. Still, the emergency management work showed 
signs of being reactive, as accidents were “needed” before preventive measures were 
implemented (Bourrier, 2002). 
In most cases, inspectors believed in compliance through persuasion and 
education, viewing themselves as consultants and teachers who provided regulatees 
with information and knowledge (Kitamura, 2000). In organizing compliance 
approaches, the regulator emphasized discussion, reflection, and networking in the 
regulator-regulatee interface. Knowledge was closely related to the inspectors and 
emergency managers and spread through people-to-people approaches facilitated by 
the regulator (Hansen et al., 1999). Learning within the compliance approaches 
fostered a co-operative and open climate, promoted knowledge circulation, and 
generated knowledge through actions and reflections among individuals, groups and 
communities of emergency managers and inspectors (Aase & Tjensvoll, 2003; 
Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000a). Through the compliance approaches, emergency 
management was promoted as a social and participatory process, and the courses, 
seminars, meetings, and emergency exercises contributed to increased knowledge 
level and second order learning processes within the regulated municipalities (Black, 
2002; Lant & Mezias, 1996). Emergency management processes developed from 
incremental all-out-efforts, often initiated by an inspection announcement, to 
processes in which municipal emergency managers searched for and explored new 
alternatives, such as checklists, risk and vulnerability analyses, and exercises to solve 
their challenges. However, the compliance activities turned out to be particularly 
vulnerable to negligence and the presence of enthusiasts in the municipal emergency 
organizations. 
In particular, the emergency exercises promoted learning processes in several 
ways. Through the exercises, the municipal emergency management organization 
enlarged their action repertoire, managed new variables under controlled 
circumstances, and prepared for new emergency situations (Lonka & Wybo, 2005; 
Weick et al., 1999). During the exercises the emergency managers could reflect in 
action and gather feedback on their performance, while plans could be revised and 
improved upon. The exercises enabled vital members of the municipal organization to 
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understand emergency management in new ways, develop new communication and 
coordination skills, and learn by practicing (Snell & Chak, 1998; Argyris & Schön, 
1996; Brown & Duguid, 1991). The occurrence of diverse emergency exercise 
methods and elements coupled with a strong participation record (95 percent in the 
four years prior to 2005) indicated that municipalities found this activity interesting 
and important. However, exercising under circumstances that mimic reality as closely 
as possible should be stressed due to the low percentage of municipalities (13 percent) 
applying full-scale exercises in collaboration with vital institutions involved in real 
emergency situations. The capacity to manage real situations and develop practical 
skills such as coordination and communication may be reduced when only conducting 
tabletops or role-plays, not involving external participants or media pressure. 
Improving preparedness and emergency management requires balancing and applying 
diverse types of exercises.   
The regulator’s distribution of emergency management tools and artefacts in 
County 2 was ambivalent from the learning perspective. The tools and artefacts were 
indeed helpful and facilitated the work processes, but the distribution practice also 
involved a potential counteraction to second order learning processes due to the 
reduced practical experience with conducting risk and vulnerability analyses and 
establishing internal control routines. The regulator should balance the roles of expert 
advisers and active performers of the municipal emergency management work tasks 
(Reiman & Norros, 2002). Providing municipalities with these tools could result from 
inspectors’ increased focus on speeding up compliance with governmental 
expectations rather than on developing sound learning processes. 
 
5.2  Learning constraints  
 
Financial problems were present in several case municipalities, resulting in a lack of 
priority in emergency management. Inspectors tried to influence decision makers by 
informing politicians about their responsibilities (Vaughan, 1992), but the lack of 
emergency management positions as well as education and knowledge among 
municipal employees, in addition to the conflicting demands between emergency 
management and production, were identified as learning constraints in the interface 
(Aase & Tjensvoll, 2003). Furthermore, the geographical distances and decreasing 
number of inspectors within the regulatory authorities could potentially complicate 
regulator-regulatee interaction (Jensen & Kleivan, 1999) and cause insufficient 
learning environments due to restricted ability to regulatory enforcement using 
people-to-people approaches.  
The control activities, related to the deterrence approaches, did not foster a 
healthy learning climate with openness, reflection, and networking in the interface to 
the same degree that the compliance activities did (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000a, 
2000b; Hansen et al., 1999). In fact, aspects of the control activities could to some 
extent constitute learning constraints in the interface. Formal written documents and 
written information exchange were important aspects in organizing these activities, 
and the inspectors were usually preoccupied with document quality, rather than 
process quality, which is vital to ensure learning processes. Activities such as 
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inspections and document reviews were action oriented with the purpose of forcing 
municipalities to establish and revise their plans, conduct risk and vulnerability 
analyses, and get area plans approved (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). The municipalities 
usually did not ignore or postpone meeting the regulatory demands, but the control 
activities searched for deviations from governmental expectations, and the municipal 
emergency managers became preoccupied with making minor adjustments and 
adaptations to comply with regulatory demands instead of seeking new alternatives or 
exploring new work procedures to cope with their challenges (Argyris & Schön, 
1996; Lant & Mezias, 1996). These findings concur with the fundamental idea of the 
deterrence approach in enforcing regulation in which fear of sanctions should result in 
compliance (Braithwait et al., 1987); however, in terms of learning and improvement, 
the deterrence approach did not contribute to continuous improvement processes 
within the regulated municipalities. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
This study has approached the regulatory enforcement debate by applying a learning 
perspective to different regulatory enforcement strategies. This paper has discussed 
how compliance approaches foster both first and second order learning processes 
within emergency management in the regulated municipalities, while the deterrence 
approaches are delimited to fostering first order learning processes. 
Regulatory enforcement activities must often contend with reasons for non-
compliance argued by those regulated, such as competing demands, financial 
circumstances, and time pressures. In practice, these are learning barriers obstructing 
regulatory enforcement strategies and emergency management improvement. To 
foster learning processes among regulatees, these learning barriers need to be 
addressed, and a statutory law would support the regulator in doing so. Furthermore, 
even if a statutory law were provided, the regulator should facilitate arenas in which 
regulatees can meet, encourage networking and collaboration, and promote 
emergency exercises to improve safe emergency practices. Municipalities usually face 
similar challenges and can save both time and resources in cooperating and taking 
advantage of each other’s expertise in emergency management.  
This study has emphasized learning processes among the regulated. Future 
studies should explore how the regulatory authorities and inspectors learn in the 
interface. Dialogue-based processes involving communication and feedback loops 
should be explored in order to map how regulators and inspectors learn and how they 
develop their competences, tools, and strategies as well as improve regulation in the 
long run.  
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ABSTRACT: The paper explores how regulatory practice affects procedures and 
routines regarding patient safety in hospitals. The objective is to explore how 
systematic and incidental interaction activities between regulator and hospital 
contribute to patient safety. The paper is based on a multi-level case study within the 
Norwegian health care system. The study indicates that despite the increased patient 
safety awareness and efforts within the hospital, the regulatory activities as they are 
performed in practice do not have a substantial impact on patient safety improvement 
and learning from errors within the hospital 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1  Background 
 
It is difficult to understand and explore the concept of safety without linkages to rules 
and regulations. They span the system levels from the regulatory rules in laws, 
through standards down to operating rules at the work place (Hale 2006). 
Consequently, patient safety, risk management and regulation are interrelated 
concepts (Palmer 1999). Safety is a dynamic property of the health care system (Cook 
& Rasmussen 2005). It does not reside in a person, device or department, but emerges 
from the processes and the interfaces in a socio-technical risk management system 
(Wiig & Aase 2006, Gherardi & Nicolini 2000, Rasmussen 2000). The system levels 
are: Government, regulators and associations, local regulator, hospital, medical 
department, staff, and work operation (Ale et al. 2006, Wears 2005, Rasmussen 
2000). To improve patient safety an important research subject is to explore the 
interactions between the system levels and to make explicit the interfaces of their 
normal work systems, and the impact of decisions on the constraints and decisions 
criteria at the other system levels (Rasmussen 2000). In this perspective, safety 
oriented regulators and their styles and practices are components of the system 
affecting patient safety in the hospital – risk regulator interface (Wilpert 2006, Walshe 
2003). These interface activities, is the subject explored in this paper. 
Patient safety improvement requires organizational learning and knowledge 
transfer at the system level, which entails changes in organizational routines that cut 
across divisions, professions, and levels of hierarchy (Rivard et al. 2006, Dixon & 
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Shofer 2006). The interface between the regulator and the regulated is an essential 
feature for the health care system to learn and improve patient safety (Kirwan et al. 
2002, Reason 1997). The issue of how to manage errors in the relationship between 
the regulator and the regulated is sensitive and can be drawn between the liability 
aspect and need for openness related to errors (Wilpert 2006). Regulatory agencies 
face difficulties of accomplishing a dual mission of rule enforcement and learning. 
Formal activities and enforcing regulation interfere with learning activities because 
incentives designed for rule enforcement affect collection and interpretation of 
important learning information (Kirwan et al. 2002, Tamuz 2001). Knowledge and 
research on how regulatory agencies balance their dual mission can contribute to 
improve patient safety by promoting effective incident reporting systems and 
fostering a learning environment in hospitals and other health care organizations 
(Tamuz 2001, Kohn et al. 2000).  
 
1.2  Objective 
 
The paper explores how regulatory strategies and practices affect procedures and 
routines regarding patient safety in hospitals. The main research question is: How 
does the interface between hospital and risk regulator affect patient safety? This is 
further elaborated by the research questions: 1) How does systematic or incidental 
activities in the interface contribute to patient safety? and 2) Does an individual or a 
system focus in the interface have different effects on patient safety? 
 
2 Theoretical approach 
 
2.1  System or individual models? 
 
Previous research regarding system and individual models in error management has 
revealed a blame culture within the health care system. The individual health care 
worker, and not the system, is blamed for medical errors (Reason 2000, Mulcahy & 
Rosenthal 1999, Leape 1994). The individual focus has hampered the organizational 
learning, counteracted explorations of work processes causing a loss of rich 
information about the interaction of individuals, technical work, and organizational 
processes (Vincent 2006, Leape 1994). According to Reason et al. (2001) all 
organizations are prone to the “vulnerable system syndrome” (VSS). The VSS-
syndrome is constituted by three interacting and self-perpetuating elements: Blaming 
the individuals, denying the existence of systemic error provoking weaknesses, and 
the blinkered pursuit of productive and financial indicators. Recognizing its 
symptoms and taking corrective action is a prerequisite for effective risk management 
and improved patient safety. A crucial step is to engage in double loop organizational 
learning that goes beyond the immediate unsafe actions, to question the core 
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assumptions about human fallibility, and to reveal and reform the organizational 
conditions that provoke it (Tucker & Edmondson 2003, Reason et al. 2001). 
Theoretically, there has been a shift from an individual oriented model of errors to a 
systemic approach to errors within the patient safety movement (Infante 2006). 
Human, organizational, and cultural factors are now viewed as important elements in 
patient safety work, but in practice research shows that the individual model is still a 
prominent cultural aspect within the health care system (Leape & Berwick 2005). 
 
 
2.2  Systematic or incidental approaches? 
 
The previous research regarding systematic and incidental approaches in regulating 
risks and improving safety is a vast body of literature on improvement of work 
processes, from the local work places to regulator control regimes. Parts of this 
literature cover organizational development with strong linkages to quality 
management systems at a micro level (French & Bell 1999; Logothesis 1992) while 
other parts cover risk management and regulations at a meso-level (Kirwan et al. 
2002, Hood et al. 2001, Frick et al. 2000, Hood & Jones 1996). Hood et al (1999a, b, 
2001) present a framework for comparing and understanding variations in risk 
regulation regimes (RRR). According to the RRR framework there is a set of 
components that all control systems contain. In this perspective regulatory practice 
consist of control activities to perform standard setting, information collection, and 
behavior modification (Hommen 2003). This trio of control components aligns with 
policy making, monitoring and enforcement involving different forms and varying 
emphasize on the activities within different risk regulation regimes (Hood et al. 2001, 
1999a, b). A key factor in this literature is the underline of systematic use of these 
control components as opposed to an incidental approach to promote safety work.  
 
3 Methodology 
 
The research design is based on a multi-level (Rasmussen 2000) case study within the 
Norwegian health care system. Data is collected using method triangulation of 
interviews, observation and documents (Yin 1994, Quinn Patton 1990).  
The study is conducted within two hospital divisions, hospital top management, the 
Chief Medical Officer, and the Norwegian Board of Health. A total of 49 qualitative 
interviews were conducted. The informants were hospital top management and 
division management (6), hospital staff (32), inspectors at national and local level 
regulator (9), and patient representative association (2).  
The interfaces are studied through: Systematic and incidental regulatory activities 
(process dimension) and the regulator’s system or individual focus (structure 
dimension) in performing these activities. Four types of systematic activities are 
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covered: 1) System audit, 2) Event based inspections, 3) A mandatory error reporting 
system, and 4) Error investigations. The systematic activities are diversely performed 
but are all characterized by formal procedures. In addition three types of incidental 
activities are covered:  5) Courses, 6) Meetings, and 7) Exchange of personal 
knowledge.  
 
3.1  Context 
 
In the Norwegian context the systematic approach to safety is embedded in the 
regulatory framework. The Health Care Supervisory Act (1984) requires all providers 
of health care services to establish internal control systems, to manage safety and 
errors. The enterprises and services should be planned for, performed, and maintained 
according to standards and regulations. Specialized health care institutions are 
furthermore required to establish a quality committee as part of the internal control 
system. The quality committee is supposed to be vital in the hospital internal error 
management, especially in cases of reportable medical errors and near misses. 
Hospitals are required to report medical errors causing serious patient injury, and 
serious near misses, to the regulator.  
An independent patient representative association is established in each county. 
The purpose is quality improvement and advocating patient needs, interests, and legal 
rights towards the specialized health care services. The association notifies the 
regulator concerning conditions requiring regulatory response. 
The Norwegian Board of Health is the regulator responsible for general 
supervision of health and social services at a national level. At a local level (county) 
this responsibility is delegated to the Chief County Medical Officer. Usually, the local 
level regulator interacts with the hospitals. Patient safety is an important work area for 
the regulator. According to policy documents patient interests, patient’s legal rights, 
quality improvement, and patient safety are the main targets of the regulatory 
activities.  
 
4 Results 
 
The empirical material will be categorized and analysed according to two analytical 
dimensions: Process and structure.  
  
4.1  Regulatory interface matrix 
 
Figure 1 depicts how the regulatory activities covered in the study are categorized 
according to 1) Process (Systematic – Incidental) and 2) Structure (Individual – 
System). In Figure 1, the activities are categorized according to how the two 
dimensions are emphasized performing the regulatory activities in practice. 
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Figure 1. Regulatory interface matrix 
 
The regulatory activities are described in depth in chapter 4.2 and 4.3.  
 
4.2  The process dimension of the regulatory practice  
 
4.2.1  Systematic activities 
There are two main types of systematic regulatory activities: System audit and event-
based inspection. They are both inspections, but differ in numerous ways. Their 
characteristics are presented in table 1. 
 
   System  
1) System Audit 
 5) Courses 
 
 
 
  
               6) Meetings   2) Event-Based 
            Inspection 
 
 
Incidental         Systematic       
         
 3) Error Report  
            System   
     4) Error  
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       Knowledge Exchange    
            
Individual 
1 
3 
2 
4 
5 
6
7 
Article III 
 139 
Table 1. Characteristics of system audit and event-based inspection 
Characteristics System 
audit 
Event- based inspection 
Approach Proactive Reactive 
Information         
collection 
Written and oral Written 
Document analysis Yes Yes 
Meetings Yes No 
Interviews Yes No 
Written report Published Secret5 
Verifications Yes No 
Structure dimension System Individual/system 
Process dimension Systematic Systematic 
 
The system audit is delegated6 from national to local level regulator. The local level 
inspectors have diverse opinions regarding the organizing of the system audit and its’ 
contribution to improve patient safety processes. All local level inspectors believe the 
system audit initiate important patient safety processes within the hospital, such as 
document preparation, examination of internal control procedures, and increased 
awareness among employees. Performed within a specific medical domain or 
organizational level they consider the system audit to provide a proper foundation to 
assess the hospital’s internal control system. The system audit results in an open 
inspection report, published by the national regulator. In the regulator’s opinion, 
Norwegian hospitals in general only to a certain degree apply inspection reports to 
improve patient safety at an organizational level. Some inspectors question the 
efficiency of the system audit, and some are concerned with it’s ability to map the 
hospital reality and actually reveal latent conditions threatening patient safety. The 
paper work can easily be checked, interviews can be performed, but to map whether 
patients receive proper treatment is difficult. A local level inspector explains:  
 
The system audit is variable in its function. We ask ourselves from time to time whether 
we apply our resources in an optimal way. I don’t think we’ve found the perfect methods 
to perform our inspections. To get to the core of internal life within the hospital and find 
the exact level or existence of risks and vulnerability, is not easy for us. 
                                                 
5 Open after a process of being patient anonymized. 
6 The legal authority for the national and local level regulator is stated in the Health 
Care Supervisory Act (1984). The local level regulators perform system audit 
according to local areas of priority; and nationwide system audits according to 
guidelines established by the national level regulator.  
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Informants at the managerial within the hospital are positive to the system audit and 
describe it as a well-organized process. They perceive the system audit as an aspect 
that improves patient safety and brings attention to internal error management 
processes. According to informants within the patient representative association, the 
regulator has an exaggerated confidence in the system audit, and the written 
documents analysed in the audits do not represent reality. The representatives stress 
the complexity within health care services and the complex risks caused by 
interactions, limited time resources, and high degree of information transfer within 
and across hospital departments. They doubt that the regulator is able to uncover such 
latent conditions by using system audits.  
Opposed to the proactive system audit, the event-based inspection is reactive and 
more individually oriented. It is initiated by mandatory error reports, patient 
complaints, or by suspicion of insufficient practice. Based on the severity of the 
reported errors or complaints, the regulator opens cases against either an individual 
health care worker or the hospital. The regulator collects information and investigates 
whether or not the law has been violated and whether or not health services has been 
provided according to sound professional standards. In cases of liability, the case is 
forwarded to the national regulator who holds the power to sanction either the health 
care worker or the hospital. The hospital and the involved employees take the event-
based inspection serious, and routines are improved locally, but improvements are not 
implemented hospital wide. 
Current error investigation practice is based on formal written information 
collection of patient journals, reports from directly involved health care employees, 
and the hospital. Occasionally, expert judgements are used. Interviews are not part of 
the information collection. Informants within the regulator find the written 
information collection satisfactorily, while informants within the hospital and the 
patient representative association are sceptical to this investigation practice 
characterising it as too scant and distant from the hospital reality: 
 
They should be out there talking directly to the personnel, doing interviews to get rich 
information. Employees close to the accident often have the experience and knowledge 
that could contribute to better learning and understanding of the error. In addition, 
personnel indirectly involved in the error are not even asked for written information 
regarding the event. This results in mediocre error investigation, taking too long before the 
results are available. In the mean time dangerous routines still exist. (Hospital employee). 
 
Some hospital informants and the patient representatives argue that error 
investigations should focus more on latent conditions, not just the active failures. The 
investigations could then contribute to change the focus from an individual 
perspective to a system perspective, and to a stronger degree reveal human, 
technological and organisational factors related to medical errors. The investigation is 
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further criticized for being time-consuming, and lack of feedback to the involved 
employees.  
The regulator refers to a high degree of underreporting at the hospital, based on 
information from the media together with patient complaints. The inspectors are 
concerned with the current internal error management practice at the hospital, and 
have organized meetings with the hospital management to clarify legal demands and 
express their worries. The inspectors criticized the hospital quality committee, for 
lack of error management and the hospital for not analysing and learning from errors. 
A local level inspectors explains: 
 
Our responsibility regarding error reports is to control that the hospital’s internal control 
system works. We assess if and how the error is managed at the department level and 
whether the quality committee has managed it. We are not satisfied with the present 
situation. In addition, the hospital strives to conduct a proper analysis and learn from the 
errors. Today, they just describe the error when we ask them to analyse it.  
  
Informants within the hospital to a certain degree agree to the picture described by 
local level inspectors. Physicians and nurses admit that the error rate is higher than 
formally reported, and that they seldom or never report or discuss near misses. They 
usually perceive error reporting as statistics, involving limited feedback and influence 
on patient safety. The hospital management perceived underreporting as a minor 
problem before the regulator informed them. They admit that the mandatory quality 
committee does not hold a strong position within the hospital and is not working as 
expected. On the other hand the hospital emphasizes patient safety and quality 
improvement as one of five strategic areas. The hospital intends to promote patient 
safety as a competitive advantage in the future. Recently, the hospital has 
implemented a new electronic error reporting system, established a new patient safety 
position, and financed patient safety research projects to promote patient safety.  
 
4.2.2  Incidental activities  
Incidental regulatory activities are activities “standing on their own” and not part of a 
systematic and consistent “safety-control-system”. These incidental activities are 
characterized by advice rather than control. All informants in the study are positive to 
the informal character of incidental activities, but the national and local level 
inspectors express a restrictive attitude towards advice. A national level inspector 
said:  
 
Speaking from a pedagogical point of view, we don’t reject giving them advice, we rather 
give them hints of where they can find their answers. 
 
Daily, the inspectors receive phone calls from health care employees asking for legal 
advice. Hospital informants express a low threshold to contact the regulator 
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informally. Twice a year, the regulator arranges a meeting for experience transfer 
between the regulator and the hospital. Meetings are also held incidental if necessary. 
There are examples of courses arranged by the regulator on request from the hospital 
in for example patients’ rights. Informants report about a decrease in informal 
incidental activities the last years due to a sharper separation between the control and 
advice role caused by new legal reforms. The hospital informants consider the advice 
aspect as absent in the systematic regulatory activities, with exception of the system 
audit. In addition to enforcing a powerful legislation, the regulator is supposed to give 
advice to health care organizations, usually during inspections, to promote patient 
safety. A division manager expresses a general criticism of the overall regulatory 
practice:  
 
The advice role is more absent and I wish they were more advising than controlling, as the 
present practice is. The general criticism from health care employees is that the regulator 
emphasizes control. The regulatory practice is quite rigid and law-abiding and there is 
little room for considerations.  
 
Despite the strong control orientation in the interface, all informants believe in the 
dialogue as a means to solve problems. The regulator expresses how trust and 
dialogue usually is preferred instead of sanctions, especially in cases where the 
hospital organization is the object for improvement and not the individual. There is a 
restriction within the regulator to apply their strongest sanctions at the system level. A 
national level inspector explains: 
 
We believe in dialogue. We seldom use our strongest sanctions at the system level. If we 
give an order to comply and they don’t, well should we close down the hospital? So, we 
believe that if we don’t exaggerate our use of the sanction abilities they know that when 
we reveal deviations we actually mean it. Usually that is enough to get them to comply 
with our demands. 
 
4.3  The structure dimension of the regulatory practice 
 
According to the regulator there has been a systematic improvement of the regulatory 
practice during ten to fifteen years. The regulator has developed the system audit to 
become a high-quality system-oriented method. Previous, the system audit was rule-
based. A national level inspector says:  
 
It is our duty to assess reality against the law, but we must in a way test how this rule is 
complied with in a specific system. We assess what is justifiable treatment in a maternity 
ward, what do we expect there. I think we have become better to operationalize the rules 
in practice.  
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The challenge for the regulator is to incorporate the system perspective in the event-
based inspection. Inspectors find themselves well competent to perform system level 
inspections (system audit), and to handle cases involving individual health care 
workers (event-based inspection). But they refer to a gap to bridge between these 
approaches, and there is an ongoing process at the national level to improve 
regulatory practice and move the event-based inspection in a more system orientated 
direction. A national level inspector said: 
 
We discuss how we can improve our regulatory practice and conduct system oriented 
inspections in cases of medical errors. Traditionally, the regulator has been preoccupied 
with the individuals when serious errors occur, and we have been unable to bridge these. 
 
In a juridical perspective, the legislation is strong and states both duties and rights for 
the health care workers and the enterprises. According to the law, the individuals in 
the health care system are more exposed to diverse sanctions than the organizations. 
The patient representatives criticize the regulator for being weak in sanctioning the 
system level, and further that the criticism given from the regulator is not taken 
serious by the hospitals. Informants within the hospital management that usually 
interact with the regulator, argue that the regulator is careful sanctioning the 
individual and rather takes a system perspective. Hospital managers believe that 
physicians and nurses may have a higher perceived risk of reactions from the 
regulator because they are closer to the patients. The physicians and nurses express a 
fear of speaking up about medical error due to the possibility of negative reactions 
and sanctions. Inspectors at both national and local level admit their ability to 
sanction the individuals is much stronger than at the system level. But inspectors 
argue that the individuals sanctioned are in most cases sanctioned due to other reasons 
than individual medical errors. As a national level inspector explain:  
 
Just a few health care workers a year, lose their licences due to medical errors. But many 
are afraid of that so they hesitate to report themselves or others. We try to explain that 
there is another recipe to follow if they want to lose their licences. Our warnings are 
usually related to indefinite distribution of responsibility, bad communication, medication 
management and lousy journal record. If you avoid those four aspects, don’t take drugs or 
have sex with a patient, well then you will not meet me. 
 
The inspectors have a strong commitment to the distinct responsibility given by the 
law. For example regarding error investigations there is limited experience transfer 
from other relevant institutions. There is for instance limited communication with the 
Labour Inspection Authority about information regarding working hours and working 
environment that may be relevant for patient safety. Some local level inspectors argue 
in favour of a distinct responsibility between regulatory authorities:  
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We focus on staff, but not on their working hours. The Labour Inspection Authority 
inspects that. We don’t ask about it because we focus on the patient. We don’t ask about 
subjects concerning the Working Environment Act, they do and they are preoccupied with 
long work shifts and understaffing. But it is obvious that if the workload is too high it is a 
threat to patient safety. But we don’t inspect areas we are unable by law to inspect (Local 
level inspector).  
 
5 Discussion  
 
In our perspective, patient safety is a process dependant on learning and improvement 
across levels in the health care system (Rasmussen 2000). The study indicates that 
despite the increased patient safety awareness and efforts within the hospital, the 
regulatory interfaces as they are performed in practice do not have a substantial 
impact on patient safety improvement and learning from errors within the hospital 
(Walshe 1999, Brennan 1998). The case hospital has recently increased their patient 
safety efforts with a strong commitment from the top management. But the systematic 
patient safety activities required in the interface such as internal control activities, 
mandatory error reporting, and quality committee, suffer from a lack of priority and 
commitment from the hospital management and employees. The present regulatory 
activities are characterized by imposing corrective actions locally, rather than 
engaging the hospital in double loop organizational learning processes (Tucker & 
Edmondson 2003, Reason et al. 2001).  
Ideally, risk regulators aim to be proactive, prevent and learn from errors, rather 
than reacting to them (Becker 2002). The present results focus on aspects of the 
systematic regulatory activities, except the system audit, that do not promote such 
learning processes and improvement (Walshe 1999). First, the present communication 
processes in the interface complicate learning because they usually come in the form 
of formal written information exchange, (letters, error reports, inspection reports and 
investigations). In a learning perspective, this does not encourage reflection and 
discussion within the hospital or across the hospital – regulator interface, and thereby 
both system levels suffer from learning disabilities (Wiig & Aase 2006, Høyrup 2004, 
Hansen et al, 1999). The incidental interface activities come in the form of advice 
involving informal person-to-person communication. These activities are not 
predominant in the interface, despite the positive attitude from the hospital regarding 
these activities. Second, the lack of feedback processes, reflection, and experience 
transfer in the regulatory activities cause an insufficient learning environment in the 
interface (Schulz 2005, Høyrup 2004, Svensson et al. 2004). Based on system audit 
and event-based inspections, errors are corrected at a local level. Practices and 
routines are changed locally, but new knowledge and practices are not properly 
diffused either within the hospital or across system levels (Wiig & Aase 2006). This 
implies that the hospital’s internal error management system fails, and the regulatory 
practice faces difficulties coping with this fact. Third, a system perspective is 
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emerging, but as Figure 1 illustrates, only the system audit has a strong system focus 
in practice. The remaining three systematic interface activities event-based inspection, 
error reporting, and error investigation have a higher degree of individual focus, with 
a potential of counteracting exploration of working processes and prevent 
organizational learning (Reason et al. 2001). There is a paradox situated in the 
regulatory legal framework. The liability aspect within health care legislation has a 
potential influence patient safety improvement, the openness to speak up, and the 
error reporting within the hospital. The law on the one hand focuses on the system 
responsibility to provide safe health care, but at the other hand sanctions individuals. 
This explains why the regulator is restrictive sanctioning the system level, and why 
the employees have a higher perceived risk of being sanctioned (Leape 1994, Reason 
2000).  
There is a need to think of patient safety issues in terms of processes depending on 
the total system within health care (Ale et al, 2006, Wiig & Aase 2006, Wears 2005, 
Rasmussen 2000). The current limitation of an exclusive focus on single system levels 
such as the hospital or physicians must be transcended and considering a multitude of 
factors that are able to contribute to safety. Patient safety is an inter-organizational 
phenomenon and reference organizations, the patient representative association, and 
different regulatory authorities could be stronger involved promoting patient safety 
(Fahlbruch et al 2000). In the study the regulator seldom seeks relevant information 
from other regulatory authorities or patient representative associations. Such 
information could provide important information in the error investigation practice, 
and contribute to enhance knowledge about latent conditions and system factors 
causing medical errors (Walshe 2001). The hospital requires the regulator to provide 
advice and best practices from other hospitals, but the regulator’s difficulties in 
balancing the different roles of control and advice complicate the error investigation 
process as well as learning from others (Reiman & Norros 2002). There is a need to 
reconsider current error investigation practices. The regulator already has realized 
there is a need for a stronger system oriented practice, and this aspect is presently 
changing (Infante 2006). To improve the error investigation approach the regulator 
should consider applying people-to-people approaches such as interviews an focus 
groups as methods for information collection rather than relying on written 
information solely (Hansen et al. 1999). The results also show a need for reinforced 
feedback mechanisms in the interface as means for improved patient safety. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The regulator is a vital institution within the health care system, and the hospital-
regulator interface can be analyzed according to different perspectives. The hospital – 
regulator interface is complex and involves several regulatory activities. Some 
activities are systematic, while others are incidental. The activities vary regarding 
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their underlying models of error management. As shown in Figure 1 regulatory 
practices are system oriented and individual oriented. 
The variety of systematic and incidental activities is positive and provides a good 
basis for patient safety improvement processes. The systematic process, system audit, 
improves patient safety locally, but strives to improve patient safety across intra-
organizational borders. Other systematic processes, such as the event-based 
inspection, error reporting, and error investigation contribute to keep staffs aware of 
their responsibility when doing harm, but the activities have less impact on patient 
safety due to insufficient communication processes and lack of feedback mechanisms 
across the hospital-regulator interface and within the hospital. The incidental activities 
contribute to increase knowledge level among hospital staffs and contribute to a 
positive communicative climate, but these activities are not predominant in interface. 
The regulatory activities holding a system perspective, such as system audit and 
courses, promote openness and dialogue, and affect patient safety more positively 
than the activities holding an individual perspective. The individual perspective 
characterizing the event-based inspections, error reporting and error investigations 
contributes to underreporting, fear of sanctions, and hamper openness, discussion, and 
experience transfer.  
In a patient safety process perspective, the approaches within the interface need 
improvements to move the systematic regulatory activities (event-based inspection, 
error reporting, error investigation) towards a system perspective, and to emphasize 
incidental regulatory activities (courses, meetings) more strongly.  
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ABSTRACT: This paper examines risk perception among officials and employees 
within different risk regulation regimes. Risk regulation regimes are complex 
systems, including institutional arrangements, at different system levels, ranging from 
the governmental, regulatory, organizational, and management levels to street-level 
bureaucrats. Officials and employees at different levels of a given regime may 
perceive risk differently, developing divergent attitudes towards the regulation and 
demands for risk management. This discussion focuses on institutional and 
instrumental aspects of risk regulation regimes—namely, the context and backdrop of 
regulation—as well as the content involving the objectives and styles of regulation. 
The paper explores how these institutional and instrumental aspects shape risk 
perception among officials and employees within two highly different Norwegian 
public risk regulation regimes. The study design is a most dissimilar case study 
approach covering specialized healthcare and municipal emergency management.  
The results identified diverging risk perceptions across regime levels within the 
two studied regimes, implying the amplification of certain risks and attenuation of 
others; this suggests that the potential exists for latent conditions not to be discovered, 
managed, or learned from. In order to improve risk regulation, detect signals, and 
prevent accidents from emerging, the role of risk amplification and attenuation should 
be acknowledged. Improved risk communication mechanisms are needed to foster 
experience transfers across structural levels, applying a system perspective. 
Furthermore, educational activities and learning arenas should be supported in 
promoting a common understanding among officials and employees of how risks 
emerge in complex regimes, thereby hopefully avoiding the misperception resulting 
from risk amplification and attenuation processes.  
 
Keywords:  
Emergency management, patient safety, risk perception, risk regulation.  
 
1 Introduction 
 
In today’s society the role of the state as a regulator of risk and safety seems to have 
become more influential (1). Influenced by the new public management movement, 
public institutions and agencies have adopted risk management ideas and blueprints 
from the private sector. However, state agencies manage risk in considerably different 
ways. Institutional arrangements, public perception, and the nature of risks give rise to 
substantial differences in risk regulation regimes (2,3,4,5). Risk regulation regimes 
are complex systems that comprise multiple components subject to diverse pressures 
and have their own sub-cultures. Risk is perceived from different points of view, and 
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decisions about risk stem from diverse rationalities that have the potential to 
complicate and counteract processes of risk regulation and risk management (6,7).  
In practice, officials and employees in different levels of a regime may 
understand risks differently (2,3,8), work within different discourses of risk (9), and 
demonstrate divergent attitudes towards the regulation and demands for risk 
management (2,3,8). As a result, tragic events have occurred due to the misperception 
of accident signals among officials and employees as well as shortcomings in the 
regulatory process (10). One of Britain’s worst medical disasters, the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary tragedy (BRI), demonstrated that contrasting perceptions of risk reflected a 
tainted understanding of data among different parties within the risk regulation regime 
at various times over a period of eleven years (9). The BRI was entrapped in a period 
of blindness (11), where no functioning external agency existed to monitor the quality 
of clinical performance of the healthcare professionals or of the hospitals (12).  
As risk perception varies across risk regulation regimes’ participants and system 
levels, there is a need for research addressing forces or influencing factors to explain 
this variation. More attention should be focused on the role of risk perception within 
risk regulation regimes (8), researchers should explore the characteristics of the 
various regimes themselves—namely, the context of the regimes such as the types of 
risk, public attitudes, and organized interests as well as the content of the regimes 
such as the legislation, institutional structure, and regulatory styles facing the officials 
and employees within the different regimes (2). In this paper, we argue for the need to 
address these factors in order to understand how some risks are amplified while others 
attenuated. This paper aims to explore risk perception among officials and employees 
within risk regulation regimes in two highly different public sectors: specialized 
healthcare and public emergency management. More specifically, we will explore 
how risk regulation regimes along with context (type of risk, public preferences and 
attitudes, organized interests) and content (size, structure, style) shape the perception 
of risk among officials and employees. The research question is:  
 
How do contextual and content elements of risk regulation regimes shape 
risk perception among officials and employees within different regimes? 
 
Risk regulation regimes that regulate business and privatized utilities have gained 
much attention in previous research. Less commonly discussed are the analogous 
processes of regulation within the public sector (13). This study explores risk 
perception in two public sector regimes relying on self-regulation. Self-regulation 
regimes can vary in their structure, enforcement, and rule type (14). In this study, 
healthcare and municipal emergency organizations are required to develop risk 
management systems and procedures to secure and monitor compliance to standards 
established by the state. The public organizations are expected to establish routines to 
deal with non-compliance while regulatory officials supervise these processes (15).  
 
Article IV 
 154 
2 Theoretical approach 
 
2.1  Risk Regulation Regime 
 
Regulating and managing risk include processes of risk identification, assessment, 
monitoring, and evaluation of social interventions (2,16). An understanding of the 
space or interface in which the regulator and regulated meet is important to gain new 
knowledge and improve understanding of how to regulate and manage risk in modern 
societies (17,18). This space can be approached by applying the concept of risk 
regulation regimes as systems of interacting actors ranging from street-level 
bureaucrats to policy makers. This paper is based on the risk regulation regime (RRR) 
framework developed by Hood et al. (1999, 2001). The authors presented a method 
for comparing different regimes and their commonalities and differences in 
institutional risk profiles, thereby tracking the activities of risk regulation in different 
domains (2,3). The purpose of this framework is to map the systemic interactions and 
relationships among different parts of a regulatory system. 
RRR incorporates a two-dimensional anatomy. The first dimension comprises the 
three components that form the basis of any control system: standard setting, 
information gathering, and behaviour modification. The second dimension comprises 
the regime’s institutional and instrumental elements, categorized as regime context 
and regime content. The regime context refers to the backdrop or setting in which 
regulation occurs. Three contextual elements tend to be stressed the most: 1) type of 
risk, involving the inherent features of the risk or hazard; 2) public preferences and 
attitudes, meaning how the risk is viewed by the public—varying from anxiety to 
apathy—as well as whether or not the media interest is hot or cold; and 3) the nature 
of organized interest surrounding the risk domain, referring to who creates and is 
exposed to risk and the ways in which these players are organized. These three 
contextual elements, to some degree, overlap, but they encompass what is most 
commonly identified as the main features of the regime context.  
Meanwhile, the regime content denotes the regulatory objectives, the manner in 
which regulatory responsibilities are organized, and operating styles of the regulator. 
The three basic elements of regime content are: 1) regime size, meaning how much 
regulation is brought to bear on any risk within a regime, the extent of risk toleration, 
and the scale of investment going into the regime; 2) regime structure, referring to 
how the regime is organized, what institutional arrangements are adopted, and 
whether the risk involves multiple overlapping systems of regulation; and 3) regime 
style, referring to the operating conventions and attitudes of those involved in the 
regulations as well as the formal and informal processes through which regulation 
occurs. The style element also includes whether regulation is rule-bound or 
discretionary and whether it is based on command-control approaches or compliance 
approaches. The six regime context and content elements are broad in character; 
disaggregating the elements could help highlight the variations in greater detail when 
comparing similar regimes (2,3).   
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2.2  Risk perception  
 
Risk perception is based on how information on the risk source is communicated, the 
psychological mechanisms for processing uncertainty, and previous experiences of 
danger. People construct their own reality and assess risks according to their 
subjective perceptions (19,20). Various models have been developed to represent the 
relationship between perceptions, behaviours, and qualitative characteristics of 
hazards. Within the psychometric paradigm research demonstrates that perceived risk 
is affected by a lack of control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and 
inequitable distribution of risk and benefits; moreover, it is affected by whether or not 
hazards are unobservable, unknown, new, or delayed in their manifestation of 
damage. Risk perception research rooted in the psychometric paradigm contributes to 
providing insights into humans’ individual processing of hazard information (21).  
In a broader sense, the cognitive heuristics and biases that shape individuals’ risk 
perceptions are themselves shaped by organizational and institutional contexts, 
processes, and decisions. In terms of risk regulation, rules and regulations are 
omnipresent, powerful, and unavoidable, imposing structure and procedure on a wide 
variety of organizational forms while stimulating the strategic actions of 
organizations. Strategic interaction occurs among regulators, managers, and 
employees; thus, the understanding of risk is drawn in different directions (22). The 
social amplification of risk is founded on the thesis that hazards interact with 
psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways that may increase 
or decrease the perception of risk and shape risk behaviour. The experience of risk is 
not just an experience of physical harm; it is also the result of a process by which 
individuals or groups learn to acquire or create interpretations of hazards (23,24,25). 
Hazardous events hold a signal value, which individuals and social groups may 
perceive differently. These signals are subject to transformations as they are filtered 
through others—e.g., mass media, groups of scientists, governmental agencies, and 
politicians. These processes imply that diverse hazards are given more or less 
attention due to the diverse understanding of signals among individuals and groups of 
people, causing an amplification or attenuation of risks (26).  
Limited research exists on risk perception within risk regulation regimes. 
Rothstein (2003a) made an interesting contribution to social shaping of risk through 
case studies conducted within UK RRRs. According to Rothstein, complex RRRs are 
vulnerable to the phenomena denoted as “institutional attenuation”, which refers to 
institutional processes that serve to reduce regulatory inspectors’ perception or 
awareness of a risk and/or perception of the policy importance of associated 
regulations. Institutional attenuation could contribute to ineffective monitoring and 
enforcement within the regimes. Rothstein’s work highlighted some institutional 
factors as contributors to reducing regulatory officials’ risk perception and attention to 
regulations. Institutional attenuation was most likely to occur when officials were 
confronted with unfamiliar risks because inspectors traditionally give more attention 
to observable and tractable safety issues rather than chronic and complex issues. 
Furthermore, institutional fragmentation had a tendency to contribute to information 
distortion and control problems within the regimes as well as cause multiple 
regulatory sub-cultures, resulting in diverse responses to risk from those involved in 
policy making, monitoring, and enforcement. Such institutional attenuation effects 
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could contribute to regulatory neglect and serious failure in monitoring and enforcing 
risk regulation (8). 
According to Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock (1992), inspectors’ perceptions of risk 
contributed to developing diversity in their enforcement practice. Inspectors’ 
individual accident experiences indicated a tendency to amplify effects on inspectors 
and their subsequent enforcement practices in the form of, for example, altering risk 
tolerance criteria of specific risks and some developed “hobby-horses”, meaning they 
emphasized certain types of risks over others. The cumulative effects of accidents also 
amplified the inspectors’ risk perception and influenced enforcement practice. During 
inspections, inspectors frequently talked about previous accidents, to both managers 
and the workforce within the regulatee. The amplification of risk was demonstrated as 
the inspectors’ awareness of risk associated with frequently investigated accident 
types were fuller and more vivid to them; the attenuation of risk was demonstrated as 
inspectors’ awareness of risks associated with rarely investigated accidents remained 
more vague and abstract. Inspectors emphasized risks about which they were most 
likely to be able to do something, which in turn related primarily to existing safety 
regulations. Generally speaking, inspectors find specific and clear regulations more 
enforceable than vague standards (27).  
 
3 Methodology  
 
3.1  Research design and context  
 
This study is a multiple case study of two dissimilar Norwegian public RRRs: 
specialized healthcare and municipal emergency management. The case study 
approach was chosen due to the characteristics and conditions of the regimes, which 
comprise multiple components, complex processes, and rapid changes. The case study 
approach is particularly applicable for gaining insight into, and understanding the 
structure of, a complex system and how its interdependent individuals, groups, and 
institutional components function (or fail to function) together (28,29,30,31). The 
study applies a most dissimilar case study approach (32) to generate contrasting data 
to explore how regime context and regime content shape risk perception among 
employees and officials within the regimes. The cases have been selected due to their 
diversity in instrumental and institutional aspects, such as type and scale of hazard, 
diverse formal rule specification, authority to sanction, history, enforcement 
strategies, and tools and practices used by the state. Such different cases allow the 
study of regimes with diverse balances between the regime content and regime 
context, thereby enhancing the analysis of the impact on how risk is perceived as well 
as mapping social and institutional factors affecting risk perception. Furthermore, the 
purpose of the design is to provide research material in which the contrasting 
elements enable the exploration of the interfaces among various parts of the regimes, 
such as between regulator and regulatee or among managerial levels within the 
regulatee. Regime interfaces are emphasized in order to explore their impact on risk 
perception among the officials and employees.  
Society responds to different risks by developing different RRRs. The regimes 
covered in this study have different risk profiles. Within the specialized healthcare 
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field, medical error frequency is high, causing approximately 2000 patient deaths and 
15000 severe injuries a year in Norwegian hospitals (33). However, the potential for 
catastrophe is low because medical errors harm one patient at a time (excluding 
epidemics and fires). However, in municipal emergency management, the risk profile 
is the opposite as various hazards are present; some represent a significant potential 
for catastrophe but have a low probability of occurrence. Figure 1 depicts the regimes 
in a risk matrix according to probability and consequence. 
 
Figure 1: Risk matrix for specialized healthcare and municipal emergency 
management 
 
  High catastrophic  
  potential  
 
Municipal 
emergency 
management 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
   Specialized 
healthcare  
 
  Low catastrophic  
  potential  
Low probability    High probability 
 
 
 
Although public healthcare services involve both primary and specialized healthcare 
services, this study is concerned with specialized healthcare only. A case is defined as 
the hospital organization along with the regulatory authority responsible for 
supervising healthcare services—the Norwegian Board of Health at the national level 
and the Chief County Medical Officer at the local level. Both national and local level 
inspectors are included in the study. 
The municipal sector is comprehensive and involves such areas as education as 
well as technical, economical, and social aspects. This study covers the emergency 
management carried out by the municipalities. A case is defined as a municipality 
along with the regulatory authority responsible for supervising municipal emergency 
management. The County Governor is the chief representative of the government in 
the county and, among several other responsibilities, supervises the municipal 
emergency management. 
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3.2   Data collection 
 
Data were collected using a triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods such 
as interviews, document analyses, observations, and statistical analyses (34,35). The 
application of methods varied within the different parts and levels of the regimes due 
to information needs, practicalities, and time constraints. An extensive 
methodological description and review of the single cases and data collection are 
provided in previous publications (36,37,38).  
A total of forty-nine tape-recorded interviews were conducted within the 
specialized healthcare field using structured interview guides. Seventeen interviews 
focused on the relationship between the regulator and the regulatee (hospital), 
covering aspects of legislation, error reporting, learning, risk perception, and 
prevention according to inspectors, the patient ombudsman, and hospital 
management. Thirty-two interviews focused on how two hospital divisions managed 
errors, covering aspects of amount and error categorization, human and organizational 
factors, learning, power issues, and the regulator’s role according to middle 
management, physicians, and nurses. Furthermore, we registered and analyzed a total 
of 894 written error reports from two hospital divisions using an Excel database. We 
analyzed healthcare legislation, Norwegian White Papers, guidelines and policy 
documents, inspection reports, and annual reports. The first author also observed a 
hospital-regulator meeting.  
Within municipal emergency management, this study examined six case 
municipalities along with the regulatory authority in two counties. Frequent contact 
with respective regulators regarding case selection was crucial in designing the study. 
The case municipalities varied with regards to population, size, location, risk sources, 
size of emergency management staffs, occurrences of severe accidents, and how 
regulators evaluated the emergency plans and exercises. We conducted twelve tape-
recorded interviews with municipal emergency management employees and 
regulatory inspectors, following an interview guide that included questions related to 
risk perception, risk communication, learning, and trust. Furthermore, the first author 
observed a planned system audit within one of the case municipalities to identify 
interactions between inspectors and emergency managers. We analyzed municipal 
plans, risk and vulnerability analyses, emergency management plans, crisis 
information plans, inspection reports, and annual reports. In addition, we applied 
second order data material from annual municipal surveys (39,40) regarding 
emergency management as well as an evaluation report (41) regarding the county 
governors’ regulatory enforcement practices.  
 
3.3   Data analysis 
 
Qualitative data were analyzed by transcribing summaries and memos with relevant 
quotations from all data collection activities. The amount of interview data was 
extensive within the specialized healthcare field. To enhance the credibility of the 
qualitative analysis within this area, a multiple analyst approach (analyst 
triangulation) was used to independently review the comprehensive data material 
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(34,35). Quantitative data were analyzed using a statistical analysis of frequency with 
regard to error type, error severity, error causality, and personnel categories.  
The total empirical material collected within both regimes was analyzed 
according to the RRR framework (2,3). We analyzed risk perception according to 
both regime context and regime content, applying the subcategories of each (type of 
risk, public preferences and attitudes, and organized interests for the former, and size, 
structure, and style for the latter) to identify their impact on risk perception among the 
employees and officials within the two regimes.  
 
4 Two public risk regulation regimes 
 
The following subsection presents the results from the two case studies separately. 
Case 1 describes municipal emergency management, and case 2 describes patient 
safety in specialized healthcare. The results from both cases are presented according 
to regime context and regime content.  
 
4.1  Case 1: Municipal emergency management 
 
4.1.1  Regime context 
The study of municipal emergency management focused on perceived risk among 
officials and employees of both natural risk sources, such as avalanches, floods, and 
hurricanes, and technological risk sources, such as breaks in the water or electricity 
supply, conflagration, and infrastructural accidents. Several risk sources involve a 
catastrophic potential of harming inhabitants, environment, and vital societal 
functions. The threat against vital societal functions was an important feature of risks 
present within the regime, affecting risk perception among officials and municipal 
employees.  
The presence of technological risks within a municipality increased employees’ 
perceived risk; however, due to the seldom occurrence of and employees’ limited 
experience with such technological breakdowns, employees were more preoccupied 
with familiar and frequently occurring situations such as natural risks or fires. Within 
several case municipalities, typical natural risks were present due to the geographic 
location in areas exposed to avalanches and floods. Three out of six case 
municipalities had experienced such accidents (37). Living close to the natural risk 
sources and experiencing accidents with fatal consequences caused municipal 
emergency managers to be more aware and conscientious of risk. Municipal 
emergency managers expressed concerns about the inhabitants and the municipal 
reputation in cases of emergency, which resulted in an increased work effort within 
emergency management through improved emergency plans and the implementation 
of risk-mitigating measures.  
Inspectors were usually concerned with similar risk sources as employees, but 
they expressed more concern with the level of work effort within municipal 
emergency management. Therefore, the inspectors, through their regulatory activities, 
stressed the importance of continuous emergency management work processes in 
order to be prepared for all kinds of accidents and undesired events. 
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There is a need for us to stress emergency management continuously or else they relax, 
and emphasize more urgent problems. Our guidance, meetings, courses, and emergency 
exercises are important to keep up the awareness within the municipal emergency 
management (inspector). 
 
Public preference and attitudes coupled with organized interests, which overlapped in 
this sector, influenced risk perception to a certain degree among municipal emergency 
managers and inspectors. Although media coverage was limited on a daily basis, a 
higher frequency of natural accidents over the past years has resulted in an increased 
media interest, covering the responsibility and performance of municipal emergency 
management. The media interest increased municipal informants’ risk awareness and 
led them to fear being exposed in similar situations. Municipal emergency managers 
expressed a strong commitment towards protecting local inhabitants from being 
exposed to risks caused by inappropriate land use planning, absent emergency plans, 
insufficient municipal responses in emergency situations, etc. A municipal informant 
explained the rationale behind the municipal emergency management work processes:  
 
The Norwegian Parliament has given municipalities the responsibility of emergency 
management. But the most important reason is expectations from other parties towards the 
municipal organization, expecting the municipality to be responsible and manage 
emergency situations. It would give inhabitants a bad impression if the municipality did 
not attend to the emergency management because, first of all, it results in insufficient 
solutions; second the municipality could be criticized; and last but not least, the 
inhabitants well-being is vital and consequences must be reduced if emergency situations 
occur (municipal emergency manager). 
 
4.1.2  Regime content 
The regulation within municipal emergency management does not entail 
comprehensive legislation, standards, or any extensive regulatory information 
collection or monitoring activities. The overall investment in the regime in the form 
of employment at the regulatory and municipal levels was limited and has been 
decreasing in past years due to structural changes at the regulatory level. The 
municipal emergency managers lacked formal competence within emergency 
management, and emergency management tasks went beyond their everyday work 
tasks. The regime incorporated no detailed act that required specific demands for 
municipal emergency management or supported the regulator through sanctioning. 
However, governmental entities expected the municipalities to conduct risk and 
vulnerability analyses, develop emergency management plans, perform emergency 
exercises, and develop internal control systems to ensure continuous emergency 
management processes in addition to incorporating these systems into local municipal 
plan processes. The regulator was supposed to ensure proper compliance to these 
expectations. According to inspectors and municipal participants, establishing a 
statutory emergency management act would contribute to increasing the emergency 
management awareness and effort. The absence of legislation, together with no 
previous accident experience, attenuated awareness and counteracted the non-
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mandatory emergency management processes, leading the municipal emergency 
managers to instead prioritize their mandatory duties.  
The regime structure was not perceived as complex by officials or employees; 
moreover, it did not complicate risk perception among officials and employees. The 
regime included the Ministry of Justice and the Police, the Directorate for Civil 
Protection and Emergency Planning (DCPEP), and the county governor supervising 
the municipalities. However, municipal land use planning overlapped municipal 
emergency management. The government expected risk and vulnerability analyses 
and emergency management planning to be integrated into both general municipal 
plan processes and land use plans in particular. The Norwegian land use act (Act-
1985-06-14-77) provided the regulator with the legal authority to sanction non-
compliance in the form of objections raised against municipal land use plans with 
insufficient risk assessments or when risks were assessed and accepted by the 
municipality, but disapproved of by the regulator. To some degree, the regulator 
applied the only available sanctioning means; usually the municipalities performed 
the necessary adjustments. The results herein also document scarce municipal 
budgets, with no positions dedicated specifically to emergency management. This 
caused difficulties in complying with governmental expectations and responding to 
regulatory objections due to a cross-pressure between legally established processes 
and emergency management in practice:  
 
A legal authority is necessary for municipal emergency management. I’m responsible for 
emergency management tasks and purchasing. It is difficult to combine these two tasks 
because new purchasing regulations recently came into force and I have to prioritize the 
work tasks as stated by law. That’s how it works in practice, when different duties 
compete and you have limited time (municipal emergency manager). 
 
Regulatory style and strategies were important factors in shaping the perception of 
risk among both officials and employees within municipal emergency management. 
Due to the lack of legal authority, the inspectors adopted regulatory styles 
emphasizing collaboration, personal communication, education, and persuasion in 
order to enhance the knowledge level among municipal emergency managers and 
initiate learning processes within and across municipalities in order to affect 
emergency managers’ perception of emergency management as a useful process. In 
other words, the inspectors compensated for the absence of formal rules and 
regulations with a strong degree of interaction among the regulated municipalities to 
amplify risk perception, particularly among employees who lacked formal education 
and experience with emergency management. The inspectors emphasized learning 
activities in the interface between the regulator and the regulated (see 37) and 
arranged courses, conducted emergency exercises, and informed politicians to 
increase risk awareness among both municipal emergency managers and politicians. 
The inspectors and emergency managers all assessed the emergency exercises as the 
most valuable activity in the interface to promote common understanding of risk and 
learning within emergency management. Furthermore the DCPEP (superior to the 
county governor) distributed guidelines to municipalities regarding issues such as 
emergency planning, information preparedness, and risk analysis to inform, guide, 
and initiate emergency management processes.  
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The regulatory style was influenced by a shift in the definition of what constitutes 
common risks within the municipal emergency management regime. Ten to fifteen 
years ago, the regime emphasized emergencies during war more; currently, it 
emphasizes peacetime emergencies. This shift changed the interest among municipal 
participants in regards to viewing emergency management as relevant, useful, and 
related to undesired events that could actually happen in their local communities: 
 
The regulator used to be oriented against war. From our perspective, we were almost 
unable to understand what they talked about back then. But when they changed risk 
orientation away from thinking in war terms and started talking about floods, avalanches, 
and landslides, it caught our interest. They started talking about floods and avalanches in 
the areas with high concentrations of cabins, and we found it relevant because these are 
risks we have to manage in our municipality (municipal emergency manager). 
 
Both inspectors and municipal informants perceived the imagination of war on 
Norwegian ground as unrealistic. Results showed that the shift in risk definition to a 
certain degree unified the inspectors’ and municipal informants’ understanding of 
risk, despite difficulties with priority, financing, and employment at the municipal 
level.  
 
4.2  Case 2: Patient safety within specialized healthcare 
 
4.2.1  Regime context 
The types of risk studied in specialized healthcare focus on the perceived risk among 
officials and employees of harmed patients. Patient harm is related to medical errors 
such as misdiagnosis, mistreatment, medication error, and fall injuries. The healthcare 
system is complex, involving sophisticated technology, specialized professions, and 
tightly coupled interactions between employees and divisions in the hospital 
hierarchy, causing a complex and interconnected causality regarding medical errors. 
All such aspects affect risk perception in the healthcare regime. Risk perception varies 
according to officials’ and employees’ location within the regime (national or local 
regulator or within the hospital hierarchy), responsibility, profession, and personal 
experience with medical errors.  
In the current study, participants at the hospital division and department level 
perceived increased risk due to conflicting demands between safety and efficiency, 
worrying about understaffing, corridor patients, and lack of time to perform tasks 
beyond everyday work operations, such as error reporting. All nurses and physicians 
revealed personal experiences with medical errors or those they observed colleagues 
making. They were preoccupied with specific risk types, such as medication error, 
prescription errors, and patient falls; according to the analysis of error reports, nurses 
and physicians often blamed themselves and not the system for such errors. 
Occupational differences also existed regarding risk perception; nurses were more 
aware of and paid more attention to medical errors than physicians did. Physicians to 
a stronger degree argued that medical errors and complications were inevitable parts 
of their profession that should be managed and discussed within the professional 
group, but not necessarily formally reported. Error classification was considered as 
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problematic both by nurses and physicians. They were confused about what to define 
as an error or a complication, whether or not they should report it, and how they 
should report it. Nurses reported errors more frequently than physicians. In general, 
an open culture for discussing errors existed, although some employees expressed 
concern regarding blame, cover-ups, trivialization, reprisals, and negative responses 
from colleagues and superiors if they admitted medical errors. 
 
I think negative responses may occur when people make mistakes, and you change your 
view of the person who made the mistake, particularly if the mistakes caused serious 
patient injury (head physician).  
 
Communication about errors and near misses was usually informal through person-to-
person conversations; however, patient safety issues and errors could be discussed in 
formal department meetings. Several employees and middle managers did not 
perceive information about medical errors and near misses to be relevant for other 
departments or divisions. Consequently, information lacked an upward 
communication path in the organization, which hampered information flow to higher 
organizational levels within the regime and reduced the ability to identify common 
problems, learn, and improve medical practices. Errors were corrected and learned 
from locally; however, similar risk sources across the hospital organization continued 
to injure patients repeatedly. 
 
The systematic safety approach is a challenge for the organization; errors are managed 
locally, but they are not incorporated into routines and procedures in a system, causing 
error reiteration (hospital top manager). 
 
Participants within hospital top and division management and regulatory inspectors 
maintained an overall perspective on patient risk, worrying about system errors 
resulting from interaction and miscommunication among humans, organizational 
levels, and technology or in the interface between specialized and primary healthcare 
services. Although top management’s perceptions of risk sources in many cases were 
in accordance with regulatory officials’ perceptions, a large discrepancy occurred 
regarding perceived risk of underreporting. Inspectors explained that underreporting 
had increased during past years due to information being retrieved via informal 
channels. Hospital top management was surprised when inspectors confronted them 
with a presumed degree of underreporting.   
Public preferences and attitudes coupled with organized interests affected risk 
perception within the healthcare case, particularly that which related to negative 
publicity. Sharp-end employees feared media coverage and were highly aware of the 
large media interest regarding medical errors. Medical errors were frequently covered 
in national newspapers and television, and the media often searched for scapegoats—
usually the individual triggering the error. However, the hospital organization also 
experienced media coverage regarding the systems’ responsibility to comply with 
formal safety regulations and internal error management routines and procedures. The 
national level regulator utilized the media to communicate safety issues in an effort to 
increase risk awareness among employees and managers within healthcare and assure 
the public of the regulators’ role to guard public interests. The local level regulator 
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perceived the media as a partner, contributing information that occasionally resulted 
in cases being opened against individuals or institutions. Although a limited tradition 
exists for taking medical errors to court in Norway, the fear of negative publicity, in 
addition to the large public interest in increased perceived risk, hampered the ability 
of lower-level employees to speak up about or learn from errors. The government has 
improved patient rights in public healthcare, establishing a patient ombudsman and a 
national independent body to process compensation claims from harmed patients. As 
a result, public knowledge and awareness of these improved patient rights, together 
with the ability to claim financial compensation due to mistreatment, have increased, 
as have the numbers of claims7 and payments8.  
 
The public has become more offensive; there has been a change in attitude, and people are 
more aware of their ability to complain (local level regulator). 
 
At the governmental level, patient safety interest has increased. The latest initiative 
was the establishment of a national patient safety centre to promote patient safety and 
learning from medical errors. In summary, patient safety and risks to hospitalization 
have become more present in the mind of the public, specialists, hospital managers, 
and regulatory inspectors over the past years.  
 
4.2.2  Regime content 
The regime structure involved a complex hierarchy that included the Ministry of 
Health and Care services as the owner of Norwegian hospitals as well as the 
Directorate of Health and Social Services, which is responsible for technical and 
certain administrative functions. Furthermore, the Norwegian Board of Health 
Supervision and the Chief County Medical Officer constitute the national and local 
level regulators responsible for supervising health services and healthcare personnel. 
Norwegian specialized healthcare services are organized in four regions; hospitals are 
subordinate to these regional structures. The hospital organization comprises several 
organizational levels, including top management, division management, department 
management, and physicians and nurses treating the patients. Ensuring safe patient 
care depends on processes across these levels of the regime. The current study 
demonstrated that the interconnected regime structure caused problems for 
employees, managers, and regulators in understanding the comprehensive processes 
essential for the provision of safe patient care. The structure complicated risk 
perception, risk communication, and feedback among regulators, hospital managers, 
and healthcare employees. 
The regulator enforced strict and detailed regulations, involving several legal acts 
related to the rights and duties of the individual healthcare employees and the hospital 
organizations. A wide range of sanctioning means for both the individuals and 
organizations supported the regulator. Informants within different parts of the regime 
                                                 
7 Total number of claimed cases during the past three years: 2004—2062, 2005—
2671, 2006—3309. 
8 Total payment in million Euros per year during the past three years: 2004—50, 
2005—55, 2006—60.  
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perceived the sanctions as being biased against blaming individuals due to more 
specific means being stated in the law against individuals than systems. Hospital 
physicians and nurses knew they could be sanctioned and, in the worst case, lose their 
licences; still, they usually did not worry about it. National and local level inspectors 
argued in favour of the system approach in patient safety and medical errors; 
however, they agreed that the regulator is presently supported with a stronger 
individual sanctioning repertoire.  
 
From a five-year perspective, our focus has changed towards the system approach, but we 
actually have a more extensive sanctioning repertoire against the individuals compared to 
institutions. The implication is probably that we are conceived as being better prepared for 
going after the individuals (national level regulator). 
 
Currently, it is mandatory for hospitals to establish an internal control system to 
ensure high quality healthcare services and sound internal error management. 
Furthermore, hospitals must establish a hospital quality committee, with a specific 
mandate regarding error management in order to foster discussions and experience 
transfer across internal hospital borders. According to the law, hospitals are obliged to 
formally report all medical errors causing serious patient injury or serious near misses 
to the regulator; all error reports are stored in a national database.  
These legislative elements illustrate the extensiveness of the legal framework to 
ensure patient safety. In practice, the findings showed a fallible error management 
system within the regime (36). A complex causality explained the imperfect system, 
in which perceived risk and benefit were contributing factors. The lack of perceived 
benefit for the employees to commit to the current error reporting system, time 
pressure, understaffing, and reluctance to discuss near misses caused underreporting, 
hampering information flow and learning activities. The quality committee did not 
comply with legal requirements due to low commitment to error management, almost 
absent experience transfer, and limited confidence and interest in their own mandate. 
 
The quality committee at the hospital level is a mandatory committee, and we must 
establish it. Well, the situation at our hospital is similar as within many other hospitals: we 
establish it because we have to. Our policy is to delegate problems connected with medical 
errors to the division level in order to ensure discussion about safety aspects closer to 
where problems occur (hospital top manager). 
 
The local level inspectors and inspection reports express concern with low 
commitment towards internal control processes within the hospital. Inspectors 
perceived the present situation as unsatisfying, claiming the hospital failed to identify 
and learn from medical errors. 
 
The hospital does not perform systematic monitoring and revision of the internal control 
system to ensure its supposed function, in which the hospital has legal responsibility 
(inspection report, 2007). 
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For local level inspectors, it was sometimes difficult to get a proper overview of the 
complex hospital organization due to a limited workforce, recruitment problems, and 
information collection methods in need of improvement.  
 
I don’t think we have good enough knowledge of the everyday life and the situations 
within the hospital. From time to time you get the feeling of powerlessness because we are 
few inspectors and we inspect large organizations and complex areas, and it is obvious that 
it is impossible to know the details. Therefore, it is important to use our time to reveal 
vulnerable processes or areas and contribute to improve patient care (local level inspector). 
 
Some hospital participants as well as the patient ombudsman accused the regulator of 
overemphasizing formal written information collection and suggested supplying 
interviews to improve information richness in medical error investigations, for 
example.   
The professional sub-cultures and specialized positions and processes in the 
hospital could increase risk and complicate risk perception and cooperation among 
employees. As physicians and nurses become specialists, they may develop a narrow 
perspective and not understand the importance of interaction within the regime. A 
local level inspector explained concerns about this issue: 
 
The physicians have ‘procedure-mania’ as I like to call it. They are extremely preoccupied 
with their specialities, and as specialists they think they need to improve their professional 
skills and knowledge. But in fact that doesn’t contribute to safety improvements in a 
department; it could, in fact, become a patient risk if there are too many specialists 
because they live in their own world and don’t know how to interact. Medical errors are 
not caused by a lack of professional competence; they are caused by a lack of interaction, 
a lack of a system perspective, and a lack of ability to communicate and incorporate all 
these components into the risk picture. 
 
The regime style and strategies did not play an important role in shaping risk 
perception among officials and employees in the healthcare regime. A positive 
dialogue was evident between the inspectors and the hospital as well as a low 
threshold to contact each other; however, the interactions between regulator and 
regulatee were to a strong degree characterized by formal written information 
exchange. The regulatory practice emphasized control-based activities while advice, 
education, and persuasion aspects were not predominant in this regime (see 38 for a 
thorough discussion of the hospital–regulator interface). The study identified that the 
attention inspectors offered to certain risk types could affect the hospital’s emphasis 
on error management. The most prominent example is patient falls, the category of 
medical errors most frequently reported within the hospital. This category has limited 
potential for severe patient injury exceeding fractures. Reported medical errors within 
two divisions from 2003 to 2004 indicated that patient falls accounted for a total of 65 
percent of issues. However, neither the hospital nor the regulator directed any specific 
attention to this error category. 
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We don’t investigate patient falls. I cannot recall any of these patient fall cases being that 
interesting (local level inspector). 
 
5 Discussion 
 
Our studies within the specialized healthcare field and municipal emergency 
management have shown that risk perception differs among employees and officials 
within the various hierarchical levels of the risk regulation regimes (8,17). Risks are 
amplified and attenuated (23,24,26) throughout the hierarchical regime structures 
through risk management processes depending on interaction between humans, 
organizations, and regulators; external pressure from public and organized interests; 
and technological changes and financial circumstances causing compound pressure 
between safety and production.  
The social amplification and attenuation of risks were more prominent in the 
complex specialized healthcare regime. One reason for this might be the exclusion of 
street-level participants in the municipal emergency management study. However, we 
argue that the most important reason is the differences between the two contrasting 
regimes, resulting in heterogeneous risk perceptions across the specialized healthcare 
regime and homogenous risk perceptions across the municipal emergency 
management regime.  
 
5.1  Regime context and risk perception 
 
Risk amplification and attenuation within specialized healthcare were influenced by 
the lack of consensus and lack of common conceptualization of risk across the regime 
(42,43,44). Risks were difficult to grasp for employees, hospital managers, and 
regulatory officials. Changes within the regime over recent years have implied a 
stronger professional specialization, with more specialized functions involved in 
patient treatment processes. This progress has in many ways improved the treatment 
while simultaneously creating a system vulnerable to patient handovers (45) and risk 
communication. The increased specialization implies a potential for information loss 
combined with restricted ability to track, evaluate, and learn from positive and 
negative patient outcomes. The increased specialization level may also explain 
nurses’ and physicians’ specialized and “narrow” perception of risk. Middle and top 
managers and, in particular, regulatory inspectors demonstrated a broader risk 
perception, explaining medical errors using a system perspective. Although limited 
financial resources and risk mitigation measures were incorporated into error 
management systems, the hospitals’ top management showed increasing attention 
towards improving patient safety. 
Our results are similar to findings from a case study of British Rail (17), in which 
Hutter (2001) demonstrated that occupational status and position within the risk 
regulation regime influenced employees’ risk perception. Senior managers displayed 
a broader overview of risk issues, focusing on systems and general trends. For 
employees in the sharp end of the organization, concerns tended to be more specific; 
sometimes they were less likely to perceive the risk sources surrounding them. 
Several explanations relate to this issue; one is that employees in the upper corporate 
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hierarchy have more information available and thus a broader overview of risks. 
Moreover, understanding risk relates to employees’ sense of autonomy and agency, 
and risk related to social status is reflected in adaptations to risk among employees 
who are the most exposed. As a result, risk could be normalized, even denied—seen 
as typical facts of life (17).  
Regulatory officials espoused a system perspective towards error management; 
however, tacitly an individual blame culture still seemed to be institutionalized within 
the healthcare regime due to the unbalanced legislative sanctioning means against 
individuals and the employees’ fear of speaking up (36). Furthermore, faulty 
communication caused misunderstanding, information loss, and ineffective feedback 
mechanisms (46,47,48), failing in the process of internalizing a system perspective 
across this regime. The current fundamental challenge of distributing risk information 
within the healthcare regime is affected by numerous barriers (49). The cultural, 
structural, and financial barriers (43,50) inherent in the regime, such as 
underreporting, the lack of error management commitment, the demand for higher 
production, and an individual control system, all contribute to a heterogeneous risk 
perception.  
The various risk sources and characteristics with regards to probability and 
consequences were important in shaping officials’ and employees’ risk perception in 
both regimes. A majority of the nurses and physicians had experienced medical 
errors, but their reactions very much depended upon the outcome and their own 
personal sensibility (17). Several nurses and physicians were reluctant to discuss or 
formally report near misses if the events did not imply patient injury (44,51). 
Familiarity with risks in the sharp end could explain physicians’ reluctance to error 
reporting (52) and their low commitment regarding the formal error management 
system (21,53). Complications during patient treatment were perceived as part of the 
medical profession; socially constructed mechanisms seemed to exist to enable 
individuals to cope with risks by normalising the risk sources and classifying them as 
complications discussed and managed within the professional group (17).  
Within municipal emergency management, the familiarity with risk caused the 
opposite effect. The regime was not complex in terms of oversight, structure, or 
overlapping agencies; however, the risk sources could be diffuse and unknown. 
Municipal participants did not have experience with breakdowns in vital societal 
functions, and they did not particularly fear such events, despite the catastrophic 
potential. On the other hand, they feared the more familiar and frequently occurring 
risks, usually related to natural accidents. The fear of natural accidents and their 
characteristics as both highly probable and catastrophic for the local communities 
increased the perceived risk of being exposed and implied increased work effort (54). 
These findings align with previous research on flood risk perception that 
demonstrated that floods needed to be experienced, not only in magnitude, but also in 
frequency; without repeated experiences, the process whereby managers develop 
emergency measures of coping with floods did not occur (55). A similar example is 
the shift in orientation from emergencies during war towards everyday risk sources. 
Such change processes were caused by repeated natural accidents caused by floods 
and hurricanes, which led to insistent demands for national action. The accidents 
speeded up the legislative processes, but the changes were also a result of increased 
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public and organized interests influencing policy and decision-making processes 
within emergency management (Reports to the Parliament, 56,57).  
Public preferences and attitudes as well as organized interests evident in both 
regimes contributed to the presence of reputation risk management, concerning how 
and whether certain events may be amplified or not by wider social processes such as 
the media and the legal system. These processes are uncontrollable for officials and 
managers and reflect a new sense of vulnerability to politicians and administration 
within risk regulation regimes (4,5,23,26). Within both regimes, participants were 
concerned about negative media publicity, and strived for a good reputation since 
both municipalities and hospitals were financially dependent of their inhabitants and 
patients. The reputation risk management aspects manifested differently at the various 
regime levels. Employees were concerned about their personal reputation and wanted 
to avoid media coverage, and hospitals and municipalities were concerned about 
organizational reputations; meanwhile, regulators wanted to demonstrate their 
supervisory role in guarding inhabitants’ legal rights against hospitals and 
municipalities, utilizing the media for this purpose.  
 
5.2  Regime content and risk perception 
 
Our case study involving a most dissimilar approach demonstrated that differences in 
regime size, structure, and style are important in shaping risk perception. The regime 
size and its influence on risk perception can relate to the constitutive aspect of 
regulation, viewing regulation as part of a broader social “structuration” process. In 
other words, regulation structures relationships (17,22) and interfaces between system 
levels, which played an important role in determining risk perception in this study. 
Perception of risk was in part a social construct emerging from interactions among 
employees, professional groups, and regulators involved in the different regimes 
(22,58,59,60). Risks could also be “constructed” as common neglects (8), 
demonstrated by the patient falls attenuated within the entire healthcare regime. 
Furthermore, the legislative framework in the specialized healthcare field constituted 
the hospital error management system, but its practical application brought 
frustration, low commitment, and limited information richness. The error 
management system seemed trapped in a vicious circle because the understanding of 
risk could, in the next turn, be shaped by incorrect information leading to insufficient 
decision-making—and probably more frustration and even less commitment. 
The complexity of regime structure serves as a key element in understanding 
differences in perceived risks within the different regimes (8). An interconnected, 
tightly coupled regime structure along with advanced technology and 
multidisciplinary employees in the healthcare case implied a loss of oversight. The 
complexity caused newly emerging interaction risks as perceived by the regulator that 
were difficult to observe for employees and correct within the hospital. Oversight and 
fewer organizational levels and operators involved in the processes, as in the case of 
the municipal emergency management, provided the employees and inspectors the 
ability to follow and understand the entire emergency management processes, from 
beginning to end.   
The choice of regulatory styles is an important element not only for regulatory 
monitoring and compliance, but also for the inspectors’ ability to affect employees’ 
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risk perception. Within the specialized healthcare field, the regulator emphasized 
control activities and formal written information exchanges (38). Few arenas for 
dialogue existed (61), with the risk for misperceptions emerging across regime levels 
without proper arenas to clear up misunderstandings. Within municipal emergency 
management, the regulator compensated for the absence of legislation by emphasizing 
the regime style component and enforcement according to compliance strategies 
(61,62). By stressing a variety of arenas, emphasizing interaction and experience 
transfer, the regulator managed to increase the knowledge level, practical skills, risk 
awareness, and commitment to regulatory demands (37). In addition, this informal 
enforcement style contributed to more comprehensive, homogenous risk perceptions 
among officials and employees, beyond the specific risk types within each 
municipality.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored how contextual and contentual elements of different risk 
regulation regimes shape risk perception among officials and employees. By using a 
methodology contrasting two dissimilar regimes, we revealed that differences in the 
balance between contextual (type of risk, public attitudes and preferences, and 
organized interests) and content elements (size, structure, and style) affect risk 
perception, resulting in amplification and attenuation of risk among different levels of 
risk regulation regimes. 
• Contextual elements: 
o Risks imposed externally as observable risk sources were easier to 
perceive and manage, compared to risks emerging from 
interconnectedness followed by late manifestation. Internally 
emerging risks demonstrated a proneness to amplification and 
attenuation processes. 
o Public preferences and attitudes as well as organized interests 
implied risk reputation management with a potential of attenuation 
of certain risks. 
• Content elements: 
o Size affected risk perception. The absence of legislation attenuated 
perceived risk among employees, while extensive legislation 
involving strong individual sanctioning means, applied strictly 
according to deterrence approaches, creates a proneness to 
amplification and attenuation of risk perception among inspectors 
and employees.    
o Structure involving increased complexity within the regime 
complicated the ability for officials and employees to make sense of 
risk, causing heterogonous risk perception across regime levels.  
o Style according to informal compliance approaches contributed to 
homogenous risk perception within the regime, while formal and 
more control-oriented enforcement styles involved the potential for 
complicating risk perception through amplification and attenuation 
processes. 
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The study revealed differences in the degree of heterogeneous versus homogenous 
risk perception across regime levels between specialized healthcare and municipal 
emergency management. We argue that the explanation for this variance lies in the 
differences between the two regimes. Although both regimes rely on self-regulation, a 
regime involving complex structures and formal regulatory enforcement of a detailed 
legislation will involve occupational and hierarchical variations in understanding risk. 
On the other hand, a regime with informal regulatory enforcement styles, limited 
legislation, and low complexity will imply less variation in risk perception. These 
content-related aspects alone do not shape risk perception; contextual aspects also 
have to be taken into account. Among contextual elements, type of risks was the most 
vital for shaping risk perception. Within municipal emergency management, risks 
were usually observable and therefore commonly conceptualized across the regime. 
Within the specialized healthcare field, some risks were observable and managed, but 
several risk types emerged due to the changes and complexity within the regime, 
turning out to be perceived differently across the regime—if perceived at all. 
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Appendix I  
 
Interview guide – municipal emergency 
management (municipality) 
 
Introduction 
• Purpose 
• Use of data 
• Anonymity 
 
Background of the informant 
• Education 
• Previous work experience 
• Present position 
• Number of years in current position 
 
Background information about the municipality 
• Size 
• Geographic locality 
• Structure 
• Economy 
• Number of employees within municipal emergency management  
 
Status of the municipal emergency management 
• Risk and vulnerability analysis 
• Emergency management plan 
• Crisis information plan 
• HSE – plan 
• Emergency exercises  
 
Characteristics of the municipal emergency management   
• Assessment of the competence and financial resources  
o What kind of competence does the municipality have in municipal 
emergency management? 
o Is there a need for a different kind of competence? 
o How do you consider the financial priorities regarding municipal 
emergency management? 
 
• Assessment of overall goals within municipal emergency 
management 
Appendix I 
 177 
o How does the municipality identify risk and perform risk 
assessment? 
o Does the municipality use risk and vulnerability analysis in area 
plan processes? 
o How does the municipality incorporate risk into the overall 
municipal plan and area plans? 
o How does the municipality use the municipal emergency 
management plans in practice? 
o Why do you think the municipality conducts the municipal 
emergency management work tasks? 
 
• Participants in establishing risk and vulnerability analysis 
and municipal emergency management plans 
o Who are the municipal participants in the establishing risk and 
vulnerability analysis and municipal emergency management plans? 
o Do any politicians or external stakeholder participate? 
o Do representatives from the regulator participate? 
 
The regulator-regulatee interface 
• How does the overall interaction with the regulator work? 
• What happens when the regulator visit the municipality? 
• What kind of contact/activities exist between the regulator and the 
municipality? 
• Who are the employees with most frequent contact with the regulator? 
• How is the dialogue between the municipality and the regulator? 
• How do you assess the guidance from the regulator within municipal 
emergency management? 
• How is the guidance performed? 
• Does the regulator assist the municipality in order to improve weaknesses in 
the municipal emergency management? 
• How do you assess the control aspects in the interface? 
• How does the regulator focus on deviations from regulatory demands? 
• What are your thoughts on the fact that municipal emergency management is 
not established by law? Should it be? 
• How much work (in percentage of a full time position) do you think the 
governmental expectations require? 
• What are your thoughts of the regulator? 
• What kind of burden do diverse regulatory activities and demands constitute 
for the municipality? 
• What do you think are the largest challenges for the regulator today? 
 
Risk perception and risk sources 
• What kinds of risk sources are present within the municipality? 
• Could you tell me what kind of risks you perceive as the most prominent? 
• Does the municipality have experience with accidents?  
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• If so, how did the municipality cope with it?  
• How did the municipality work on municipal emergency management work 
tasks after the accident? 
• Who influences what the municipality regards as risk sources? 
• Which factors are important regarding the effort the municipality directs to 
the municipal emergency management? 
• What kind of role does the regulator have regarding the perception of risk in 
the municipality? 
 
 
Risk communication 
• Are all municipal employees familiar with the risk sources and municipal 
emergency management plans? 
• Does the municipal emergency management plan include industrial risk 
within the municipality? 
• Is there any contact between the municipality and industry involving risk? 
• How does the municipality communicate municipal emergency management 
plans to the citizens? 
  
Trust 
• How is the relationship between the inspectors and the municipal emergency 
management staff? 
• Is the municipality open with regards to weaknesses in the municipal 
emergency management? 
• How do you assess the emergency management competence among the 
inspectors? 
• Do you think the regulatory tools and strategies are able to reveal latent 
conditions within the municipality? 
• Are the everyday work situation and the demands from mandatory and 
voluntary work operations you experience in accordance with the view the 
regulator expresses about the municipality? (Compound pressure between 
resources and demands) 
 
Learning 
• How does the municipality evaluate the municipal emergency management 
subsequent to emergency exercises and undesired events? 
• Does the municipality implement risk mitigation measures subsequent to 
emergency exercises and undesired events?   
• Could you tell me if the municipality increases work within emergency 
management prior and subsequent to regulatory inspections? What happens? 
• How does the municipality work within municipal emergency management 
in the period between inspections? 
• Does the municipality do something special to keep a systematic attention 
towards municipal emergency management? 
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• How does the regulator contribute to the learning processes within the 
municipality? 
• What kind of factors do you believe would improve the municipal 
emergency management within your municipality? 
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Appendix II 
 
Interview guide – municipal emergency 
management (regulator) 
 
Introduction 
• Purpose 
• Use of data 
• Anonymity 
 
Background of the informant 
• Education 
• Previous work experience 
• Present position/responsibility  
• Number of years in current position 
 
Background information about the county 
• Size 
• Geographic locality 
• Structure 
• Economy 
• Number of employees within regulator related to municipal emergency 
management  
• Have you participated in inspections? 
 
Views about the status of the municipal emergency management 
• How do the municipalities emphasize municipal emergency management 
work tasks? 
• Why do you think they perform the municipal emergency management work 
tasks? 
• Does municipal emergency management usually satisfy regulatory demands? 
• Do municipalities apply municipal emergency management plans as a tool in 
their ordinary management processes? 
• What kind of benefits do you think the municipalities find in working on the 
municipal emergency management? 
• How do you assess their emergency management competence?  
• How does the regulator consider the link between municipal emergency 
management plans and the overall municipal plans? 
• What do you think are the most important reasons that affect the 
municipalities’ effort within municipal emergency management? 
• What do you think are barriers within the municipal emergency management 
causing a reduced work effort? 
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The regulator-regulatee interface 
• Could you describe the tools and strategies you employ? 
• What happens when you inspect the municipalities? 
• What kinds of documents are reviewed prior to the inspection? 
• What are the main priorities when you perform a system audit? 
• How do you provide feedback to the municipalities? 
• What happens in the aftermath of the inspection? Does any kind of follow-up 
activities exist?  
• What kinds of means are available in order to sanction non-compliance? 
• What kind of activities and contacts exist between the regulator and the 
municipalities? 
• Could you describe the degree to which you find the contact and activities 
satisfying? 
• Is it the regulatory inspectors or the municipal emergency managers that 
usually initiate contact in the interface? 
• How is the usual information flow? Written information exchange, 
telephone, e-mail, formal meetings, or informal meetings? 
• How would you characterize the dialogue between the regulator and the 
municipalities? 
• In what kind of occasions does the regulator have a dialogue with the 
municipalities? 
• How does the regulator perform guidance within municipal emergency 
management? 
• How does the regulator perform control activities? 
• How would you characterize the role of the regulator within municipal 
emergency management?  
• How do you assess present regulatory practice?  
 
Risk perception and communication? 
• What is the regulator’s strategy in order to make the municipalities perceive 
and manage new risks? 
• Does the regulator have any effect on how the municipalities perceive and 
manage risk? 
• How do you think the regulator effect the work effort and attention to 
emergency management work processes within the municipalities? 
• Is the regulator familiar with if there is any contact between the municipality 
and industry involving risk, located in the municipalities? 
• How do the municipalities communicate risk to the citizens? 
 
Trust  
• How does the regulator work to grow trust in the interface? 
• Does the regulator have trust in emergency management competence level 
within the municipalities? 
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• How does the regulator assess the municipalities’ ability to comply with 
regulatory demands? 
• How does the regulator vary the response to the single municipalities? Does 
variation occur? When? 
• Does the regulator apply the same regulatory practice regarding small, 
middle sized and large municipalities varying in type of risk and number of 
employees? 
• Do you think the regulator is able to see the correct picture of the municipal 
everyday situation? 
• Do you think the regulatory tools are able to grasp latent conditions within 
the municipalities? 
• How would you characterize the advantages and disadvantages concerning 
the regulatory tools? 
 
Learning 
• How would you characterize the ordinary municipal emergency 
management? 
• Do you think the municipalities’ work effort increases prior to and after 
control activities? 
• Does the regulator do anything in particular to keep continuous municipal 
emergency management awareness within the municipalities?  
• How do you think the regulator influences the learning processes within the 
municipalities? 
• What kinds of factors do you think would improve municipal emergency 
management? 
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Appendix III 
 
Interview guide – specialized healthcare 
(national regulator) 
 
Background of the informant 
• Position 
• Previous experience 
 
Responsibility and legislation 
• Could you describe your work and responsibility? 
• What are the legal acts most important for the Norwegian Board of Heath 
Supervision? 
• How do you assess the legislation in order to secure safety and quality in 
patient treatment? 
 
Risk areas 
• What is your perception of risk sources or areas involving high risk within 
healthcare? 
• What kind of errors do you think are most common? 
• How does the regulator expect the hospitals to map and assess risks? 
• Do you think there is a common perception of risk areas within the national 
level regulator, local level regulator, and the hospital? What kinds of 
discrepancies exist? 
• In what way does a divergent risk perception between system levels affect 
your way of approaching the local level regulator and the hospitals? 
(Contact, attention, ways of interaction) 
 
Regulatory tools and regulatory practice 
• What is your overall regulatory strategy?  
• How does it work? What is the objective? 
• How do you assess the methods used in regulatory practice according to 
patient safety? 
• What is the advantages and disadvantages and why? (System audit, event-
based inspection). 
• How does the national level regulator think about activities in the local-level 
regulator - hospital interface? (What kind of activities are acceptable, what 
type of contact, meetings, role performance and role conflicts?) 
• Are you familiar with the §2 in the Health Care Supervisory Act (1984) 
stating that the regulator should provide guidance and advice in connection 
with performing inspection activities? 
Appendix III 
 185 
• How do you plan and conduct such guidance and advice activities in 
connection with inspections and not as a part of inspection?  
• How could this aspect be improved? 
 
Leaning 
• The concept of a learning organization is often used in healthcare. What does 
learning organization mean to the national level regulator? 
• Who is supposed to be a learning organization? The entire system, the 
regulator, the hospitals? 
• How could learning processes be facilitated? 
• How does the mandatory error reports system contribute to learning 
processes within healthcare? 
• How do the healthcare staff and hospital receive feedback on reported errors 
from the regulator? 
• How does the national level regulator evaluate the way hospitals manage 
error and use this information in order to improve patient safety practice? 
• How does the hospital quality committee presently contribute to learning 
from errors and undesired events? 
 
Proactive risk management  
• How does the national level regulator conceive the hospitals’ effort to 
prevent medical error? 
• Has there been a change in the past years? Why? 
• How can the national level regulator contribute to improved proactive risk 
management within the hospitals? 
• How do you think activities between the local level regulator and the 
hospital improve patient safety? 
• What factors do you think are the most important in order to improve patient 
safety in the Norwegian healthcare? 
• How is the process going on a new national mandatory error reporting 
system? What is new? What will happen in the future? 
 
Appendix IV 
 186 
Appendix IV 
 
Interview guide – specialized healthcare 
(local level regulator) 
 
Background of the informant 
• Position 
• Experience  
• Number of years in current position 
• Description of current work responsibility 
 
Legislation, risk, report system 
• Could you describe what you think are common types of risk sources in 
hospitals?  
• Which risk sources do you think are most prominent and involve the highest 
patient risk? 
• How often do you think medical errors occur? (Patient deaths, severe injury, 
minor injury, near misses) 
• What type of risks obtains most attention in order to be prevented? (The 
severe seldom occurring/ minor often occurring) 
• How does the type of risk and number of events affect the regulator’s contact 
with the hospital? 
• What are the legally established responsibilities for hospitals within patient 
safety? 
• How are the institutions informed about this responsibility? 
• Could you tell me about the regulator’s responsibilities and duties towards 
the hospital? 
• What is the regulatory demand in order for hospitals to establish an internal 
error report system? 
• How do you think the error report system affects patient safety? 
• How does the mandatory error report system work? 
• What is the procedure for mandatory error reporting and feedback? 
• Does the regulator facilitate any kind of training or education regarding error 
reporting? (why/why not) 
• What does the regulator expect the hospital to do after medical errors have 
occurred, in order to learn from these? 
• How does the regulator investigate medical errors? What is the purpose? 
How do you collect information? What happens? What kinds of measures 
are implemented? 
• How does the regulator consider the role of the hospital quality committee 
within patient safety? How should it be? 
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The regulator - regulatee interface, tools, activities, roles 
• How frequent is the contact between the regulator and the hospital? 
• How would you characterize the contact and how is it usually performed? 
(Person-to-person, written, e-mail, telephone, meetings, inspections, reports 
etc.) 
• Could you describe different approaches the regulator applies in the 
regulator-regulatee interface? Please give examples. (Dialogue, guidance, 
control activities, system audit, event-based inspection)  
• How do you use these different tools/methods? 
• How do you think your methods reveal latent conditions and weaknesses 
within the hospital organization? 
• What is the purpose of the inspection reports? 
• How do you think inspection reports are applied to improve patient safety? 
• Could you describe your different roles as inspector? (Expert, consultant, 
authority) 
• How can these different roles influence patient safety effort within the 
hospital?  
• Does the regulator facilitate arenas such as courses, training, exercises, etc. 
to increase competence within patient safety issues? (If so, how does it occur 
and to what extent?) 
• Could you tell me to what degree you consider that the regulator operates in 
a proactive or reactive way? 
• Could you tell me about ways of sanctioning and how these prevent the 
recurrence of medical errors? 
• How does the regulator stimulate the hospital to seek new solutions to 
manage risk? 
• Could you exemplify specific risk mitigation measures the hospital has 
implemented to improve the patient safety level? 
 
Leaning/experience transfer 
• Are you familiar with arenas for experience transfer within the hospital? 
• Are you familiar with any arenas for experience transfer between the hospital 
and the regulator?  
• How do these work and what kind of information is transferred? 
• What kind of activities contributes to experience transfer in the hospital-
regulator interface? 
• What kinds of barriers hamper experience transfer? 
• What do you think are important factors in patient safety learning processes? 
 
Competence, organizational size, resources, media publicity 
• How would you characterize the regulator’s oversight regarding the hospital? 
(The hospital ordinary work situation, pressures etc.) 
• How does the size of the regulated organization affect your oversight? 
• How would you characterize the regulator’s resource situation? (Time, 
money, staff) 
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• How would you characterize the resource situation within the hospital? 
• Do you think the resource situation is sufficient to establish an acceptable 
level of patient safety? 
• To what degree would you say that the regulator holds a sufficient 
competence in patient safety issues? 
• How would you describe the patient safety competence within the hospital in 
order to be able to perform proactive risk management? 
• How does media publicity affect patient safety? (From the regulator’s point 
of view, within the hospital and the healthcare employees) 
• How do you think external stakeholders and political attention affect patient 
safety? (Within the hospital, between the hospital and regulator, within the 
regulator) 
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Appendix V 
 
Interview guide – specialized healthcare 
(hospital top management and division 
management) 
 
Background of the informant 
• Education 
• Position 
• Experience 
 
Responsibility, legislation, risk  
• Could you describe your responsibility and your work? 
• Could you mention the legal acts most important to patient safety and 
quality? (Directed towards the individual and organizational level) 
• Could you describe what you think are common types of risk sources within 
the hospital? 
• How often do you think medical errors occur? (Patient deaths, severe injury, 
minor injury, near misses) 
• Do you know what type of errors are most common? 
• How does the hospital map and analyze risk? 
• Is there a common conceptualization of medical error between the hospital 
and the regulator?  
• In cases of discrepancy, how does it affect the hospital – regulator interface? 
(Methods, attention, contact) 
 
Error report system, learning 
• What kind of regulatory demands exist for error reporting?  
• What is the role of the regulator regarding error reporting? 
• What kind of procedures exists to report? 
• How does the regulator provide feedback to the hospital regarding 
mandatory error reports? 
• Does any kind of education or courses exist to educate employees in 
mandatory error reporting and the internal error report system? E.g. what 
type of events should be reported, how to report. Is the regulator involved?  
• How do you think error-reporting influences working on patient safety? How 
useful is this activity? 
• How does the error reporting systems contribute to learning from errors 
within the hospital?  
• How is the obtained information applied to improve patient safety?  
• How does the person who reported receive feedback?  
• How does the hospital quality committee contribute to learning from errors? 
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• How does the quality committee manage errors and circulate the information 
across hospital divisions and wards? 
• What is the role of the quality committees at the division level?  
• How do they influence the patient safety work? 
 
Experience transfer/learning 
• Does any arena exist for experience transfer regarding patient safety issues? 
• Does any arena exist for experience transfer between the hospital and the 
regulator? 
• What kinds of activities contribute to experience transfer? 
• How does the regulator contribute to experience transfer? 
• What kind of barriers hamper experience transfer and learning processes 
within the hospital? 
 
The regulator – hospital interface, tools, activities 
• How do you perceive the regulator’s overall strategy? What is the objective? 
• How would you characterize the regulatory strategies and tools? 
• How do these contribute to improve patient safety and quality of healthcare 
services?  
• Could you say something about advantages and disadvantages? 
• How do you think the relationship between the regulator and the hospital 
should be? (Type of contact, activities, meetings, guidance/control) 
• How does the regulator provide advice and guidance? (During system audit 
and when the hospital asks for guidance) 
• How do you think activities between the hospital and regulator affect patient 
safety processes within the hospital? 
• How does the hospital perform proactive risk management to prevent 
medical error? 
• Is this an area in which you have seen changes in past years? How? 
• How can the regulator improve the proactive risk management within the 
hospital? 
• What factors do you think are the most important in order to improve patient 
safety? 
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Appendix VI 
 
Interview guide – specialized healthcare 
(middle management, staff level) 
 
Background of the informant 
• Age 
• Gender 
• Education 
• Profession 
• Number of work hours when you are on duty 
• Work experience 
• Permanently employed/temporary 
 
Amount and categorization of medical errors/undesired events 
• How would you in you own words define medical error in your ward? 
• Do you think the other employees and managers at your ward define medical 
error as you do? What do you think would be different? 
• Do you know if medical errors happen within your ward, other wards, within 
your profession, or other professions? Could you give examples? 
• Would you say that some types of medical errors occur more often than 
others? Which and why? 
• Based on the fact that medical errors occur within healthcare – what are your 
thoughts on the reasons why they occur? 
• What kind of situations do you think involve the larges potential of the 
occurrence of medical errors? (E.g. at the end of the duty, at night, when 
understaffed, etc.) 
• Have you personal experience with medical errors? (Yourself or being 
around when others have made mistakes) 
• How do you report medical error? What kind of routines do you follow? 
• Have you ever reported a medical error you or one of your colleagues has 
committed? Have you ever omitted to report a reportable error?  
• In what way are near misses managed? How do you think they should be 
managed? 
• How is the available information about medical errors and near misses used? 
Is there any kind of feedback to the person who reported or the ward? 
• How do you think work experience affect if employees perceive situations as 
a patient risk? Why and how? 
• What kind of use do you find in error reporting? Positive and negative 
• What are your thoughts on if error reporting should be open or anonymous? 
• What are your thoughts on underreporting? To what degree do you think it 
exists? 
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• What do you think are reasons why underreporting might occur? (e.g. fear of 
media coverage, bad reputation, reprisals, lack of time if they do not have 
examples themselves) 
 
Human and organizational factors related to managing medical 
errors 
• Are there any circumstances (managers, colleagues, regulators, media etc.) 
that affect your perception of medical error? 
• How do your managers (top, division, middle) encourage you to report 
medical errors? How are error reports treated?  
• Would you say that there is an open climate to discuss medial errors at your 
ward? 
• How are the employees informed about and trained within error reporting?  
• If you were going to report an error, when would you do it? Immediately, if 
you a quiet period on your call, when you are off duty? 
• Would you say that new efficiency demands have caused changes in 
priorities regarding safe patient treatment? Could you give examples? 
• Have there been any changes with regards to the workforce situation within 
your ward the past years? Could you exemplify how that has influences your 
work situation? 
• How does stress affect the occurrence of medical errors and the degree of 
reporting medical errors? 
• What kind of factors are the most present in hampering the management of 
errors? Why? 
• What kind of factors do you think strengthen the management of errors? 
Why? 
 
Experience transfer related to medical error 
• How do employees discuss medical errors within the group and with the 
managers? 
• How does experience transfer take place between you and your most 
important colleagues/wards that your work depends on? 
• Does any experience transfer regarding medical errors take place across 
wards, departments, and divisions? How does it happen? Formally or 
informally? 
• In what kind of arenas do you discuss issues regarding near misses, medical 
errors, and patient safety? (Ward meetings, formal meeting within the 
professions, informal discussions within the professional group etc.) 
• How do these arenas work? Is there any difficulties concerning performance, 
priorities, results etc.? 
 
Power and power relations and their influence on error 
management 
• Do you think some professional groups have a higher degree of error 
reporting than others? Why? 
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• Are employees in any kind of way encouraged to suggest improvements of 
routines and procedures? 
• Have you experienced conflicts regarding managerial decisions and 
guidelines and what you think is the right in order to perform safe patient 
treatment? 
• Do you think there exist any kind of collegial cover-ups or concealment of 
each other’s medical errors? 
• What kind of reactions, formal and informal, might occur if you are open and 
discuss your own and others’ mistakes? 
 
The role of the risk regulator regarding management of medical 
errors 
• What kind of relationship exists between your ward and the regulator? In 
what kind of cases involve the regulator? Who is in contact with the 
regulator? 
• Have you ever been in contact with the regulator? Local level or national 
level? Why and what was your experience? 
• Is there any contact between the ward and the regulator in forms of follow up 
activities to improve previous medical errors and prevent medical errors? 
• How would you say that it is useful for your ward to interact with the 
regulator (e.g. inspections, inspection reports)? Has this been positive or 
negative? 
• How does the regulator influence the focus of error management? Is there 
any case that attracted your attention towards specific types of errors more 
than others? 
• Do you know if the regulator has any sanctioning means available? How 
does that affect your work?  
• How do you think the regulator influences the error management within your 
ward? 
